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SUMMARY
This thesis explores the management of solid waste in Addis Ababa, with the objective of 
understanding the underlying reasons for the poor solid waste management situation that the 
city is faced with today. Accordingly, governance and urban political ecology are used as a 
theoretical framework. Governance was chosen because currently it dominates the 
development discourse and governance policies are implemented by governments aiming to 
improve urban services, whereas urban political ecology is used to explore how governance 
processes operate within solid waste management in the city. In order to understand the 
reasons for the decisions and actions that have taken place within solid waste management 
and to understand better the present-day situation, I focus on exploring actors’ subjective 
views, the nature of the power relationships between them, and politics at various scales.  
An ethnographic approach is used to explore the subjective perspectives of the actors 
involved in solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The main method used was semi-
structured interviews, which were designed to collect the subjective views of the participants 
involved and identify conflicting interests. In addition, personal observations and document 
and newspaper reviews were used. The methods were used to compare the subjective views 
and official norms with my observations made in the field. The analysis of data started in the 
field, using constant comparative method, whereby all interviews were compared within a 
group of actors and between groups of actors and then related to the research context. This 
was considered a logical way to make sense of and order the information in order to confirm 
or dispute it, and was also one of the techniques used to ensure the reliability of the data 
collected.
The main findings of the study are described in the five articles that are attached to this 
thesis. All of the articles address the formal rules, regulations, and policies officially adopted 
to improve solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The official rules and regulations are 
compared with the findings of a detailed study of how they are adopted and implemented, by 
focusing on the various actors’ subjective views and agendas and how these are acted upon 
based on the distribution of power between them. The articles address different aspects of 
solid waste management, including attempts to enter into partnership with the private sector 
(Articles 1 and 2), attempts to plan a new solid waste management system (Article 3), the 
relationship between the city administration and the informal recycling sector (Article 3), 
international organizations’ involvement in improving solid waste in the city (Article 4) and 
how dominant discourses such as neoliberalism and good governance have affected solid 
waste management in different African cities (Article 5). The articles show how power and 
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politics affect the way that solid waste is managed in Addis Ababa, and I argue that the 
promise of good governance has not resulted in the official goals being attained, but rather a 
rhetorical use of policies and reforms. The Ethiopian Government has adapted good 
governance policies to suite its own interests and agendas, and this has not led to improved 
governance and a more efficient management of solid waste in the city. This thesis 
contributes to an understanding of the underlying reasons for the poor solid waste 
management in Addis Ababa today, and the identification of aspects and strategies that should 
be in place in order to improve solid waste management and to achieve more equitable 
development among the various actors` involved. I conclude by arguing for a more critical 
approach in studies of urban services, where the focus should be on both the politics and 
power relationships among involved actors and on the politics of scales. 
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1PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In Addis Ababa solid waste management during the last 10 years has undergone several 
reforms and organizational changes in line with neoliberal and good governance policies, with 
the aim of improving the urban services provided in the city. Today, the service provided has 
not changed for the better. This study aims to explore and give a critical view of solid waste 
management in Addis Ababa in the period 2004 to 2011, to understand better the reasons for 
the weaknesses in the services provided. The study is framed within governance and urban 
political ecology perspectives and my aim has been to provide a detailed study of the various 
formal and informal actors’  involved in solid waste in Addis Ababa, as well as  their agendas 
and actions within the city. In particular, I focus on the interactions between actors, seen in 
light of the distribution of power. This is done in order to analyse how the governance process 
operates in the local context and hence to understand better the solid waste situation 
confronting the city administration today.
This thesis comprises an overview and a collection of five articles that can be read 
independently. The articles deal with the empirical findings of the study and are mostly 
empirical in nature. The overview therefore serves as the main theoretical framework for the 
study, whereas the articles can be seen as the empirical findings. Accordingly, the thesis is 
organized into two main sections: the overview and the articles. Readers are recommended to 
start by reading the overview, then read the articles, and thereafter return to the final section 
in the overview, which gives a synthesis of the articles and presents the conclusion of the 
thesis. Since the articles have been written to be read independently, there are some 
unavoidable repetitions in the articles and the overview due to the need to provide readers 
with contextual background information and to ensure continuity between the parts of the 
thesis.
The overview is organized in five sections: an introduction (i.e. this introduction); 
presentation of the theoretical framework; a description of the research context; description of 
the methodology; and a synthesis of the five articles. I start the introduction (Part One) by 
describing the main approaches to the management of solid waste in Africa. I include a 
discussion of the various debates in the field, before positioning the study and presenting the 
objectives and research questions. The aim of the theoretical framework section (Part Two) is 
to discuss the main concept and theory used in the study, namely governance and urban 
political ecology. I also clarify my understanding of governance and urban political ecology, 
and present an analytical framework for how they are combined and used in the study, 
simultaneously relating them to solid waste management in urban areas in Africa. I regard the 
2research context as important for gaining a broader understanding of the findings in the study 
and therefore a description of the research context is included. Part Three focuses on a 
description of the organization of city administration in Addis Ababa as well as the official 
policies and reforms, and a detailed description of the formal and informal solid waste 
management systems in the city. Part Four, the methodology section, describes how the 
research was conducted, including the process of collecting and interpreting the data. Finally, 
in Part Five, I present a synthesis of the five articles included in the research. I briefly 
describe the articles and explain how they are interrelated. Thereafter, I discuss the main 
findings of the research in relation to the theoretical framework. I conclude by referring to the 
minimum conditions that I consider have to be in place in order for the management of solid 
waste in Addis Ababa to be improved.  
1.1 APPROACHES TO SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA  
African cities are faced with increased generation of solid waste and solid waste has become 
one of the most serious challenges facing urban governments (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 
2012; UN-Habitat, 2010a, 2010b; World Bank, 2004; Kpundeh & Khadiagala, 2008). The 
situation is characterized by a low collection rate and poor disposal of solid waste, resulting 
large amounts of waste accumulating in urban environments, thrown away either in rivers or 
in open spaces. Such insufficient handling of solid waste is polluting the urban environments 
and making the cities unhealthy places for the citizens. Today, the generation of waste per 
capita is low compared to cities in other parts of the world. However, with the urbanization 
processes taking place, improvement in living conditions and the adoption of modern 
lifestyles, problems related to solid waste management are becoming more serious and will 
increase in the years to come (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 2012).
The approaches to dealing with solid waste have changed the last 50 years (i.e. since the 
early 1960s). In the 1970s and 1980s the main responsibility for providing solid waste 
services rested upon local governments. The most common approach was a technical ‘end of 
pipe’ approach, including collection, transportation, and disposal of solid waste. With the 
growth of cities, the amount of waste generated also increased and solid waste was 
increasingly becoming a problem related to citizens’ health and pollution of urban 
environments. This situation was worsened by the lack of proper urban planning, resulting in 
the prevalence of slum areas that made access to many of the neighbourhoods difficult, and in 
turn leaving large parts of the cities without access to solid waste services. The poor solid 
3waste services were also due to lack of resources, the lack of ability to pay for such services, 
and low awareness among the citizens.  
During the 1980s it was acknowledged that most local governments were not able to 
provide sufficient solid waste services, due to lack of resources, lack of institutional capacity, 
and inefficiency in terms of bureaucracy (Myers, 2005; Post, 2004). There was increased 
awareness of the poor urban services and the state was seen as the main obstacle to improving 
the services provided. Neoliberalism was established as the dominant political and ideological 
approach to development and improvements to urban services. The main aim of the neoliberal 
ideology was to privatize public services, according to the belief at the time that the private 
sector and the free market were the most cost-efficient ways to provide urban services. The 
implementation of neoliberal policies and reforms led to significant reorganizations of the 
state institutions and their responsibility, where the emphasis was on the market and the 
retreat of the national state in line with neoliberal ideas. Within solid waste management, the 
neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) led to the involvement of 
private actors in the provision of urban services in many cities (Batley, 1996; Baud, Grafakos, 
& Post, 2005; Myers, 2005; Post, 2004). However, the results of the policies and programmes 
were disappointing. In many cases, they resulted in growth in the informal economy and 
increased inequality between urban citizens in terms of services provided, excluding those 
unable to pay for solid waste services. Thus, neoliberal policies had reshaped and restructured 
institutional infrastructure, norms, and regulations, but had failed to produce a coherent basis 
for development and growth. It was argued that the neoliberal ideology rested upon a utopian 
vision of a perfect market and a society rooted in an idealized conception of competitive 
individualism. In most cases, there was a big gap between the ideology of neoliberalism and 
everyday practice (Grindle, 2007).
As a response to the unwanted results of SAPs, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced governance as a new concept in the development discourse. 
If states were no longer able to provide adequate urban services, they were to be held 
responsible for promoting good solutions in partnership with non-state actors, in order to 
improve the provision of urban services. This led to a focus on the involvement of new actors 
within solid waste management, and recognition of the possibility of using urban services 
such as solid waste management to create jobs among the unemployed within cities and 
thereby reduce poverty (Schûbeler, Wehrle, & Christen, 1996; Thomas-Hope, 1998; World 
Bank, 2004). The involvement of new actors such as community-based organizations (CBOs) 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the creation of micro- and small-scale 
4enterprises (MSSEs) and cooperatives led to new roles and responsibilities among the actors 
involved in solid waste management. The focus therefore changed, and governance and 
subsequently ‘good governance’ were introduced in order to improve the capacity of 
governments and to reorganize governmental institutions with the aim of improving their 
accountability, transparency, legitimacy, and adherence to laws. In this way, it was hoped to 
bring the governance processes closer to the people and improve the level of participation of 
non-state actors. Good governance has led to new ways of managing urban services, with the 
aim of improving the services provided, and it remains to be seen whether good governance 
will result in improved service provision in urban areas (Hoornweg & Bhada-Tata, 2012; Van 
de Klundert & Anschûtz, 2001; Myers, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2010a).
The next section presents an overview of the literature related to solid waste management 
in urban areas in developing countries. The focus is on the relevant debates within the field, in 
order to identify gaps within the literature where I consider that more emphasis should be 
given and where my research will contribute to fill such gaps.  
1.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES AND CURRENT DEBATES WITHIN SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
In recent decades solid waste management has been given more attention due to both the 
increased visibility of solid waste in urban landscapes and increased awareness of the 
negative effects that poor management of solid waste have on urban environments, the image 
of cities, and public health. A broad body of literature can be found on solid waste 
management and there is agreement that solid waste management is complex and has 
technical, social, political, and economic aspects that need to be taken into consideration. My 
aim is not to examine the various approaches to solid waste management, but rather to focus 
on the literature that deals with how the management has been approach over the years and 
studies related to service provision in urban areas. It is possible to identify three main areas of 
interest that dominate the studies: exploration and description of the informal recycling sector 
and its contribution in the management of solid waste; the involvement of non-state actors in 
providing solid waste services; and the provision of solid waste services seen in the light of 
good governance. The literature clearly reflects that neoliberal and good governance policies 
have affected how solid waste is managed locally. In the following section, I give a brief 
description of the main debates within the three areas, with emphasis on their contribution to 
the topics.  
51.2.1 RECOGNIZING THE INFORMAL RECYCLING SECTOR AS A POTENTIAL 
PARTNER  
Solid waste is seen as a valuable resource for many people that make a living by collecting 
waste for reuse and recycling. It has been estimated that as much as 1% of the urban 
population in developing countries depends on waste collection for reuse and recycling as part 
of their daily livelihood (Medina, 2007). In most cities in developing countries, the informal 
recycling sector has developed highly organized systems for the collection, trade, and 
recycling of solid waste. There is a broad body of studies focusing on describing and 
exploring the organization of and activities performed by the informal recycling sector 
(Gutberlet, 2010; Kaseva & Gupta, 1996; Nzeadibe, 2009; Ojeda-Benitez, Armijo-de-Vega, 
& Ramírez-Barreto, 2002; Sembiring & Nitivattananon, 2010; Troschinetz & Mihelcic, 
2009). DiGregorio (1994) describes the organization of the informal recycling sector in 
northern Vietnam and provides a broader understanding of the way the sector is organized and 
the various activities involved. Medina (1997, 2007) also explores the sector, but in most of 
his studies the main focus has been on the role of the informal recycling sector and its impact 
on solid waste management overall. He has shown that the informal recycling sector 
contributes to improved solid waste management by reducing the quantities of waste needed 
to be collected, transported, and disposed of, by supplying industry with raw materials at a 
low cost, by reducing the demand for raw materials needed to be imported from abroad, by 
supplying the market with recycled products at a lower price, and by creating jobs and 
livelihoods for urban citizens (Medina, 2007). Many other studies have been conducted in line 
with Medina’s approach (Kaseva, Mbuligwe, & Kassenga, 2002; Samson, 2009; Scheinberg, 
Spies, Simpson, & Mol, 2011), and have contributed to our understanding of the reasons for 
people’s involvement in the sector, the varieties of activities they undertake, and their 
contribution to overall solid waste management in cities.  
There has been a growing focus on the relationships between the informal recycling sector 
and local authorities, where studies have shown that in many cases the informal recycling 
sector is repressed, neglected, or ignored by city officials (Medina, 2007). For example, 
Samson (2009) shows that the informal actors in different cities in South Africa had been 
denied access to a municipal landfill and thereby denied the right to make a livelihood. Many 
researchers and international organizations have therefore called for recognition and support 
of the informal recycling sector (Imam, Mohammed, Wilson, & Cheeseman, 2008; Medina, 
2007; Nzeadibe, 2009; Samson, 2009, 2010). Their emphasis has been on the positive role 
played by the informal sector, and hence there has been a call for policies aimed at 
6recognition and formalization of the informal recycling sector, and entering into partnerships 
with them as a strategy to improve overall solid waste management in cities (Baud, Grafakos, 
Hordijk, & Post, 2001; Medina, 2000; Sembiring & Nitivattananon, 2010). It is clear that if 
partnerships are successful, the outcome will be advantageous to both sectors and result in 
increased waste collection and recycling rates, create employment, and increase 
environmental awareness and social responsibility. However, studies have shown that 
implementing partnerships has not been easy (Post, Obirih-Opareh, Ikiara, & Broekema, 
2005). Baud et al. (2005) show that partnerships can be challenging due to the informal nature 
of the sector, the informal sector`s lack of organization, hostile attitudes towards informal 
actors, and lack of trust between the actors. This has led to studies focusing on the issue of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) within solid waste management (Azam & Mansoor, 2004).  
1.2.2 PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) IN SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
A growing number of scholars and international organizations have, in line with neoliberal 
policies, focused on the role of non-state actors in service delivery. There is growing support 
for policies aimed at entering into partnerships with non-state actors, in the belief that the best 
outcome for both sectors will be gained by combining the efficiency and experience of the 
business world with public interests (Azam & Mansoor, 2006). Brinkerhoff (2002: 14) defines 
partnership as: 
a dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objectives, perused 
through a shared understanding of most rational division of labor based on the respective 
comparative advantages of each partner. This relationship results in mutual influence, with a 
careful balance between synergy and respective autonomy which incorporates mutual respect, 
equal participation in decision making, mutual accountability and transparency. 
Based on Brinkerhoff’s definition, mutuality is understood as an important concept in efforts 
to achieve good partnerships. According to Nabeel (2004), mutuality means that all partners 
have an opportunity to influence shared objectives, have a mutual dependency, and mutual 
rights and responsibility. However, these conditions rarely exist in the real world, where there 
is distrust, mutual disrespect, and self-interest, as well as conflicting objectives and unequal 
power relations among actors, and are some of the problems reflected in the studies conducted 
to date. 
7Most published studies of solid waste management have focused on the relationships 
between the actors in PPPs and the role of non-state actors in solid waste management. The 
emphasis has been on exploring the service given by non-state actors and identifying 
obstacles, with a view to improving partnerships and services (Azam & Mansoor, 2004, 2006; 
Baud et al., 2001, 2005; Baudouin, Bjerkli, Habtemariam, Frank, & Chekole, 2008; Henry, 
Yongsheng, & Jun, 2006; Kaseva & Mbuligwe, 2005; Van de Klundert & Inge, 1995; 
Massoud, El-Fadel, & Abdel Malak, 2003; Oteng-Ababio, 2010; Post, 1999; Post et al., 2005; 
Zelalem, 2006). The studies show that more or less all cities have undergone changes in how 
they manage their waste and where non-state actors such as the private sector, informal actors, 
CBOs, and NGOs have been included in order to improve the services provided. The studies 
have also given us an understanding of the varieties of partnerships that exist between state 
and non-state actors. Several studies have shown that the nature of partnerships is not as 
idealistic as defined by Brinkerhoff (2002). Baudouin, Bjerkli, Zelalem, & Yirgalem (2010) 
show how the relationships between the informal recycling sector and the city administration 
have shifted from neglect to control, relating them to the changing political situation in Addis 
Ababa. Post et al. (2005) and Baabereyir (2012) show how privatization has resulted in the 
exclusion of some actors and uneven service delivery due to the ability of some to pay for 
solid waste services. In cases where high-income areas are provided with better services than 
poor income areas, it has resulted in increased inequality among citizens regarding access to 
service delivery. Thus, the studies have revealed that it is not easy to arrange PPPs, due to 
lack of trust between the various actors, ignorance on the part of some actors, differing 
interests, and the fact that the implementation and outcomes of PPPs are closely related to the 
context in which the partnerships occur (Baud et al., 2005; Post et al., 2005). Whereas most 
studies conclude that the involvement of non-state actors has resulted in improved solid waste 
management in terms of the amount of waste collected in cities, there is still a long way to go 
in order to achieve successful partnerships (Halla & Majani, 1999; Kaseva & Mbuligwe, 
2005; Massoud et al., 2003). Most studies focusing on PPPs refers to lack of good governance 
as the main obstacle to successful partnerships. Post et al. (2005) argue that highly centralized 
governmental structures have resulted in needs on the ground not being taken into 
consideration when plans and decisions are made, leading to lack of accountability and lack 
of trust towards government. Further, Azam & Mansoor (2004) argue that a weak legal 
framework and lack of capacity on the part of government, makes it difficult to integrate non-
state actors and to manage such new networks of partnerships efficiently. 
81.2.3 REFUSE AND THE PROMISE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Studies with a governance approach to solid waste are gaining increased attention. Most 
studies have examined either the way neoliberal and good governance policies have affected 
solid waste management in cities or how a poor solid waste management can be explained 
due to lack of good governance. Examination of the literature related to governance shows 
there is agreement that the various aspects of good governance are critical for improving the 
solid waste services provided in cities, including accountability, transparency, the rule of law, 
legitimacy, and increased capacity of governmental institutions (Adama, 2007; A. Allen, 
Hofmann, & Griffiths, 2008; Bhuiyan, 2010; Davies, 2008; Kironde & Yhdego, 1997; Manga, 
Forton, & Read, 2008; Njeru, 2006; Onibokun, 1999). Onibokun (1999) explores solid waste 
management in Abidjan, Ibadan, Dar es Salaam, and Johannesburg from a governance 
perspective, and through four case studies shows how solid waste management has been 
privatized and reorganized as a result of neoliberal policies. Despite the structural changes, 
the uneven distribution of resources for service provision has persisted and resulted in 
exclusion of the urban poor. Onibokun concludes that lack of governance is the root of most 
problems within solid waste management in all four cities. In referring to highly centralized 
government structures where local governments are dependent on central government for 
revenues and resources and where there is a lack of qualified employees due to upward 
accountability. Myers (2005) gives a detailed and critical analysis of the United Nations 
Sustainable Cities Programme in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, and Lusaka. He also shows how 
neoliberalism, sustainable development and good governance have led to new ways of 
managing solid waste in the three cities. Further, Myers shows that privatization of waste 
services has led to increased segregation of poor areas due to the inability of the poor to pay 
for waste services, and that the promotion of good governance has led to the opposite of what 
it promises. He argues that the authoritarian nature of the state and the political culture within 
the cities has persisted, thus preventing any improvements in solid waste management. He 
concludes by arguing that political culture and power relationships are closely related to the 
management of urban services such as solid waste.  
The studies conducted in these three areas have contributed to our understanding of the 
complexity of solid waste management and the fact that solid waste has become an important 
issue due to the implications for public health and urban environments. It is also 
acknowledged that solid waste is an important source of income for many urban poor and the 
sector is seen as having the potential to create even more jobs in order to reduce poverty.
9Further, there is agreement that improved solid waste management cannot be achieved by 
municipalities alone but needs to be done in cooperation with non-state actors (Azam & 
Manssor, 2006; Post, 1999). There is growing agreement that the services provided are 
closely related to the governance processes locally, arguing that the way governance is 
adopted and implemented in the local context is affected by conflicting interests, power 
relationships, culture, and politics that affect the implementation of reforms and policies. 
Studies have shown that there is growing inequality among citizens, whereby some actors 
(usually the elite) are treated as potential partners, whereas other actors (usually the poor) are 
ignored and excluded from participation in development processes (Devas, 2005; Myers, 
2005; Post et al., 2005; Baabereyir, 2012). This has led to a debate and the notion of ‘the right 
to the city’, where the focus is on understanding the reasons for the uneven development and 
identifying strategies to achieve more equal development for all citizens (Brown & Rakodi, 
2006; Parnell & Pieterse, 2010). There is an agreement that solid waste is complex and the 
strategies to improve solid waste management should extend beyond merely technical 
approaches. The main focus today is on different aspects of good governance, such as 
accountability, transparency, rule of law, legitimacy, and responsiveness, in order to improve 
the partnerships and the capacity of both local governments and service providers in order to 
achieve more equitable and improved solid waste services in cities (UN-Habitat, 2010a, 
2010b; World Bank, 2004). Although the idealistic aim of governance is widely known, how 
the processes operate in practice is poorly understood. In order to be able to understand how 
the governance processes operates within solid waste management in a given context, a 
critical approach to the governance processes is required. The focus should therefore be on the 
power relations among the actors involved in order to understand the decisions taken and the 
service provided, and the reasons behind them.  
1.3 STUDIES OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT IN ETHIOPIA
The available studies of solid waste management in Ethiopia are limited to Addis Ababa. One 
of the first studies was carried out by Norconsult in the 1980s and dealt with waste generation 
using a technical approach to the management of solid waste in the city (Norconsult, 1981, 
1982). Since then, limited research has been conducted on solid waste, and mainly by Addis 
Ababa City Administration, local NGOs, and students preparing master’s dissertations 
(Aklilu, 2002; Selamavit, 2007; Bjerkli, 2005; Enda Ethiopia, 1999; ILO, 2007, 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2009; Melaku, 2008; Kinfe, 2002; Mesfin, 2006; Samuel, 2006; 
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SBPDA, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e; Solomon, 2006; Teka, 2006; Yared, 
2007; Yirgalem, 2001; Zelalem, 2006).  
The studies of solid waste management in Addis Ababa to date have had a relatively 
narrow focus. Most of them tend to focus on the technical dimensions of the municipal solid 
waste management, such as estimating the amount of waste generated (Aklilu, 2002; Melaku, 
2008; Mesfin, 2006; Samuel, 2006; Yared, 2007), or systems that should be put in place (e.g. 
new sanitary landfill, transfer stations, composting sites, new trucks and containers, data on 
waste generation, and waste composition) in order to improve the capacity of the management 
in the city (Escalante, Rymkiewicz, & Kranert, 2011; Kinfe, 2002; SBPDA, 2004c, 2004d, 
2004e; Tadesse, 2004; Tilahun, 2009). Regassa, Sundarana, & Seboka (2012) show that the 
city suffers from poor solid waste management and refer to lack of data on waste generation, 
lack of recycling activities, lack of proper transport schedules, a poor sanitary landfill, and a 
low level of awareness among the citizens as the main obstacles. However, Regassa et al. do 
not explain why the problems have occurred or the reasons behind them. Although I agree 
that the above-mentioned problems should be dealt with as a matter of urgency, it seems too 
naive to believe that adopting technical recommendations would result in improved solid 
waste management in the city. Solid waste management is complex and, as shown in the 
literature review in the preceding section, has technical, social, economic, cultural, and 
political aspects.  
Some studies have followed the neoliberal discourse, and attempted to explore 
households’ willingness to pay for solid waste services as well as the role of the private sector 
in the provision of solid waste management in Addis Ababa (Aklilu, 2002; Selamavit, 2007; 
Solomon, 2006; Zelalem, 2006). These studies conclude that households are willing to pay for 
solid waste services and that the private sector has contributed to improve the waste situation 
in the city, but in order to improve the current situation more resources, improved technology, 
and increased awareness among the citizens are needed.
Another field of research, mainly conducted by local and international NGOs, has 
explored the organization of the informal recycling system, indentified the various actors and 
activities carried out by the sector, and focused on making recommendations on how to 
formalize the informal actors in order to improve the service provided and the working 
conditions of informal workers (Bjerkli, 2005; Enda Ethiopia, 1999; Escalante, et al., 2011; 
IGNIS, 2009; ILO, 2008c).
Most studies have focused on the technical aspects of the management of waste and 
followed the dominant discourses, such as privatization and participation, in line with 
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neoliberal policies. All such studies have tried to adopt the dominant discourses in Addis 
Ababa and as a result they have overlooked the social and political realities of solid waste on 
the ground. Very few studies take into consideration the broader historical, social, and 
political context. By ignoring these issues the authors are not able to understand the 
underlying reasons for the current solid waste situation, explain why these problems have 
occurred, and find solutions adapted to the local context. Although it is widely known that 
solid waste is inefficiently managed in Addis Ababa, the underlying reasons are poorly 
understood and a more critical approach to solid waste is needed in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the reasons for the current situation. 
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
Why is the management of solid waste management in Addis Ababa not improving? My 
interest in answering this question emerged after completing my master’s degree on solid 
waste management in Addis Ababa, in 2005. Given my background in geography and 
industrial ecology, I was interested in exploring and indentifying obstacles to improvements 
to the solid waste situation in the city. However, I had never spent time in an African city and 
had limited knowledge of Ethiopian history, culture, and ‘ways of doing’. Despite this, I 
thought it was possible to find a solution to the problems by conducting a material flow 
analysis of how waste flows in the city and identifying the obstacles, such as lack of 
containers and trucks. During my fieldwork I realized that I was making the same mistakes as 
many others had before me, due to the mistaken belief that adopting a Western approach and 
technology could solve Addis Ababa’s waste disposal problems. However, after spending 
time in the city I became more familiar with Ethiopian culture and started to question the 
management. For some time I was quite confused, because I was presented with ambitious 
plans and reports that were in line with current solid waste management practice 
internationally, but nothing really seemed to materialize on the ground. However, I became 
increasingly more aware of the gap between what was officially promoted and what was 
actually done, and this aroused my curiosity concerning the underlying reasons. This narrative 
reflects my own evolution in understanding solid waste management in Addis Ababa and the 
awareness was the main reason for my interest in conducting the research for this thesis.  
As discussed in the preceding section, good governance has become a ‘recipe’ for how 
governments should manage urban services. The literature review shows that most cities in 
Africa have undergone reorganization and implemented policies to improve governance and 
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urban services. However, the literature also shows that despite governments having adopted 
good governance policies, there have been few success stories. Rather, most studies refer to 
lack of good governance as one of the main obstacles to improving solid waste management, 
comparing the realities found on the ground with a normative view of partnership and good 
governance, and identifying the gaps that should be filled in order to improve service 
provision. Some researchers have called for a more critical approach to be applied and for 
studies of how the governance processes operate within urban services (Batley, McCourt, & 
Mcloughlin, 2012; Blundo & Meur, 2009). There is a need to ask why good governance 
policies are selected in the first place, how they are adopted and implemented, how they 
operate in a given context, and what is the outcome of the processes. Bringing politics into 
our understanding can lead us to new understandings of the reasons for weak urban service 
provision and enable us to identify obstacles to improvement (Batley et al., 2012). 
The research presented in this thesis aims to contribute to the current debate on the 
provision of urban services seen in a governance perspective. In order to understand the 
underlying reasons for the provision of solid waste disposal services, my aim is to explore 
official norms and regulations within solid waste and to compare these with the results of a 
detailed analysis of the governance processes and everyday practice within solid waste 
management in Addis Ababa. The purpose is to understand the ways in which decisions are 
made, the way practice is organized, who are considered partners in the processes, and the 
relationships between actors involved. I therefore focus particularly on exploring the 
complexity of actors’ subjective views and agendas, and the distribution of power between the 
actors. I examine how these aspects are negotiated in the local context and how the processes 
have affected solid waste management in the city.  
Based on the research objectives, I aim to explain and answer the following research 
questions:
1. What kind of administrative reforms and policies have been implemented since the 
start of the 21st century within solid waste management in Addis Ababa? What have 
been the underlying reasons for these reforms and policies and how has their 
implementation and the outcome affected solid waste management?  
2. How does governance operate within solid waste management in Addis Ababa, and in 
what way does this affect the management of solid waste in the city? 
3. What preconditions are needed in order to have successful partnerships and an 
improved solid waste management service in Addis Ababa?  
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1.5 CHOOSING FIELD SITES AND DELINEATING THE STUDY 
I chose to conduct my research in Addis Ababa. The main reason behind this choice is that it 
would build onto work carried out in Addis Ababa in 2004 for my master’s degree. In order to 
narrow the field of study, I chose to focus on waste generated by households and selected 
Addis Ketema Sub-City and three kebeles1 (01/03, 10/12, and 13/15) within the Sub-City 
(Figure 1). The reasons for choosing Addis Ketema Sub-City were that this Sub-City has the 
highest population density and it is where Männ alleh/allesh tära, an informal market for 
waste, is located. The three kebeles were selected on the basis of their socio-economic 
conditions, whereby kebele 01/03 is characterized by middle-income households, kebele
10/12 is characterized by commercial activities and low-income households, and kebele 13/15 
consists mainly of poor income households.  
                                                     
1 A kebele is the smallest unit of administration in Addis Ababa 
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FIGURE 1: Location of Addis Ababa, Addis Ketema Sub-City, and the studied kebeles.
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PART TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This study is framed with a governance and urban political ecology perspective (UPE). The 
concept of governance is central, since most cities have claimed to have adopted and 
implemented good governance policies to improve urban services. I therefore describe the 
concept as it is understood and promoted by various actors, and summarize by presenting my 
own understanding of and approach to the concept. Thereafter, I describe urban political 
ecology and argue why I consider that it provides a good theoretical framework for studying 
solid waste management in light of the governance processes taking place. Finally, I present 
an analytical framework, where I describe and argue how the various aspects within UPE and 
the concept of governance are seen in relation to each other and serve as a framework for my 
study of solid waste management in Addis Ababa.  
2.1 GOVERNANCE AND THE PROMISE OF DEVELOPMENT 
As a response to the failure of neoliberal policies and SAPs, the concept of governance was 
introduced in the development discourse as a way to promote development. The concept was 
first introduced by the Word Bank in the belief that governance could ensure the 
implementation of neoliberal policies. Governance was based on the argument that the ways 
in which state institutions worked were the main obstacle to the efficient management of 
urban services (Mkandawire, 2007; World Bank, 1992). The reappearance of the concept of 
‘corporate governance’ and its generalization in the development discourses in the 1990s led 
to multiple new definitions. Since then, governance has been a central concept at many levels 
and in many areas, such as global and local governance, and urban and rural governance, and 
when the term is used in a normative way there is even ‘bad governance’ and ‘good 
governance’. To date, there is no commonly agreed definition of governance. The World 
Bank (1992: 1) defines governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of countries’ economic and social resources for development’, whereas the 
United Nation Environmental Programme (UNEP) defines governance as ‘the exercise of 
political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nations affairs. It is the complex 
mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences 
(UNEP, 1997b: 9)’. Common to most definitions of governance is the fact that governance is 
distinct from the concept of government. The use of the term implies that power is not limited 
to formal authorities and institutions, but also non-state actors (the market and civil society) 
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have a right to participate in decision-making and the provision of urban services. The use of 
the concept also means that governance is not a simple frame of action but a process, since 
decisions have to be made based on complex relationships between actors (Bevir, 2009). With 
governance, the role of the state is to steer the organization of urban services, to apply certain 
techniques in the management of urban services, and to monitor the services provided. By 
contrast, non-state actors should deliver the services and be able to participate in the decision-
making processes.  
All definitions of governance make use of more or less the same elements or principles, 
including accountability,2 rule of law,3 transparency,4 legitimacy,5 and responsiveness6. All of 
the principles are related and interdependent. Hence, transparency is a precondition for 
accountability and responsiveness is not gained without legitimacy. Further, all of the 
principles are constituent of a democratic regime. In other words, governance is not 
sustainable without effective democratic institutions.  
Governance has lead to administrative reforms of states, focusing on institutional 
arrangements to reduce bureaucracy and make the states more efficient in their new role as 
managers of networks of actors and partnerships involved in the provision of urban services, 
in line with the principles mentioned above (Pierre & Peters, 2000; B.C. Smith, 2007). This is 
achieved by placing emphasis on the decentralization of governmental institutions, to give 
more power to lower levels of government and share power with non-state actors as a way to 
ensure legitimacy and increase accountability and transparency (Cavill & Sohail, 2004). 
There is consensus that decentralization is an essential part of governance. Successful 
decentralization has shown to improve the efficiency and responsiveness of public sectors, 
because it is seen as more responsive to local needs due to politicians being more accountable 
when decisions concerning the management of urban services are made by civil servants that 
are closer to populations at the local level (B.C. Smith, 2007). Further, participation with 
                                                     
2 Accountability implies that those responsible for making decisions can be held accountable to those they 
govern. By strengthening the accountability of governmental institutions, it is believed that both social and 
economic development will benefit (Bevir, 2009; Devas, 2004). 
3 Rule of law means that legal frameworks should be fair, enforced impartially, and based on democracy in 
order to achieve political and economic development, where decentralization is a way of reforming institutions 
in order to strengthen the rule of law (Bevir, 2009; B.C. Smith, 2007). 
4 Transparency refers to the free flow of information, whereby processes and information are accessible to 
those wanting to understand and monitor them (Bevir, 2009; B.C. Smith, 2007).  
5 Legitimacy refers to participation and the rights of all citizens to participate in decision-making processes, 
either directly or indirectly through legitimate institutions that represent them (Bevir, 2009; B.C. Smith, 2007).  
6 Responsiveness refers to public institutions’ responsibility to be responsive to all citizens and that public 
leaders should have a long-term perspective when it comes to development. To achieve this, decentralization is 
essential, both to bring governance processes closer to the people and to improve the efficiency of public 
institution that aim to meet the needs on the ground while making the best use of available resources (Bevir, 
2009; B.C. Smith, 2007).  
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private actors is seen as a more efficient way to manage urban services, as the strengths of 
private and public sectors are combined. In this view, PPPs bring together the political access 
and long-term stability found in the public sector and the efficiency in the private sector 
(Bevir, 2009). There is also emphasis to entering into partnerships with actors within civil 
society in order to empower them and afford them equal access to development and decision-
making processes. One justification for such partnerships is that participation can empower 
the poor and increase their participation and legitimacy, and democracy (Davies, 2008; Devas, 
2004; Myers, 2011; Schalkwijk, 2005). Partnerships have been viewed also as a strategy to 
include civil society in governance processes, to create employment among the urban poor, 
and to create opportunities to formalize actors operating in the informal economy as a strategy 
to reduce poverty and promote development (Devas, 2004).  
However, the literature reveals that each organization, including the World Bank and the 
United Nations, seems to create its own wish list of reforms, practices, and outcomes (Bevir, 
2009). The World Bank’s definition of good governance has more or less transferred the 
concept of corporate governance into the development discourse (World Bank, 1992). This 
approach to governance calls for sound and efficient management, where bureaucracy is seen 
as the main barrier to development. The World Bank’s use of good governance is technical in 
nature and aims to have a more efficient and open administration, with the use of the free 
market, the rule of law, and equity, and it rarely mentions poverty or the poor. The bank’s 
concept of civil society is narrow and limited to the private sector and NGOs, and it is only 
recently that more emphasis has been given to public goods and social capital (Bevir, 2009). 
Multinational development agencies such as UN-Habitat and UNDP have centred their 
definitions of good governance as the key to poverty eradication and attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals (Hoebink, 2006; UN-HABITAT, 2002a, 2002b; UNDP, 1997a). As a 
consequence, the issue of participation is related to broadly-defined civil society with a focus 
on human development, social justice, and the fight against corruption. UN-Habitat’s and 
UNDP’s definitions of civil society include both formally organized and informal structures, 
and even individuals (UNDP, 1997a: 52). The multiple interpretations of governance have led 
to much ambiguity, particularly related to the concepts of participation and civil society (see 
Textbox 1 for a discussion on the term civil society). For neoliberal politicians, participation 
has nothing to do with popular or democratic participation, but is understood as the right of 
consumers of services to participate in cost-sharing and to pay for privatized services such as 
solid waste management. This understanding is far removed from participation understood as 
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the right of any citizen (men, women, and even children) to be heard, and to contribute to the 
making and follow-up of decisions and policies concerning them.  
TEXTBOX 1: DEFINING CIVIL SOCIETY
Governance refers to the management of public affairs in partnership with non-state actors such as the 
market and civil society (Masterson, 2006). However, the use of the term civil society is understood 
and used differently by different actors, and has become a fuzzy concept and difficult to define due to 
its historical roots and the varied approaches to the concept in recent years (Heinrich, 2006). 
Originally, civil society referred to a society governed by law under the authority of the state 
(Gallaher, Dahlman, Gilmartin, Mountz, & Shirlow, 2010). With the shift from government to 
governance, the understanding of civil society has changed and it is now common to view civil society 
as ‘the arena in society between the state, the market, and the family where citizens advance their 
interests’ (Heinrich, 2006: 214). It is difficult to separate economic interests defined as the market 
with social forces referred to as civil society. In Heinrich’s definition, interests could relate either to 
social interests or to economic interests. If the interests are motivated by economy, they should be 
excluded from civil society since they belong to the market. The relative boundaries between state, 
civil society, family, and market vary significantly from time to time and from place to place. In order 
to understand the structure, function, and size of civil society in a given context, that society should be 
understood in relation to the state, culture, norms, and regulations that guide actors’ behaviour and the 
power relationships between them (Swyngedouw, 1996; 2000). The definition of civil society needs to 
be a loose in order not to exclude certain individuals or activities, but should be defined more 
specifically when it is related to the culture and structure of a particular place. In this thesis, civil 
society is understood as a social space for citizens’ actions outside the direct control of the state, where 
social power are contested and struggled over, and where citizens express themselves and claim their 
rights and access to social goods. 
It cannot be denied that the core elements of good governance, such as legitimacy, 
responsiveness, accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, are relevant elements that, if 
respected, could improve urban services and the functioning of societies to the benefit of all 
(Grindle, 2010). However, the use of good governance by donors and international 
organizations imposes a technical recipe for what governments should do to improve their 
governance and refers to ‘what should be’ and not ‘what is’ (Grindle, 2004, 2007, 2010; 
Hoebink, 2006; Hufty, 2009). By focusing on what should be and not what is, donors and 
international organizations seem to ignore the possibility that governments may misuse their 
projects or in some cases even promote ‘bad governance’. In many cases, donors and 
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international organizations fail to create a deeper understanding of how the governance 
process operates in local contexts. The technical approach to governance also gives a false 
sense of political neutrality, as it portrays development without politics. As Grindle (2007) 
argues, with good governance it is easier to criticize governments without explicitly 
criticizing them for lack of democracy. This has led to the rhetorical use of governance, 
whereby discussions of core issues such as lack of democracy in development are avoided. 
Although international donors continue to promote and use good governance in a normative 
and technical way, it may asked why good governance policies, even when adopted and 
implemented by many governments, have not materialized on the ground with the expected 
results. Studies have shown that there is a big gap between the official aims of the policies 
and the actual practice, arguing that the implementation of good governance policies is a 
political process influenced by power relations and institutional pluralism and these are 
aspects that should be studied (Crawford, 2009; Hufty, 2009; Myers, 2011; Schalkwijk, 
2005).
The adoption and implementation of good governance policies is a political process and 
should be analysed as such (Batley et al., 2012). Grindle (2004) calls for more empirical 
research, in order to go behind the normative and technical approach to governance and 
critically analyse the reasons for adopting good governance policies, as well as their 
implementation and outcomes. Hence, in order to explore forms of adoption and resistance to 
the policies and ask why they occur, the aim should be to understand how governance 
processes operate in particular contexts. Good governance is a central and relevant concept, 
because it is concrete and is promoted, adopted, and implemented by international donors and 
governments, in turn this has led to the reorganization of governmental institutions and the 
implementation of policies designed to make governments more efficient in the execution of 
their duties and more accountable to their citizens (Myers, 2011). Governance refers to the 
process of management and decision-making, and offers a framework for understanding how 
decisions are made and identifying what actors are involved in the management of urban 
services. Hence, it can help us to explore the various techniques and forms of power exercised 
within the governance processes. Governance includes a wide range of actors and institutions, 
and it is the relationships and interactions between them that determine what happens in 
cities. The relationships between actors are not equal, and governance as a process involves 
the power relationships among different actors (Swyngedouw, 1996). More emphasis should 
be placed on the power relationships between actors and examining who is involved and who 
is excluded from the governance processes (Blundo & Meur, 2008; Devas, 2004; Heynen, 
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2006; Heynen, Kaika, & Swyngedouw, 2006; Hufty, 2009). While it has been observed that 
most governments have apparently adopted good governance, it remains to seen whether the 
declarations of good governance policies (capacity building of administrations and the 
redefinitions of the mandate of public agencies) turn out to be a reality and a genuine or 
partially genuine commitment to good governance, or whether they are mostly rhetorical, i.e. 
the formulation and use of a new ideology to conceal the realities of human exploitation and 
the misuse of power. This uncertainty is discussed further in Articles 2, 3 and 4).
Further to what I have explained thus far, my aim is to go beyond the normative use of 
good governance and study the everyday practice of governance within solid waste 
management in Addis Ababa. My objective is to understand why good governance policies 
are adopted, who is considered a partner, and the implementation of the policies and their 
effect on the provision of urban services. By focusing on the governance processes within 
urban services, I am able to explore individual agendas and interests, how these are acted 
upon in the local context, and to follow these over time and link them to the larger political 
context as well as to actors and agendas at other scales. In the next section, I give a 
description of UPE, which in my opinion is a good theoretical framework for studying 
governance processes within urban management, where the main focus is on politics and 
power relations between actors at various scales.
2.2 POSITIONING URBAN POLITICAL ECOLOGY IN THE FIELD 
Urban political ecology has emerged from political ecology. Political ecology was developed 
in the 1980s as a means to critique the discourse on the ‘limits to growth’ and sustainable 
development, where population growth and poverty were seen as the main reasons for the 
degradation of the environment, and a reduction in population and economic growth was seen 
as the main solution to achieving more sustainable management of natural resources (Bryant, 
1998).
Inspired by cultural ecology, political ecology held that the physical environment and 
society had to be seen in a dualistic relationship which shaped both ecologies over time. By 
focusing on the relationship between nature and society one could gain a better understanding 
of cultural practices and the reasons behind environmental change (Walker, 1998). In contrast 
to cultural ecology, political ecology viewed cultural practices in a given context, not as 
isolated but as linked to events taking place at other scales. The emphasis was therefore on 
attempts to link environmental change to a broader political economy at various scales 
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(Neumann, 2005; Robbins, 2004). The foundation for political ecology was laid by Blaikie & 
Brookfield (1987) in their study of the political economy of soil degradation in developing 
countries. Their publication brought politics into studies of environmental change and 
development (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010).  
In recent years, political ecology has evolved in various directions and fields, of which 
UPE is one. Both political ecology and UPE can be used to study the relationships between 
nature and society, in order to explain environmental changes and link them to political and 
economical processes across different scales. However, studies conducted within political 
ecology have focused on rural areas in developing countries, where the main focus has been 
on soil degradation, deforestation, conflicts regarding access to natural resources and 
protected areas, and how dominant narratives have affected decisions concerning 
environmental conservation in particular contexts (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010). UPE has 
focused on urban areas and has been used by researchers to argue that despite the fact that 
more than half of the world’s populations now live in urban areas, urban environments have 
often been neglected in rural studies (Heynen et al., 2006). Most studies conducted within 
UPE have focused on control and access to resources in cities and how this has led to unequal 
distribution of resources among their citizens (Keil, 2003; Loftus, 2007; Swyngedouw, 
2004b). Whereas political ecology has a third world focus, research using UPE has tended to 
focus on developed countries. Further, political ecology tends to be used to study ongoing 
conflicts over resources, whereas to date UPE has not studied such conflicts but has been used 
by researchers more concerned with analyzing potential conflicts (Zimmer, 2010). Although 
these differences are not significant, they differ significantly in their view of the relationship 
between nature and society. Whereas political ecology sees physical nature and society as two 
separate spheres that are in a mutual relationship to each other, UPE sees nature and society 
not as separate spheres, but rather as welded together and a product of what is referred to as 
‘urban metabolism’, in line with N. Smith (1992) and Harvey’s concept of the production of 
nature (Harvey, 1996). This approach to nature and society is examined further in the next 
section.
2.2.1 URBAN POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND URBAN METABOLISM
UPE is a critical theoretical framework that links specific analyses of urban environmental 
problems to larger socio-ecological conditions (Keil, 2003). Heynen & Swyngedouw (2003: 
914) state: ‘urban political ecology is to enhance the democratic content of socio-
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environmental construction by identifying the strategies through which a more equitable 
distribution of social power and a more inclusive mode of environmental production can be 
achieved.’ In other words, the purpose of UPE is to examine critically the production of urban 
environments by identifying actors and their agendas, and exploring power relations within a 
given context. In this way it should be possible to understand the underlying reasons for 
uneven development and come up with strategies to achieve a more equitable distribution of 
resources among urban citizens and to improve democracy. With regard to the governance 
processes taking place in urban management in Africa today, UPE can be used an approach to 
critically examine how the processes operate in a given context, and the actors involved and 
the power relationships between them, in order to understand and identify strategies that could 
contribute to improved governance of urban services.
To understand UPE as a theoretical approach it is essential to know how it views the 
relationship between nature and society. Within a UPE perspective, cities are not seen as 
separated from nature but as a social and political outcome of the interaction between physical 
nature and society (Heynen et al., 2006; Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2011; Swyngedouw, 2006, 
2009). Thus, instead of seeing cities as a second type of nature or a constructed nature, 
Harvey (1996) states that there is nothing unnatural about New York city, arguing that human 
activities cannot be seen as external to physical nature but as part of it. Swyngedouw (2006) 
uses the metaphor ‘urban metabolism’ to describe the relationship between physical nature 
and society. In contrast to the traditional view that emphasizes the dualistic relationship 
between nature and society, Swyngedouw tries to overcome this binary view of the distinction 
between the two. Thus, rather than seeing physical nature and society as two separate spheres, 
urban environments should be viewed as both social and natural, where social processes are 
seen in a historical-geographical production process of physical nature and society welded 
together, and where the outcome is physical, social, economic, political, and cultural. In using 
the term urban metabolism, Swyngedouw (2006:107) adopts  Marx’s approach to the 
relationship between the physical nature and society, and cites Marx as arguing as follows:
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through his 
own actions, mediates, regulates, and controls the metabolism between himself and nature ... 
Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he 
simultaneously changes his own nature. 
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In this relationship, physical nature is seen as the foundation (a historical product), 
whereas social relations encounter physical nature and change it, and in this way humankind 
also changes its own nature (Swyngedouw, 2009). Hence, a change in the nature cannot be 
distinguished from either physical nature or the social world, but should be seen as both social 
and natural. The metabolic process is continuous and environmental change is tied to specific 
historical and geographical places and their social, cultural, political, and economic conditions 
(Heynen et al., 2006; Heynen & Swyngedouw, 2003). The management of solid waste serves 
as a good example of this view of the relationship between physical nature and society, as raw 
materials are extracted from nature by social work, and transformed into products that are 
consumed by social actors. Our consumption patterns and what we regard as waste are 
affected by our culture and level of income. This in turn affects the amount and type of waste 
produced and disposed of in nature. As a consequence of our actions (production and 
consumption), we are faced with an increased amount of waste which if not managed properly 
will contaminate urban environments and can become a breeding ground for insects and 
vermin, which in turn will affect public health. The way waste is managed in a given context 
(i.e. collected for disposal, reuse, or recycling, or simply disposed of in nature), depends on 
the actions taken by actors within society and is structured by culture, economy, and politics. 
The way we chose to deal with the solid waste will always have an impact on the urban 
environment and society. The solid waste situation in the local context should also be seen in 
relation to other scales, of which the promotion of good governance in developing countries is 
a good example. Solid waste should therefore be seen as a product of physical nature and 
society and an outcome of urban metabolism, which results in a continuous production of new 
urban natures. All of these processes take place in the realms of power in which social actors 
(at various scales) strive to create and defend their own agendas. In order to understand how 
urban metabolism works and to understand the production of, for example, solid waste 
management, attention should be given to the evolution of political structures, economic 
agendas, and cultural conditions (Bulkeley et al., 2003; Swyngedouw, 2006).
2.2.2 POLITICS AND POWER IN URBAN MANAGEMENT 
When perceiving an urban environment as a metabolism it is necessary to understand how the 
metabolism works, in order to explain the production of the urban environment. Among 
geographers there is agreement that our knowledge of the world is always situated, 
contingent, and mediated, which means that people’s knowledge about physical nature and 
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society is not a reality but a representation of it (Morse & Stocking, 1995; Robbins, 2004). 
From a UPE perspective, the focus is on a given phenomenon (e.g. solid waste) and on actors’ 
observations and thoughts about that phenomenon, where the various social constructions are 
related to the study of the phenomenon in order to explain how social constructions and 
actions result in the production of a particular urban environment. A UPE approach can be 
used when the aim is to understand actors’ social constructions and how power relations 
between actors operate, in order to explain the production, maintenance, and recreations of a 
phenomenon within a city (Zimmer, 2010).  
UPE provides a theoretical framework that enables more emphasis to be placed on the 
interactions between physical nature and society by questioning the reasons why decisions are 
made and action are taken based on the distribution of power within a given context. The 
main focus is therefore on politics – not merely politics in itself, but how power is distributed 
and used among actors (Grove, 2009). Politics refers to practice and processes where power in 
its various forms is exercised and negotiated among actors to satisfy their own interests and 
agendas (Agnew, 2002). UPE explicitly recognizes that the material conditions (resources) 
within urban spaces are controlled by the elite, resulting in a marginalization of the urban 
poor (Heynen & Swyngedouw, 2003). Such power relations are seen as created by the social, 
political, economic, and cultural structures and processes that constitute the urban 
environment in a specific place (Grove, 2009). Thus, the focus should be on these uneven 
processes in order to understand the production of urban environments, not necessarily 
because some actors’ interests are more sustainable than other actors’ interests, but due to the 
concern that some groups of actors can exclude others from gaining access to resources, 
which results in unequal development.  
Within geography, the study of power has been important for understanding people’s 
experience of a phenomenon, social differences within society, and the reasons for uneven 
development (Panelli, 2004). Power occurs in varied ways, and consequently this has led to 
various approaches and ways of seeing power. In the broadest sense, power can be seen as the 
ability to achieve a desired outcome (Tew, 2002). However, to be able to study power it is 
necessary to identify and be able to distinguish different types of power (Engelstad, 2005). To 
argue that a person exercises power over another person can be compared to arguing that a car 
is made up of atoms, as neither approach provides insights or an understanding of what 
processes are at work (Gallagher, 2008). For this thesis I have chosen to use Allen’s (2003b) 
categorization of power, which refers to power as capacity, a medium, and technology.  
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Power as a capacity, sees power as the ability to decide and control how things should be 
organized. Power is seen as a property that is held and can be delegated or distributed. It is 
viewed as an object that some actors have, and actors that hold power have the ability to force 
other actors to act against their will. The state is a good example of this approach to power, as 
it will have power to make decisions regarding organization, whereas citizens are seen as 
lacking power. This approach to power is in line with both Weber’s view of power, where 
some individuals or institutions have power and are able to exert their own will in society 
even when others try to resist it (Weber, 1971), and Marx’s view of the capitalist relations of 
control and the reproduction of uneven social structures (Engelstad, 2005). The view of power 
as capacity holds that the distribution of power is unequal and that some have more power 
than others and have better opportunities to satisfy their interests according to class, gender, 
and ethnicity (Allen, 2003a). When those in possession of power have their interests satisfied 
it can result the marginalization of others who have limited possibilities. This conception of 
power is still influential in geography, especially in authoritarian societies where control 
dominates and influences how power is exercised (Allen, 2003b). However, power as a 
capacity held by the elite to control the powerless does not mean that those without power are 
not able to react or resist the power relationships which they are part of. Power as capacity is 
therefore only potential power and cannot enable actors to secure certain outcomes or realize 
certain objectives, as there are always opportunities for resistance among those seen as 
powerless (Tew, 2002).
Power as a medium sees power related to resources (e.g. economy, knowledge, and 
collective resources) that can be mobilized in order to achieve a desired outcome. In this 
regard, power is viewed as power to do something. The notion of power as a medium is in 
line with Giddens’ (1987) view of power as resources that enable things to be done. In this 
view, power itself is not seen as a resource, but as something that is mobilized and produced 
through social interaction. Power as a medium thus refers to a range of social interventions 
and practices that actors adopt, and can be viewed as collective actions of a group of actors to 
achieve collective goals, to challenge or resist dominant power structures, or to prevent a 
decision being made. Power as a medium does not view power as held within an institution, 
but as existing in all social interactions. It can therefore occur in a variety of ways, and studies 
of power should therefore focus on identifying how power is produced through peoples’ 
relations and actions (Allen, 2003a).
Power as technology views power as something that works on and through subjects. 
Power is seen a series of techniques of practice and draws on Foucault’s work on the 
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circulation of power and how power is exercised and practised within a given society (Allen, 
2003a). According to Foucault, people regulate their behaviour according to social norms 
(e.g. how to act in schools, in hospitals, and in prison). Power should therefore be seen as 
something that works through people’s acceptance of how they should act within a given 
context (Foucault, 1982). This means that power exists in all kinds of social relations and is 
seen as a mode of action and a set of practices, and hence is omnipresent in society, where 
actions upon actions are an ongoing process. 
In contrast to power as the capacity to make decisions, power only exists when it is put 
into action and is continuously practised between individuals and therefore cannot be viewed 
as an object or a property. This does not mean that this approach to power ignores the state 
and its role in exercising power, but that the state is not the source of power. Rather, the state 
is a set of relationships between subjects within the institutions that make up the state, where 
power is exercised over other power relations. As power is seen as relationships between 
individuals, these power relations are always contextual and specific and cannot be 
understood without taking the local context into consideration (Gallagher, 2008). The power 
relationships will also vary according to the nature of the relationships, i.e. they are affected 
by class, gender, age, and ethnicity).
Further, an action is always calculated to satisfy a series of aims and objectives. However, 
this does not mean that the outcome of an action will be in line with the aims or objectives of 
an individual subject. Even though one might have good intentions and act according to a 
desired goal or outcome, the outcome might not be as intended. The complexity of the social 
world means that social actions always have unintended effects, and according to Foucault the 
intention behind an action is therefore irrelevant. The analysis of power relations and the 
outcome of these processes is worthy of study (Bevir, 1999). Power as technology is also seen 
in relation to scales, where power is seen as nested relations through scales. Power exercised 
at a larger scale depends upon power exercised at smaller scales, and power exercised at 
smaller scales is made possible by power relations at other scales (Crampton & Elden, 2007).
I have used the three approaches to power described above (i.e. power as capacity, a 
medium, and technology) due to their relevance. These approaches to power have different 
epistemologies and views on how power operates. Using these approaches to power does not 
mean that they are mutually incompatible. Power as a capacity and power as a medium are 
used to identify strategies used by the actors, whereas power as technology is included as an 
approach to study power and combine the two first approaches in order to understand how 
power operates in a given society and how people regulate their behavior based on social 
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norms. The use of power as a capacity and medium does not mean that I view power as 
something waiting to limit the actions of others. Institutions and resources are seen as abilities 
that can be mobilized in order to increase possibilities to achieve certain outcomes. Therefore, 
in order to study power, it is necessary to understand the social norms that guide individuals. 
In that way, it may be possible to identify individuals and their position within society, their 
access to different kinds of power (capacity and a medium), and their relations to other actors. 
As mention above, the ability to act towards a certain goal does not mean that the goal will be 
achieved. Instead, there are several possible outcomes of power relationships, and the ability 
to exercise power informs very little about how power is exercised in relationships. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to know an outcome just by identifying potential power. In my 
opinion, the focus has not been on defining power or studying power in itself, but rather on 
identifying the various forms of power relationships that exist between actors. Hence, in order 
to understand the actions and decisions taking place within solid waste management in Addis 
Ababa, I have studied the various strategies used by actors to achieve their goals, and how 
other actors act and react to such power relationships. My focus is therefore on exploring how 
the power is distributed, the agendas behind actions, the strategies used, and the outcomes of 
the power relationships.
2.2.3 SEEING INFORMALITY AS TECHNOLOGIES OF POWER 
The term informal economy7 flourishes in the literature and is commonly used to discuss a 
variety of economic activities carried out by the urban poor. The concept has been approached 
and explored by many researchers. Some have adopted a dualist approach, seeing the informal 
economy as separate from the formal economy and consisting of small-scale activities 
performed by the urban poor (ILO, 1972). The concept has also been explored using a 
structural approach, in cases where the informal economy is seen as subordinate to the formal 
economy in order to reduce costs (Portes, Castells, & Benton, 1989). Others have used a 
legalist approach, where an informal economy is seen as a response to the formal regulation 
of economic activities (de Soto, 1989). Thus, approaches have different views on how the 
informal and the formal economy are linked, and the former has been given different 
meanings, depending upon the approach used (Chen, 2007; McNeill, 2004).  
                                                     
7 The term informal economy is used in order to avoid any confusion regarding reference to a specific sector 
but rather to economic activities across different sectors. The term informal economy also emphasizes the 
existence of a continuity from the informal to the formal ends of the economy and the interdependence between 
them, and therefore acknowledges that there are varieties of degrees of informality (Becker, 2004; Brown, 2006). 
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The concept of informal economy has been debated, discussed, and criticized regarding its 
various definitions and understandings, and for what it does not capture. However, the 
concept still continues to be used and has proved to be useful for policymakers and 
researchers due to the fact that the informal economy refers to a large share of the economic 
activities taking place in urban areas and are an important source of livelihood for the 
majority of the urban poor. The popularity of the concept has varied over the years, but today 
it is gaining increased attention due to the fact that the informal economy has increased and 
become the norm in most African cities (Jutting & Laiglesia, 2009; McNeill, 2004). The 
informal economy has therefore gained increased attention from international organizations 
that recognize the potential to formalize informal actors as a strategy to reduce poverty in line 
with good governance policies (UN-HABITAT, 2002a). 
Most definitions of the informal economy define it in terms of economic activities that are 
not registered and regulated by a government and operate outside the formal system (Brown, 
2006; McNeill, 2004; Portes et al., 1989). Other definitions refer to certain criteria, such as 
low entry requirements in terms of capital and professional qualifications, and operating on a 
small-scale, on a family-basis, in open spaces, using local materials, and often using labour-
intensive technology (Hansen & Vaa, 2004; ILO, 1972). Such definitions of the informal 
economy exclude those who do not operate in open spaces, and those whose activities are not 
registered but who have capital to invest in more advanced technology. The question that 
arises is where do we place or how do we define those that do not fit into any of these 
definitions. There is agreement that we have to move away from such narrow definitions of 
the informal economy (Lindell, 2010). Thus, there are different reasons for informality and 
different forms of informality, which should be seen in relation to the context in which it finds 
place. If this definition were to be applied to the pre-election time April 2010 in Addis Ababa, 
the informal economy would most likely be described as having been small. At the time, the 
informal actors such as the shoeshiners and street vendors were forced to register and pay 
taxes to the kebeles and to become members of the ruling party in order to be able to continue 
their activities. This shows that the informal economy is a process that can change over time 
and should be seen in relation to the state. The shifting character of the informal economy and 
its relation to the state requires a definition that is not too narrow or rigid. In this regard, 
informality is understood to consist of economic activities that are not registered and those 
that practise them do not pay tax. There is a need for a more specific definition of the 
informal economy in relation to a context at a given time, as the informal economy differs 
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from place to place and from time to time. The emphasis should be less on the distinction 
between the informal and formal economy, and more on the relationships between them. 
Beyond the question of defining the informal economy, the political dimension of the 
activities is poorly understood. Lindell (2010) calls for more focus on the political aspects of 
activities in the informal economy and the agencies of the informal actors. It may be argued 
that the notion of informality is not important in order to understand the production of urban 
services in a given context, arguing that informality is just a question of articulating informal 
with formal activities and that the dominant structure of uneven development and the 
disempowerment process of the poor will continue. However, informality might not be of any 
relevance if we study informality on a macro-scale. However, on the micro-scale, informality 
is a fact and a result of the failure of the state. Since the introduction of neoliberal policies and 
the rolling back of the state, the informal economy has generally increased as rules and 
regulations have regressed to make place for unregulated activities. Informality has developed 
as a response and strategy for dealing with the dominant power structures and can be seen as a 
way of claiming access to resources and to cities. In line with Lindell (2010), I view 
informality as a political process. The informal economy is a system of social organization 
involving social structure, social relationships, and a set of norms and rules that guides 
individuals or group of actors engaged in the informal economy (AlSayyad, 2004). 
Informality shapes social relations and is part of the culture, history, norms, and rules both 
within and outside the state. Bayat (1997) refers to informality as a ‘quiet political strategy’. 
Informality is seen as everyday practices of urban actor’s attempts to address their needs 
rather than as actors’ collective action to claim their rights in civil society (Bayat, 2004). 
Informal activities have a considerable impact on politicized urban environments and in many 
cases they are used as a strategy by formal and informal actors in cities in the negotiation of 
their agendas and interests (Lindell, 2010). Informal actors use informality as a strategy to 
attain their goals, such as making a livelihood and as a reaction to the established power 
structures and ongoing marginalization process. In some cases, governments have even used 
informal actors as potential voters in pre-election times (Mitlin, 2004).  
In order to have a better understanding of the way that power operates in a given context, 
informality can be used as an empirical concept to refer to a group of actors, and in turn 
facilitate an understanding of the nature of the relationships, the reasons behind decisions, and 
the actions taken by the various actors trying to fulfil their agendas. To avoid using the 
concept, it is necessary to overlook the contexts in which actions find place. The informal 
economy is a product of its historical and social networks, it is structured based on its own 
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practical norms (where different norms exist within the informal and formal economy) and 
rules that have developed over time (Jean-Pierre & Sardan, 2008). In order to study power 
relationships between actors, it is also necessary to understanding where they have come 
from, where they are, and where they are headed and relate their actions to the practical norms 
that guide their behaviour. Including informality in our research can help us to relate actors 
and their actions to culture and practical norms (further described in Section 2.3) in a given 
context and to better understand the reasons for them.  
2.2.4 THE ‘POLITICS OF SCALES’
Within geography, scales have proved important when studying phenomena. In cartography, 
scales refer to the information on a map and to geographical resolutions at which a given 
phenomenon is studied (Dahlman, 2010). In this regard, scales are viewed as a mathematical 
expression of the relationship between the map and the real world, expressed as a ratio of map 
units to real world units. Conventionally, these levels are referred to as local, national, 
regional, and global scales where a particular phenomenon is framed geographically (Agnew, 
2002). Scales also relate to methodological concerns and units of analysis, and are closely 
related to the object of study. Further, scales have been important for explaining spatial 
relationships and analysing given phenomena seen in relation to processes finding place 
between local and global scales (Agnew, 2002; Gallaher et al., 2010). These approaches to 
scales are seen as hierarchical and have been criticized for making us look at the world in a 
pre-given way, assuming that relationships are hierarchal and where higher scales are 
assumed to have more power than lower scales (Taylor, 1982). The hierarchal approach to 
scales has been called into question by the emergence of global networks that operate across 
scales such as neoliberalism and the discourse of good governance. These new networks of 
arrangements have resulted in a relatively more vertical arrangement of structures and 
relationships that has changed the hierarchical view of scales as objective and fixed to a view 
of scales as constantly produced and reproduced units in networks of relationships (Neumann, 
2009). The vertical approach to scales has been challenged by, for example, Marston, Jones, 
& Woodward (2005), who argue that the hierarchical limitations of scales cannot simply be 
solved by adding a vertical approach to scales. They suggest a flat alternative that does not 
rely on the concept of scales but an approach where practice, events, and processes are located 
in sites across space. Martson et al.’s flat ontology of scale has been commented upon by 
many, who have argued that by abandoning scale one loses the holistic approach which is the 
core existence of geography and essential in order to understand the complexity of the social 
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world (Collinge, 2006; Escobar, 2006; Hoefle, 2006; Jonas, 2006; Leitner & Miller, 2006). 
Further, Neumann (2009) argues that scales are not ontological but epistemological. The 
focus should be on the practice of social actors, not on scale itself as an analytical category. 
The attention should therefore be given to power relations between actors to better understand 
the capacity of scales and the relationships between them (Moore, 2008).  
Today, it is acknowledged by many that scales are socially constructed, historically 
contingent, and politically contested. Scale is not an existing entity waiting to be discovered, 
but is produced through geographical structures of social interactions between places (Jones, 
Jones, & Woods, 2004). N. Smith (1992) has argued for the politics of scale , on the basis that 
scale is a political act in itself and a practice by state and non-state actors which has resulted 
in the creation of scales. The politics of scales are therefore defined by those who participate 
in them. With the use of the urban metabolism metaphor, Swyngedouw (2006) has 
contributed to the debate on the politics of scale and introduced physical nature into the 
debate, showing how power through scales affect the production of the urban environment. 
Thus, the focus should not be on any particular scale, but on the dynamics of the production 
of scales as a result of power relations between actors at various scales (Heynen & 
Swyngedouw, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2000, 2004a). As described earlier (in Section 2.2.1), 
urban metabolism is constantly produced; therefore, scales are never fixed, but are constantly 
redefined, reconstituted, and restructured in terms of their content, importance, and 
interrelations. According to Swyngedouw (2000), this continuous reorganization of spatial 
scales is an integral part of social strategies used by actors to combat and defend control over 
resources and the struggle for power, and will affect the production of urban environments. 
Scale should be seen as created and a result of the power relationships that lead to networks of 
relations between actors at various scales. Scales are therefore arenas where power is 
performed between actors or groups of actors. Such power relationships can change the 
importance and role of certain geographical scales, such as regional or national scales, and 
can create entirely new scales for negotiations. The scale redefinitions will affect power 
relationships between actors by strengthening the power and the control of some actors while 
disempowering others (Ekers & Loftus, 2008; Swyngedouw, 1996, 2000). These power 
relationships are important and reflect the scale capabilities of individuals or social groups to 
contribute actively to the process and production of an urban environment and to ensure that 
their interests are heard. This is demonstrated in cases where informal actors have organized 
themselves into international organizations in order to have their interests heard and have 
been able to empower themselves (Lindell, 2010). 
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Scales are essential in studies of power, including studies of the way in which power 
operates between actors among scales. Hence, the way power is distributed within a given 
society should not be seen in isolation from power relationships at other scales, but as 
embedded in different configurations of power relationships between the local and the global 
scale (Foucault, 1982; Swyngedouw, 2006). A good example is governance as an ideology, 
where governance has been promoted across scales, and ideas have flown between places and 
countries, and reform processes created in one place have affected institutions, policies, and 
management of urban services in other places. As discussed in the preceding section (2.1), the 
promotion of good governance policies has led to reorganizations of governmental 
institutions, new policies, and the involvement of new actors in the performance of urban 
services. This has resulted in a rescaling of states’ affairs and their management of urban 
services – upwards towards international organizations and downwards towards local non-
state actors. Projects supported by international organizations often result in the rescaling of 
governance processes and can create new arenas for negotiations between the partners 
involved in the projects. This constant reconstruction process of scales affects the social 
power relationships among actors, depending upon who is seen as a partner, who is involved 
in the processes, and who is not recognized as a partner. Moreover, it will strengthen the 
power of some actors and disempower others (as further discussed in Article 4). This shows 
the importance of drawing attention to the production of scales and how this in turn affects the 
production of urban environments. If scales are not taken into consideration, it will not be 
possible to gain a complete understanding of the activities finding place in local contexts and 
therefore attention should be on the production of scales in order to understand the underlying 
reasons for actions taking place at the local scale.  
2.3 A THEORETICAL COCKTAIL 
In the preceding section, I have argued that governance is a central concept with regards to 
studying the provision of urban services. The way it has been promoted by international 
donors and adopted and implemented by governments has affected the way cities are 
organized and governed. Governance is therefore directly involved in decision and 
management processes regarding the provision of solid waste services within cities and is an 
important concept for understanding the underlying reasons for the decisions made and 
current practices in this regard. I have also argued the need to shift from a normative to a 
more analytical approach to governance. There is agreement among researchers that there is 
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often a big gap between the idealistic aims of good governance policies and how such policies 
are put into practice and operate in local contexts (Blundo & Meur, 2008; Osterveer, 2009; 
McCourt & Gulrajani, 2010; Batley, 2012). Further, I have argued that UPE offers a good 
theoretical framework for studying governance processes and the provision of urban services. 
Accordingly, the management of solid waste should be seen not merely as a technical issue, 
but as a production process affected by the actors involved, their agendas, and their 
interactions based on the distribution of power and politics at various scales. Within UPE, the 
concept urban metabolism is frequently used to describe how physical nature and social 
processes interact and result in the production of urban environments. I deem the use of the 
concept urban metabolism useful in order to show how physical nature and society has to be 
seen as a whole and not viewed as two distinct spheres. However, I have struggled to relate 
the various aspects of UPE to each other in a constructive way. Very few researchers, if any, 
have come up with an analytical framework for how to adapt the theoretical framework in 
practice, and how to relate the different aspects such as power, politics, scale, culture, and 
history to each other. My attempts to make use of political ecology’s ‘chains of explanations’ 
proved unsuccessful because although the approach offers a pre-given hierarchical ordering 
for studying relationships between scales, it did not reflect the chaotic reality I found in the 
field, nor does it not allow for various scales that may be created by social interaction 
between actors at various levels (Robbins, 2004). Scales are not only places where action 
takes place but also a product of social relationships, where scales should be seen as 
subjective and not preconfigured (Haripriya & Kull, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2000). I therefore 
suggest an alternative analytical framework for combining the concept of governance and 
UPE in studies of solid waste management. The analytical framework is inspired by Hufty’s 
(2009) article on the governance analytical framework. I consider that the framework 
presented by Hufty has proved fruitful for approaching solid waste management as a 
governance process in specific locales in order to understand the continuous production of 
solid waste management, how power is used and negotiated among actors, as well as the 
reasons behind these processes. The various aspects of UPE such as actor’s subjective views 
and agendas, politics and power, culture and scales are organized into five analytical 
categories: problems, actors, norms, locales, and processes. Figure 2 shows an overview of 
the different categories and how they are linked to each other (modified from Hufty 2009).  
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FIGURE 2: Analytical framework for studying solid waste management in a UPE perspective. ‘Actors’ refer to 
the actors included in solid waste management (government, private, informal, and civil society). ‘Problems’ 
refers to the various issues at stake seen from the perspective of various actors. Collective actions lead to the 
formation of norms, which guide actors’ behavior. The actions taken result from the interactions between the 
actors on the basis of their subjective views, and culture and norms in the local context, referred to as a ‘locale’. 
Locales consist of physical interfaces were problems, actors, and norms converge and the outcome leads to the 
production of solid waste and can be compared to what in UPE is called urban metabolism.  
Using this analytical framework, the first task should be to identify the actors involved and 
try to give a description of the actors and their background such as their class, gender, 
economic status, activities, and role within solid waste management. The problems refer to 
the issues at stake seen from the perspective of the various actors. At this stage it is essential 
to explore the actors’ views of the phenomena under study. What is seen as a problem can 
vary depending on the different actors involved in solid waste management. It is therefore 
essential to be aware that a problem is socially constructed. UPE holds that although there is a 
reality, there are social constructions of that reality based on actors’ background and 
experiences (Grove, 2009). The emphasis should be on trying to deconstruct and reconstruct 
the problem facing each actor, relating it to the local context and the actor’s background and 
to where they are and where they are headed. It is at this point that power struggles between 
various actors find place. The ability to explore the subjective views and agendas depends on 
the context, methodology, techniques used, and the relationships between researcher and 
participants. In some cases the political context can make it difficult for a researcher to gain 
access to and the trust of various actors, and hence to understand their views and agendas. The 
proposed alternative analytical framework is discussed in more detail in the methodology 
section (Part Four).
The next step is to explore norms. Norms are based on values and shared beliefs 
concerning what is regarded as right and wrong. This includes guidelines for what one should 
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think, and do or not do, and hence influences the behaviour of actors. Further, norms are 
continuously produced by social interaction over time within a given context, are closely 
related to power relationships, and a natural part of urban metabolism. In everyday practice 
we are confronted with a pluralism of norms, ranging from formal to informal norms. Such 
norms can be social, professional, or practical. Social norms are not explicit, but are 
embedded in ideologies and can be applied to a society as a whole. Professional norms are 
defined and formalized through laws and regulations, procedures, and organizational 
structures. Practical norms are not official norms but are accepted by all members of a society. 
The production and use of the three types of norms leads to a pluralism of norms and 
situations where the norms coexist and guide  actors’ behaviour (Jean-Pierre & Sardan, 2008). 
Hence, in order to understand various actors’ behaviour, it is important to explore the various 
forms of norms that exist in a given context and the type of activity to which they apply, as 
different type of norms can exist within the formal and informal sectors. Further, it is 
important to explore who formulates the norms and how the norms are put into practice. 
Norms can be produced at different scales and transferred to other scales. Norms can be 
created at the national level and then transferred to the local level. Alternatively, in the case of 
good governance, norms are created at the global level and then transferred to the national and 
local scale. At each scale there is reaction, rejection, or internalization and adaption to the 
norms. It is therefore essential to analyse norms at different scales as well as how they are 
transferred, adapted, or rejected at another scales (Hufty, 2009).
The locales are a category where actors, problems, and norms are nested together. A 
locale refers to space and time-specific event in which actors negotiate. The focus should be 
on exploring the actions taking place within a locale, exploring and identifying how power (as 
capacity, a medium, and technology) is used by the actors in the locale, the nature of their 
power relationships, the link between the power relationships and processes at various scales, 
and the outcome. In my study, locales refer to the various stages of solid waste flows in Addis 
Ababa, from the generator –in this case, the households – to the containers, the municipal 
landfill, and the local waste market, Männ alleh/allesh tära. Each of these stages is referred to 
as a locale, where the governance processes operate and where interactions and struggles 
between the various actors occur. Figure 3 shows an overview of the solid waste stream and 
the organization of solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The boxes shaded grey refers to 
the case study locales.  
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FIGURE 3: The solid waste system in Addis Ababa, showing the waste stream from the households to the 
landfill site at Repi, the various stages in the reuse and recycling process, and the various actors’ involved at 
various stages. Grey-shaded locales are those selected as case studies.  
In each of the locales, there are also actors that interfere in the processing of waste but are not 
physically involved in the processing. The city administration interferes through having 
overall responsibility for solid waste management, and donors are involved through research 
and projects designed to improve the service provided. Figure 4 shows the various actors’ 
involved in each of the locales selected for study. 
Männ allesh tära 
The informal 
waste market 
Qorqoro alleh 
Foragers 
Scavengers 
Landfill (Repi) Containers Pre-collectors Households 
Factories Small-scale 
craftmen 
Rural traders 
The municipal solid waste system 
The informal recycling sector 
37 
FIGURE 4: Overview of the selected locales and the actors that interfere in them. 
The final step is to look at all the categories (actors, problems, norms in the locales) as a 
process, putting them together and seeing them in a historical aspect as well as linking them 
(actors and power relationships) to various scales or exploring the creation of new scales. In 
my case, five periods of fieldwork resulted in all of the studied locales being repeatedly 
analysed in order to identify the direction of the development of a particular locale over time. 
The reasons for emphasizing the local scale concerned methodology and the ability to conduct 
a grounded empirical study of solid waste management in Addis Ababa. It is also easier to 
observe and study at the local scale how power relations materialize. By adopting this 
analytical framework, it is possible to identify conflicting interests and sequences, which in 
turn make it possible to evaluate the direction in which processes are evolving, understand the 
production of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, and identify factors that promote 
change.
2.4 SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CHOICES
Urban political ecology can be seen more as a theoretical framework than a uniform theory. I 
find UPE to be a good framework for studying solid waste management with a critical 
approach to what is happening in Addis Ababa. It has allowed me to focus on important 
aspects such as power and politics across scales that other approaches would have failed to 
address. However, UPEs is a complex framework that takes many aspects into consideration. 
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I therefore chose to focus on some aspects more than others. Accordingly, in my theoretical 
framework, I have chosen to emphasize some aspects more than others. The main emphasis is 
more on power and scales than history and culture, because history and culture are given a 
broader place in my empirical work, where reviews of documents were important for 
understanding both the history of solid waste management and the political history in Addis 
Ababa. Further, culture is emphasized through the relatively long period of time spent in the 
field, to gain familiarity with the culture and the ‘ways of doing’, as well as to understand 
better the actions taken by the various actors.
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PART THREE: BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH CONTEXT OF 
ADDIS ABABA 
This provides background information on Addis Ababa and the solid waste management 
situation in the city. I start with a description of the historical development of Addis Ababa 
and then briefly describe the socio-economic situation in the city. In addition, I describe 
recent and current organizational changes within Addis Ababa City Administration (AACA). 
Although it would be useful to include a section on the political culture, this is not done 
because it is described and discussed in the five articles. A description of the municipal solid 
waste management system and the informal recycling sector in the city is given, to provide 
readers with a more in-depth understanding of the solid waste situation in the city and to 
understand better the local context under study. 
3.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADDIS ABABA 
Addis Ababa was established as the capital of Ethiopia in 1989, when Emperor Menelik 
decided to relocate there from his palace at Entoto, on the top of the escarpment of present-
day Addis Ababa (MEDAC, 2000). The city is characterized by a rugged topography, with an 
altitude of 3000 m above sea level in the northern part of the city, whereas the southern part is 
flat and lies at an altitude of c. 2000 m above sea level. The earliest settlements in the city 
developed around the king’s palace, with camps allocated to high-ranking officials and 
warlords, spread around at various distances from the palace. Vacant spaces separated the 
dignitaries from those of their subordinates, and the first settlements within the city were 
characterized by many small villages (Yirgalem, 2008). Over the years, the growth of the city 
has led to a gradual infilling of the vacant spaces, resulting in the emergence of a residential 
structure where the wealthy lived side by side with the poor. The mixed residential structure 
of poor and rich living in proximity still exists to today. However, in the last three decades a 
few predominantly high-income residential areas have emerged, first in the areas of Bole and 
Mekanisa, the site of the former airport. A new upper-middle class residential area is currently 
developing on the eastern peripheries of the city. The western part of the city is occupied 
more by administrative services, including the headquarters of administrations and palaces. 
By contrast, the eastern part is dominated by business activities, such as those in Merkato, the 
biggest market in the city.  
Ethiopia is the second largest country in Africa, with almost 80 million inhabitants (CSA, 
2009). The country is also one of the least urbanized countries in Africa, with only 16% of its 
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population living in urban areas (UN-HABITAT, 2008a). Today, Addis Ababa has a 
urbanization rate of 6% and is one of the fastest growing cities in East Africa (UN-Habitat, 
2008b). The growth of the city has accelerated dramatically since the mid-1970s, driven 
mainly by unemployment, poverty, and declining agricultural productivity in rural areas and 
improved income and employment opportunities in the city. In 1910, the city had 70,000 
inhabitants, by 1961 the total had increased to 443,000, by 1984, the population was 
1,412,575, and in 1994 the population reached 2,112,737 (UN-Habitat, 2008b). It is estimated 
that today Addis Ababa has c.4 million inhabitants and is still growing rapidly (3.8% per 
year) due to immigration from rural areas (40%) and its own natural increase (CSA, 2003). It 
is projected that the population will reach 5.1 million by 2015, resulting in Addis Ababa 
becoming home to 30% of the urban population in Ethiopia (UN-Habitat, 2008b). With this 
fast urbanization, the city has also shown extensive physical growth over the years (Figure 5). 
In the 1920s, the area covered by the city was estimated to be 33 km2, by 1984 it had grown to 
224 km2, by 2003 it was estimated to be 527 km2 (CSA, 2009).
FIGURE 5: The physical growth of Addis Ababa from 1886 to 2003 (Yirgalem, 2008).
41 
The physical growth and development of the city have been affected by the lack of efficient 
urban management. Since the Italian occupation in the period 1936–1941, six master plans 
have been prepared for Addis Ababa, but none have been implemented and this has resulted 
in spontaneous urban growth and development in the city (Yirgalem, 2008).  
Visitors to Addis Ababa today may be impressed to find that a new ring road has been 
completed and high-rise apartments, offices, and hotels dominate the main streets and central 
areas of the city. New houses and factories are rapidly emerging both within the city and in its 
hinterland. Villas dominate in middle-class and wealthier areas, whereas in several parts of 
the city blocks with low-cost housing have been built. The city fringe is expanding to the 
south-west of the city and the road to Nazareth is becoming the main industrial road in 
Ethiopia. Visitors to the capital may have the impression of a well-built and spacious city, yet 
the buildings and roads overshadow the real situation in the city, giving a misleading 
impression and hiding the low-standard housing and urban infrastructure. 
     
FIGURE 6: View of the city towards Churchill Road and Mexico and a low-income neighbourhood in Addis 
Ababa.  
Due to Addis Ababa’s function as the capital city, the seat of the Ethiopian Government, the 
African Union, and various international organizations and embassies, over the years the city 
has been given the majority of social and economic infrastructure. Despite construction 
activities in recent years to provide housing, commercial buildings, and new roads, the urban 
services and infrastructure cannot cope with the city’s rate of development. There is an urgent 
need to build or upgrade an almost non-existent sewage system, as 95% of the residents have 
no access to a sewer or drainage line (AAWSSA, 1999). Access to water is limited, and 47% 
of the households have no direct access to portable water. The existing water infrastructure is 
in a poor condition, with an estimated 35% of the water entering the distribution system not 
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reaching consumers (AAWSSA, 2008). The municipal bus transport is inadequate and a more 
flexible and expensive private minibus system has taken over responsibility for most of the 
transport in city. Air pollution is a serious problem, created by both car traffic and the use of 
traditional fuel sources. Solid waste is not properly managed and is disposed of in the rivers 
running through the city (Bjerkli, 2005; SBPDA, 2003). The situation is worsened by the fact 
that new residential areas are constructed before any infrastructure is in place (Yirgalem, 
2008).
Today, a growing socio-geographic segregation is at work, where the poorest segments of 
the population are forcefully relocated to the urban fringe. Unemployment in the city is 
increasing and has reach 31.4%, and is expected to increase further due to the fast growing 
population in the city (UN-Habitat, 2008b). This is further reflected in the increase of 
informal employment, which has now reached 69% (Fransen & Dijk, 2008). Moreover, the 
cost of living in the city has increased dramatically since 2004. This is mainly due to the 
devaluation of the Ethiopian birr, which has resulted in an almost doubling of prices of 
everyday products such as bread, gas, charcoal, water, and vegetables, making it harder for 
the majority of Ethiopians to make ends meet.  
      
FIGURE 7: Solid waste disposed in rivers running though the city. 
3.2 THE ORGANIZATION OF ADDIS ABABA CITY ADMINISTRATION 
Addis Ababa is the capital of the federal government of Ethiopia. Since 1997, the city 
government has been designated a considerable degree of self-rule compared to other cities in 
the country.8 Whereas other municipalities have to report to their respective woreda or zone 
administration, which in turn have to report to the regional administration. Addis Ababa city 
                                                     
8 This is also the case for Dire Dawa, the other chartered city in Ethiopia. 
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government administers its own affairs and reports directly to the federal government. This 
has given the city a considerable degree of self-rule compared to other cities in Ethiopia.  
Ethiopia has a long history of a highly centralized government, both under Emperor Haile 
Sellasie and during the Leninist military regime led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, commonly 
referred to as the Derg in Amharic (Poluha, 2004). The first changes in the structure of the 
Addis Ababa city administration after the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) came to power in 1991 were introduced in 2003. This was part of a national 
decentralization process under the District-Level Decentralization Program and as part of the 
Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program (SDPRP) supported by donors and 
officially introduced to give more power to lower levels of government, to strengthen their 
institutions, and to improve the delivery of urban services. When the SDPRP was 
implemented, the former city council and its executive organs were dissolved on the grounds 
of inefficiency and lack of good governance. Prior to the administrative reform, the city had 
been divided into six zones, consisting of 28 woredas (districts), which in turn were divided 
into 328 kebeles (subdistricts). After the reform, the woredas were renamed sub-cities and 
reduced to 10, which were further divided into 99 kebeles (the smallest administrative unit). 
In 2010, the 99 kebeles were further reorganized into 102 woredas.9
AACA consists of a council that is elected for a period of five years and is responsible for 
the administration of the city. The main function of the council is to make municipal laws and 
approve the annual budget. Under the city council, there is an executive committee of 15 
members drawn from the city council and are responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the city. The executive committee is further divided into three subcommittees respectively 
responsible for the economy, social affairs and administration. The subcommittees each have 
five members, all of whom report to the executive committee. The executive committee is 
accountable to the residents and the prime minister of the federal government. The AACA has 
a cabinet with executive power, led by a mayor. As Figure 8 shows, under the mayor, there is 
a city manager, and a deputy city manager who is responsible for the nine agencies within the 
administration: the Land Development and Administration Authority; Infrastructure 
Development and Construction Authority; Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development 
Authority; Road authority; Fire and Emergency Service; Code of Enforcement Service; 
Housing Agency; Acts and Civil Record Service; and the Sewage and Water Authority.  
                                                     
9 In this study the word kebele is used in reference to the smallest administrative unit in the city. The reason 
for this is that the reorganization took place while I was conducting my research and most citizens in Addis 
Ababa still continued to refer to kebele and not to woredas.
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FIGURE 8: Organization of the various departments within AACA. 
The sub-cities are organized in a similar fashion to AACA, with an elected committee, a Sub-
City manager, and nine different agencies which are mandated to administer matters under 
their jurisdiction and provide support for the kebeles. The kebeles are given power to 
administer local matters, such as the preparation of budgets and plans and the collection of 
taxes. They are also responsible for the provision of municipal service fees, recruitment 
services, education, food assistance, health care, and credit. In addition, the kebeles run the 
community social courts and local prisons. Today, the kebeles are officially the main level 
targeted for development within the city.  
The restructuration of AACA in 2003 improved the management of urban services in the 
city (Yirgalem, 2008). The achievement in transforming AACA under Mayor Arkebe is seen 
as a turning point in the history of its performance. There may several reasons for the 
implementation of the reform and for AACA’s improved performance. Yirgalem (2008) 
discuss the reasons for the achievement by questioning whether there was a genuine 
commitment to addressing the increasing socio-economic problems facing the city, or whether 
it was politically motivated by the fact that the deteriorated state of the city had become an 
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embarrassment for the government, particularly when hosting regional heads of states such as 
during meetings in the Africa Union. Yirgalem also question whether the decentralization 
process intended to gain more control over civil society. However, the results of the reform 
were only temporary. Since the national election in 2005, AACA has returned to its former 
state of inefficiency and unstable administration (Yirgalem, 2008). Article 2 gives an example 
of how the decentralization process has affected the management of solid waste between 2004 
and mid-2011. 
Parallel to the decentralization process, several other reforms have also been implemented 
to further promote an efficient city administration and improve good governance. One of the 
reforms is the National Capacity Building Program. This programme is designed to increase 
the capacity of the government, but with emphasis on the kebele level as a means of 
empowering local communities in order to promote democratization and improve service 
delivery. As part of this programme, in 2004 AACA and the Ministry of Works and Urban 
Development adopted a business management strategy called business process re-engineering 
(BPR). The aim of the reform was to improve service delivery and capacity within state 
institutions by reducing the bureaucratic structures and procedures, removing non-performing 
civil servants, and increasing the capacity of the remaining civil servants. The reform resulted 
in the reorganization of most agencies within AACA, in order to reduce bureaucracy and 
ensure that the city administration would be more efficient. Studies have shown that since the 
implementation of BPR, the level of bureaucracy has been reduced and has led to increased 
efficiency (Getachew & Common, 2006). Prior to the introduction of BPR, applicants for a 
license to register a company had to go through 14 steps and wait for at least 8 days, whereas 
since the implementation of BPR the procedure has been reduced to 6 steps and the average 
waiting time reduced to 39 minutes (see Appendix 1 for reductions the time taken for 
procedures before and after the introduction of BPR). In addition to reducing bureaucracy in 
the city administration, the BPR strategy also involved re-evaluation of the officials working 
within the administration. The evaluations were made in 2009 in Addis Ababa, and all 
officials had to reapply for their jobs according to a grading system (see Appendix 2). A 
search undertaken during fieldwork revealed that 50–70% of the criteria were based on 
behaviour. Many have argued that the Ethiopian Government has used BPR as an opportunity 
to put loyal people in the ‘right’ places and to purge those who are not loyal (Human Rights 
Watch, 2010). Several informants such as former high-level party members and interviews 
with civil servants also confirmed that evaluations based on loyalty to the ruling party were 
commonly used before the introduction of BPR.
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Both the decentralization process and BPR have officially been adopted and implemented 
to give more power to the lower levels of administration and have resulted in institutional 
reorganizations and a high turnover of civil servants. The structural changes, how they are 
implemented, and their outcome for the management of solid waste are discussed in more 
detail in Articles 2, 3, and 4.
3.3 THE SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SITUATION IN ADDIS ABABA 
Visitors to Addis Ababa rarely have the impression that the disposal of solid waste is a serious 
problem in the city. The main streets and avenues appear quite clean and street sweepers can 
be seen cleaning the main roads. Whenever there are big meetings, such as the African Union 
summits, the city is even cleaner. In addition, in high-income areas such as Bole and 
Mekanisa (the site of the old airport) the solid waste situation seems to be much better than in 
relatively low-income areas. However, upon entering most neighbourhoods, the picture is 
quite different and it is clear that solid waste is an increasing problem in the city (Bjerkli, 
2005; SBPDA, 2003; Tadesse,  2004; UN-Habitat, 2008b; Yirgalem, 2001; Zelalem, 2006). 
The solid waste situation in Addis Ababa is characterized by increasing waste generation due 
to increased levels of consumption, growing immigration from the rural areas, and the city`s 
own demography. Further, the poor solid waste situation is worsened by the lack of technical 
and institutional capacity to deal with the increasing generation of waste in the city. Waste 
accumulates in the urban environment, causing bad odours and clogging the drainage 
channels, and accumulations of waste have become breeding grounds for insects and vermin 
which pose a threat to human health and the urban environment (ILO, 2009; Kinfe, 2002; 
ORAAMP, 2002; SBPDA, 2003).
     
FIGURE 9: Waste thrown in the street and in the river in Addis Ababa. 
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3.3.1 WASTE GENERATION AND COMPOSITION 
Addis Ababa City Administration operates with data on waste generation and composition 
that were compiled by Norconsult in 1982. Given that the data are 30 years old, they are no 
longer representative for the current situation. The Sanitation, Beautification and Park 
Development Authority (SBPDA) estimate that currently the generation of waste per capita 
per day is 0.221 kg, which is equivalent to a total of 217,795 tons per day for the city as a 
whole, based on the population census for 2008. The composition of solid waste in Addis 
Ababa is similar to that of cities in other developing countries, which also have a high 
percentage of organic materials. Based on the study conducted by Norconsult in 1982, it is 
estimated that 70% of the waste was organic, 15% paper, and 15% plastic and metals. 
However, these data are highly questionable, and do not give a representative picture of the 
waste generation and composition in the city. Addis Ababa has grown rapidly in recent years, 
and its population and physical size have more than doubled since the study was conducted 
(in 1982). Moreover, the consumption habits have changed as a result of the growing middle-
class. New products have entered the market, and especially plastic and electrical items have 
increased compared to 30 years ago, in the early 1980s. Enormous construction activities have 
also taken place in the city in the last 10 years (i.e. since the early 2000s) and it can be 
assumed that the amount of construction waste has increased dramatically compared to when 
Norconsult’s study was conducted. In addition, most of the inorganic materials are reused and 
then sold or given away for further reuse or recycling by the informal recycling sector 
operating in the city, and are not even entering the municipal waste stream (Bjerkli, 2005).
According to the SBPDA, 71% of waste is generated by households, 10% is disposed of 
in the streets, 9% is generated by commercial institutions, 6% by industries, 3% by hotels, and 
1% by hospitals. The estimation was made based on the research conducted in 1982 and is not 
representative of the current situation in the city. For example, in the last 10 years (i.e. since 
the early 2000s), the city has experienced a huge growth in the number of hotels, commercial 
institutions, and industries, and the recent construction activities are likely to have resulted in 
an increase in construction waste that has not been taken into consideration by SBPDA when 
estimating the amount of waste generation and composition. By contrast, although the 
demolition of neighbourhoods (such as Arat Kilo in 2010, in line with the current master plan 
for the city) has generated large amounts of waste materials, some of the waste has been 
sorted out and sold for reuse. Despite this, some types of waste, such as cement, are not taken 
into consideration in the city planners’ budgets for waste disposal.  
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FIGURE 10: Used toilet, tiles and doors for sale.  
3.3.2 THE ORGANIZATION OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT, 1994–2011 
The way that solid waste has been managed and the service provided in Addis Ababa has 
changed during the last 18 years. The institutional organization of solid waste and the service 
provided since 1994 can be subdivided into three periods: waste generated though health care, 
when the responsibility for disposal fell under the Health Department; waste associated with 
beautification, when the Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority 
(SBPDA) had main responsibility for its disposal; and today, when the Solid Waste Authority 
has the main responsibility for managing waste disposal and the main focus is on integrated 
solid waste management (ISWM) and recycling. In this section, I describe how solid waste 
management has been organized and the reasons behind the reorganizations of the Solid 
Waste Authority.
From 1994 to 2003, solid waste management was organized under the city health bureau 
in the Department of Environmental Health Care. Seemingly, in the organizational structure 
of Addis Ababa Health Bureau (Figure 11), solid waste management was overshadowed by 
many other activities carried out by the bureau. The long bureaucratic chain also made it 
difficult to coordinate the different actors and hindered efficient mobilization and use of 
resources (SBPDA, 2003, 2004b). 
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FIGURE 11: Organization of solid waste management within the Health Bureau of AACA. 
As part of the national decentralization process in 2003, responsibility for solid waste 
management was reorganized so that it came under the Sanitation, Beautification and Park 
Development Authority (SBPDA). As part of the reform, departments responsible for solid 
waste disposal were also established at Sub-City and kebele levels with the aim of 
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decentralizing the services and increasing their efficiency. At central level, the SBPDA was 
organized under two executive managers: a General Manager and a Deputy Manager. Under 
the two managers jointly, there were three departments: the Planning, Research and 
Coordination Department, the Operations Department and Park Development, and the 
Administration Department. In addition, there were five sub-departments: Landfill 
Administration; Planning and Research; Training, Public Education and Support; Solid Waste 
Administration; and Transportation Administration and Maintenance. Further, in each Sub-
City and kebele, one person was appointed to be responsible for solid waste (Figure 12). The 
responsibility of SBPDA was to act as a regulatory and policymaking body to set standards, 
coordinate activities among sub-cities, deal with cross-cutting issues, deliver technical support 
and capacity building, manage the city’s dump site, run public awareness programmes, and 
conduct research. The sub-cities were responsible for the daily operation of activities within 
solid waste, such as collection and transport. In addition, they were responsible for conducting 
campaigns and undertaking activities related to composting and recycling. Each Sub-City had 
its own budget and was responsible for ensuring long-term management of solid waste, and 
implementing programmes and regulations, as well as monitoring and evaluating them. The 
kebeles were responsible for the daily operation of solid waste management in their 
neighbourhoods, control, and reporting to the sub-cities the services provided.
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FIGURE 12: Organization of solid waste management within the SBPDA of AACA. 
In 2009, the SBPDA was reorganized in line with business process re-engineering (BPR). The 
agency changed its name to the Solid Waste Management Agency and Landfill Project Office. 
Compared with the previous organization of the agency, the structures were more or less the 
same. The main change was that the Park and Cemetery Department was taken out and 
established as an independent agency. Further, the reorganization aimed at giving even more 
power to the sub-cities and the kebeles. I was unable to obtain any detailed information about 
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the organization structure and the new roles and responsibilities of the various levels of the 
administration, despite several attempts.  
The way in which the management of solid waste has been organized and approached 
over the last 18 years (i.e. since 1994), seems to have been affected by the current discourse 
on waste in the international agenda. This is clearly reflected in the names of the agencies 
responsible for waste at given times. The reorganizations are also in line with the official 
claims of good governance to improve urban services and increase the accountability and 
efficiency of the city administration, and are a consequence of national ‘commitments’ in line 
with the SPRSP and BPR to decentralize and make the city administration and urban services 
more efficient. This has resulted in an institutional restructuring of the waste authority and 
changes in roles and responsibilities. A comparison of the structural changes of the agency in 
the three different periods reveals that the city administration has decentralized responsibility 
for solid waste down to Sub-City and kebele levels. The Solid Waste Management Agency 
has also become more specialized, at least on paper; it focuses only on solid waste, is not seen 
as part of the Health Bureau, and does not have responsibility for areas such as park and 
beautification. Currently, the various tasks within solid waste are organized under different 
departments, such as the Planning Department and the Implementation and Operation 
Department, which reflects how solid waste management has gained more attention in recent 
years. However, more than structural changes are needed to improve the management, and 
Article 2 describes and shows how the various organizational changes within AACA have 
been adopted, implemented and affected solid waste management in Addis Ababa.  
In line with the structural changes of the waste agency, the official visions and ethical 
principles have also changed. Visitors to the Solid Waste Management Agency today will be 
confronted with a sign listing the visions of the agency (Figure 13). The agency’s visions and 
ethical principles also confirm the city administration’s official focus on good governance. 
However, they include the principle ‘loyalty’, which is not included in good governance but is 
shown in the five articles forming part of this thesis to be one of the most important principles 
to which the agency is committed.  
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FIGURE 13: Boards outside the Solid Waste Management Agency showing the vision, mission, and ethical 
principles of the agency. 
3.3.3 SOLID WASTE SERVICES PROVIDED TO HOUSEHOLDS, 1994–2011 
As in other cities in Africa, the solid waste situation in Addis Ababa has been affected by the 
urbanization process and the expansion of the city. Further, the high prevalence of low-
income neighbourhoods has made it difficult for the refuse collection trucks to access large 
parts of the city. The solid waste services provided in Addis Ababa have also changed from 
being seen as solely the responsibility of the city administration to also involving non-state 
actors, in line with neoliberal policies.
Between 1994 and 2003 there were mainly two types of collection system offered by the 
city administration. One system was a door-to-door service offered to households located 
close to the main roads. Shortages of vehicles and frequent breakdowns made it difficult to 
keep to schedules, resulting in a poor and inefficient collection system with irregular and few 
collection times. In addition to the door-to-door service, waste was also collected via 
municipal containers placed near the main roads. Hence, many of the households’ members 
had to walk long distances in order to dispose their waste in the containers. Due to lack of 
containers and collection trucks and frequent breakdowns of the trucks, it was common to see 
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containers overflowing with waste. As a consequence, people commonly resorted to either 
burning or disposing of their waste in nearby rivers or on open plots of land (Bjerkli, 2005; 
Zelalem, 2006). During this period the informal sector saw the opportunity to start offering to 
households a waste collection service either once or twice a week for a monthly fee of 10–15 
birr.10
In 2003, the informal pre-collectors operating in the city were formalized. The 
formalization was part of micro- and small-scale enterprise (MSSE) development in the city 
and in line with SDPRP supported by international donors to privatize and improve urban 
services and create employment among the urban poor (ORAAMP, 2001; SBPDA, 2004a). 
(see Appendix 3 for a copy of the newspaper article reporting the agency’s perspective). In 
addition to the pre-collectors, the container system continued to be offered to those living 
along the main roads. However, the containers were placed within neighbourhoods and 
controlled by officials from the kebeles, in order to ensure that the MSSEs disposed of the 
waste in a proper manner. In this period (2003-2005) the solid waste situation improved, but 
the services provided were offered only to those who could pay for them, thus leading to 
segregation in service provision among the citizens. In addition to the container system and 
the door-to-door collection by MSSEs, the city administration also employed 1137 street 
sweepers in 2003 (SBPDA, 2004a). However, the street sweepers only cleaned the main roads 
and avenues, leaving most of the city without access to the service. 
FIGURE 14: Pre-collectors at work (ILO, 2009)11.
                                                     
10 1 Ethiopian birr is equal to USD 0.06. The Ethiopian birr has been devaluated the recent years and since 
2008 the value has declined by almost 45%.  
11 The photos accredited to ILO, were supplied by ILO in 2009. 
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FIGURE 15: Pre-collector collecting waste and transfer the waste into municipal containers.  
In 2009, the MSSEs were reorganized into cooperatives in line with BPR. The cooperatives 
were employed by the kebeles and were paid according to the amount of waste collected per 
cubic metres. The reorganization was intended to improve service, increase employment 
levels, and collect waste fees through the water bill system. The introduction of the new 
system meant that everybody had to pay and everybody should get the service. According to 
the Solid Waste Management Agency, the implementation of the new system was successful: 
it had improved the amount of waste collected in the city and contributed to the employment 
of almost 13,000 waste collectors organized in 520 cooperatives. A critical approach to the 
development of the solid waste service offered in the city from 2004 to mid-2011 is discussed 
in Article 2. 
3.3.4 STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION OF SOLID WASTE 
Over the years there have not been enough containers for waste collection in Addis Ababa 
and the condition of many of the containers is poor, as shown in Figure 16. In 2003, the 
municipality had 512 (8 m3) f containers, which meant that one container served c.7500 
households. By 2007, the number had increased to 587, but this did not make any significant 
difference in terms of improving the collection capacity (SBPDA, 2003). According to an 
article in Addis Fortune, the municipality bought 1000 new containers in 2011 (Appendix 4). 
Based on the newspaper article the new containers did not seem to be compatible with the 
existing collection trucks, and interviews revealed that they had been bought because the local 
government had money left from a World Bank project. When I returned back to Addis 
Ababa in November 2011, none of the containers was to be seen in the city and none of the 
new officials had heard about them.  
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FIGURE 16: Containers located on main roads in Addis Ababa. 
From 1994 to 2003, the city administration had the main responsibility for the transportation 
of solid waste. According to the ILO (International Labour Organization), the Solid Waste 
Management Agency had 77 trucks in 2003, 72 in 2004, 70 in 2005, and 60 in 2006. From 
2003 to 2010, the number of trucks decreased in the city, due to their age. Frequent 
breakdowns and maintenance requirements resulted in many of the trucks being out of 
service; in 2004, out of a total of 72 trucks, only 36 worked daily). However, in 2009, in line 
with BPR, the responsibility for maintaining and running the trucks was given to the sub-
cities in an attempt to improve the efficiency of the transportation of waste. Further, the 
agency bought 44 new trucks in 2010, and implemented three shifts in 2010 instead of two 
under the previous system (06.00–14.00 hours and 14.00–18.00 hours). Today, the trucks 
should run continuously (i.e. 24 hours per day) and this has improved the capacity of the 
transportation of waste in the city (ILO, 2009; SBPDA, 2004c, 2004e). 
FIGURE 17: New trucks bought by the city administration in 2010 and trucks transporting containers back from 
Repi. 
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3.3.5 THE REPI DUMP SITE
The current dump site at Repi covers an area of 25 ha and is located in the south-western part 
of Addis Ababa, in Kolfe Keraniyo Sub-City, c.13 km from the city centre. Repi is the only 
dump in Addis Ababa and when the site was established in 1964 it was located on the 
outskirts of the city. With the growth and expansion of the city, the site has become 
surrounded by settlements and currently it represents a threat to human health and the 
environment (Figure 18 and 19). 
FIGURE 18: Location of the dump site Repi. 
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FIGURE 19: Aerial photo of Repi (personal communication, SBPDA 2009).
Today, the dump is full and is improperly managed. There is no drainage to capture leakages 
or runoff. Further, the dump is not enclosed by a fence and is not covered with soil on a daily 
base. Due to lack of a weighbridge, the amount of waste disposed on the site during the years 
has been poorly recorded (Yirgalem, 2001). In 2003 there were four bulldozers, but only one 
was working (SBPDA, 2003). Further, the road leading to the site is in a very poor condition 
and becomes almost unusable during heavy rains. Hence, on some days no waste can be 
collected from the city. Currently, the dump is also a work site for c.500 scavengers, who 
make their livelihood by collecting waste both for their own consumption and for resale. 
    
FIGURE 20: Scavengers working at Repi.      
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Over the years, few investments have been made in solid waste management in the city and 
very little has been done to invest in new equipment and resources, such as refuse collection 
trucks, containers, and landfill sites. This has resulted in a deterioration of the solid waste 
system and the service provided. However, today more efforts seem to be made to improve 
the management of solid waste in the city, and this is further discussed and analysed in 
Articles 3 and 4.
3.3.6 REGULATIONS GOVERNING SOLID WASTE 
Today, there are several laws and regulations concerning the management of solid waste in 
Addis Ababa. At the national level, the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) has the 
main responsibility for implementing laws to protect the urban environment and the 
management of solid waste. In 1997, EPA in collaboration with Ministry of Economic 
Development and Cooperation published an environmental policy for Ethiopia, which 
included aspects of solid waste management (EPA, 1997). However, the first national policy 
for solid waste was not published until 2007. The aim of the policy was to ‘enhance at all 
levels capacities to prevent the possible adverse impacts while creating economically and 
socially beneficial assets out of solid waste’ (FDRE, 2007: 3525). The policy includes 
collection, transport, and disposal of solid waste. It refers primarily to the obligations of urban 
administrations to ensure the proper planning, implementation, and monitoring of solid waste. 
The focus is on city administrations’ responsibilities and on decentralizing responsibilities to 
the lowest levels of administration in order to fulfil the obligations. In the third part, the 
proclamation focuses on regulations to manage waste glass, plastic bags, used tires, food, 
household waste, and construction waste in a sustainable manner and with focus on proper 
handling, segregation, reuse, and recycling. Part 4 deals with transportation and disposal of 
solid waste, where the focus is on technical inspection of vehicles used for transporting solid 
waste as well as ensuring proper management of disposal sites in line with the environmental 
regulations. In 2004, the city administration published a solid waste regulation – the Waste 
Managment Collection and Disposal Regulation of the Addis Ababa City Government 
(AACA, 2004) – which serves as a framework for how individuals and private enterprises 
should manage and dispose of their solid waste in a sustainable way.  
Despite all the regulations being good in theory, few of them are adapted by the city 
administration and citizens and very little is done to enforce them. In most cases, it is also 
difficult for citizens to follow the regulations, because they do not have access to a proper 
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solid waste system that allows them to manage their waste in line with the regulations. The 
claim that households should segregate their waste seems meaningless when the city 
administration has not established any formal system for the collection of segregated waste. It 
is also meaningless to argue that every person is obliged to dispose their waste in a 
sustainable way when some have to walk 1 km in order to do so and even then often arrive to 
find that the container is already overloaded. Hence, there is a big gap between what the 
regulations require and the reality on the ground, and this makes it difficult for the city 
administration and citizens to follow the regulations.  
In 2004, the SBPDA developed a list of targets and strategies for improving solid waste 
management in the city, in line with the above-mentioned policies and regulations (Appendix 
5). However, by 2011 none of the targets had been meet. Today, the laws and regulations 
seem to exist only on paper and are rarely followed up. One of the reasons for the lack of 
ability to follow up the regulations and implement them is that they are not adapted to the 
realities in the city and the culture within the city administration. This point is discussed 
further in Articles 2, 3, and 4, were I argue for the reasons for the low level of efficiency 
within the city administration.  
3.4 THE INFORMAL RECYCLING SECTOR IN ADDIS ABABA
The informal recycling system in Addis Ababa is similar to other informal recycling systems 
found in urban areas in developing countries. It consists of different actors who are involved 
in activities related to the collection, trade, reuse, and recycling of waste. The system is highly 
organized and consists of eight levels and nine different groups of actors: households, 
foragers, scavengers, Qorqoro alleh,12 pre-collectors, wholesalers, middlemen, small-scale 
craftsmen, and local industries.13 Figure 21 shows an overview of the organization of the 
informal recycling system and the actors involved.  
                                                     
12 Qorqoro alleh is the local name for iterant junk buyers. 
13 Some actors operating in the informal recycling system were not included in the study, namely foragers, 
middlemen, rural traders and representatives of local industries. The reason behind this choice is that the foragers 
seem to be randomly and irregularly involved in the collection of solid waste. Further, the rural traders and 
factories are seen as important actors but are not directly involved in the management of solid waste in the city 
and therefore not included in the study. However, some interviews were conducted with factory owners in order 
to explore their views, although emphasis is not given to their role in the system. 
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FIGURE 21:  The organization of the informal recycling system and all involved actors. 
At the bottom of the hierarchy there are the scavengers who collect waste materials from the 
municipal landfill. It is estimated that today there are c.500–600 on-site scavengers who make 
a living from collecting waste materials for their own consumption or for reuse or recycling. 
Most of the scavengers are individuals who live in the village nearby. However, the 
scavengers also include a group of boys who live at the site and claim that the site belongs to 
them. They are different from the average scavenger and are organized by one boss who is in 
charge of c.20 boys (Textbox 2). Each scavenger usually specializes in collecting one type of 
material, such as grass to feed animals, plastic sheets for fuel or sale, and old shoes. The 
materials collected for reuse and recycling are stored either at the site or in the village nearby. 
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The most common practice is to store the materials until there is a large enough amount to sell 
to middlemen or to rent a truck and transport the waste to Männ alleh/allesh tära.  
TEXTBOX 2: GROUP OF BOYS OPERATING AT REPI 
Boys have been operating at Repi for the last for the last 25 years 
(i.e. since the late 1980s) and the current boss has lived on the site 
for 15 years. He not only became the boss but also the caretaker of 
what he calls his children, which are 17 boys who either live at the 
site or come to the site and spend their days there. The boys collect 
items for recycling at the site and often accompany the drivers of 
the municipal trucks, especially if they are collecting waste from the 
Sheraton Addis hotel or other institutions where they assume they 
can find valuable items. This enables them to sort out the materials 
before they reach the landfill and secure the best items, and they proudly showed me the bed sheets 
and plates from the Sheraton Addis hotel. The boys give all salvaged materials to the boss, who sells 
them to middlemen that visit the site. In return, the boss is responsible for taking care of the boys, and 
providing them with food and clothes. The income varies between 500 and 1400 birr per day. The 
boys live from day to day and do not have any saving system like ekub but instead spend any money 
they have or find another way manage without it.  
Interviews with the boys and the other scavengers indicated that there were no problems among 
the scavengers and the boys. However, the boys regarded the sites as theirs and controlled who was 
entitled to enter the site. This was evident from the stories told by the boys. For example, when the 
municipality was working on a methane project, representatives asked the boys to watch the 
equipment. The boys required 150 birr per day for this service, which would cost 20,000 birr in total, 
and therefore the municipality decided to drop the project. Some years later the municipality tried to 
start a similar project but according to the boys, hyenas came and destroyed the pipes they had 
installed. The boys were laughing when telling the story, but the incident shows the power that the 
boys exercise at the site and that not only the municipality but also other people try to access the site, 
such as myself.  
At the time when I conducted my fieldwork, no one had contacted the boys with offers of support. 
When I asked them whether they had thought about the possibility of organizing themselves, they 
replied that it would be pointless because they would not receive support from the municipality and 
even if they were to become organized the government would take any money they were supposed to 
have.
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FIGURE 22: Scavengers for items at Repi and sorted plastic bags stored for sale.    
At almost the same level as scavengers there are foragers, who collect materials from the 
municipal containers and the streets. My reason for ranking foragers slightly higher up in the 
system is based on the quality of the materials collected. It is common for foragers to 
scavenge municipal containers for valuable items by living on the site and occupying the 
containers and claiming the rights to materials disposed in them or they scavenge the rivers 
flowing through the city in hope of finding valuable materials such as metals.  
     
FIGURE 23: Forager searching the riverbed and container for valuable items.    
At the next level, one finds the Qorqoro alleh, who buy materials mainly from households 
and to a limited extent from the foragers, pre-collectors, and dorojes14. The Qorqoro alleh
differ from the foragers and the scavengers because they buy materials before they enter the 
waste stream. The quality of the materials they collect is therefore higher than that collected 
by foragers and scavengers. Moreover, the Qorqoro alleh have a strong upward link in the 
system to the wholesalers who operate in Männ alleh/allesh tära. Their close connection with 
                                                     
14 The local name for a group of criminal street boys. 
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the wholesalers is mainly based on their ethnic background as members of the Gurage ethnic 
group. It is estimated that currently c.3000 Qorqoro alleh operate in the city, all of them male, 
and dominated by young boys in their twenties (Bjerkli, 2005). Most of the Qorqoro alleh
have a contract with a wholesaler in Männ alleh/allesh tära who gives them money each 
morning to buy materials. This forces the Qorqoro alleh to sell the materials they buy to the 
same wholesaler. If a Qorqoro alleh collects materials that their wholesaler does not buy, 
there is the option of selling them to middlemen who contact the Qorqoro alleh, wholesalers, 
and small-scale craftsmen.  
           
FIGURE 24: Qorqoro alleh at work.        
The pre-collectors participate in the collection of solid waste from households. They are 
involved in the collection of materials for recovery to some degree, though sorting out 
materials from the waste they have collected.15 The pre-collectors sell their materials to the 
Qorqoro alleh or go to Männ alleh/allesh tära in order to sell the materials directly to a 
wholesaler. The wholesalers constitute the main link between the various actors. Most of the 
wholesalers are located in Männ alleh/allesh tära, the main centre for trade and reuse of waste 
materials in the city. In recent years, other areas have developed around the city for trade of 
waste materials, including Kera, Saris, and Megenagna. However, the scale of activities in 
                                                     
15 The pre-collectors started to become involved in collection of waste materials for reuse and recycling in 
2000, when they saw the opportunity to offer waste collection services to households.  
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these areas is small compared to those in Männ alleh/allesh tära and therefore they were not 
included in the study.
     
FIGURE 25: Wholesaler specializing in old shoes and in plastics.    
The middlemen form the link between the informal and the formal actors, making contact 
with factories. With regard to the intermediaries operating between the wholesalers and the 
factories, I was not able to confirm how common or widespread their position is within the 
system. I found that there were some intermediaries operating within the system, but not how 
many and whether it was common to use them or more common to make agreements with the 
factories directly. The results of my fieldwork confirmed that waste materials collected in 
other cities are transported to Männ alleh/allesh tära, and traders from rural areas travel to 
Männ alleh/allesh tära to buy materials wholesale for further sale in rural areas. Ranked above 
the wholesalers are the small-scale craftsmen, who are mainly located in Männ alleh/allesh 
tära and make use of waste materials to produce local items such as electrical stoves, large 
metal plates used to wash clothes, shoes, and cooking equipment, and to repair broken items 
such as luggage, old toys, and old shoes. In addition, there are rural traders and industries
who buy waste for recycling.  
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FIGURE 26: Electrical stoves and kitchen items made of recycled metal. 
3.4.1 MÄNN ALLEH/ALLESH TÄRA
When Ethiopia was under the occupation by Italy (1935–1941), the Italians relocated 90% of 
the local population in Piazza (the main market area for the local population) to Addis 
Ketema (Amharic for ‘the new city’), and Merkato developed as the main market for the local 
population in the city. For many years, Merkato has been known as the commercial centre of 
the city and is often referred to as the largest open market in East Africa. Merkato comprises 
different täras (market centres), including Männ alleh/allesh tära. The meaning of the Männ 
alleh/allesh tära in Amharic is ‘What have you got?’ Hence, the name is very appropriate 
because in Männ alleh/allesh tära there are hundreds of shops that collect, convert, and resell 
waste materials and it is possible to find almost anything one is are looking for.
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FIGURE 27: Korkoro tära – an area in Männ alleh/allesh tära specializing in plastic waste. 
One asphalt road passes through Männ alleh/allesh tära, which is good enough to be used by 
cars. The area is so crowded that people have to watch every step they take: people with 
several cubic metres of loads on their bowed heads run straight ahead yelling in Amharic that 
others have to move out of the way; cars travel in all directions, using their horn to warn 
people to move out of the way; donkeys with huge loads on their back trot along without 
paying any attention; and women and young boys sit on the ground selling e.g. vegetables or 
old shoes.
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FIGURE 28: Pictures showing the main road through Männ alleh/allesh tära. 
Visitors entering Männ alleh/allesh tära for the first time may find the experience difficult, but 
also exciting. One does not know what to do with oneself, because there is almost no space 
for you, yet it is an amazing experience to see all the activities, sense the busy atmosphere, 
and see the huge hills of used plastics, metals, shoes, electrical items, tires, and glass. When 
walking around the small shops visitors are sometimes amazed by the creativity involved in 
items made out of waste materials, and if they listen carefully, there may find that the sound 
of the metalworkers is like music to their ears (Melaku, 2011).16 Männ alleh/allesh tära 
appears messy and crowded, and the impression is not one of a well-organized area. On closer 
inspection, however, the area is highly organized in terms of the types of activities taking 
place. Each of the main täras is named according to the dominant type of activities related to 
waste practised in them. 
                                                     
16 This is evident in a video of Melaku Belay, an Ethiopian dancer who dances to the rhythms of the 
metalworkers in Männ alleh/allesh tära.  
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FIGURE 29: Location of the different tära for waste materials in Männ alleh/allesh tära (Retrieved from Google 
Earth, 2012). 
The main täras for the trade of waste materials in Männ alleh/allesh tära are Chid tära, 
Korkoro tära, Kulf tära, Termus and Barrel tära, and Barabaso tära (Figure 29). The types of 
materials vary and range from scrap metals, plastics, barrels, bottles, corrugated iron sheets, 
and clothes that can be reused. Visitors can see young boys and men sitting while they repair 
old shoes that have been collected from throughout the city, whereas a few metres away 
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someone may be making metal stoves for charcoal, of a type that is commonly used in 
Ethiopia for coffee ceremonies and cooking. Used metal containers that originally held paint 
or food are cut and made into plates that can be used to make either charcoal stoves or other 
kitchen items. Old oil containers are cut up and made into washing containers. Plastics 
containers are usually collected and washed for reused or sold to plastic factories. Old brake 
plates are used to make chairs, and old luggage and toys are repaired and then sold again. 
Barabaso, an area located on the edge of Männ alleh/allesh tära, specializes in vehicles tyres 
that are longer usable on vehicles. The tyres are converted into shoes known as barabaso.
Tyres are also cut to long ‘ropes’ that are commonly used for horse-drawn carriages in rural 
areas of Ethiopia.
                 (ILO, 2009) 
FIGURE 30: Pictures showing sandals and ropes made of old tyres, repair of old luggage and old bikes.  
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PART FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Methodology is much more than a systematic way of collecting, analysing, and interpreting 
data. A researcher’s choice of methodology reflects how they see the world, and their 
personal experience and understandings of the actions taking place within their research 
context. Methodology also concerns the role of a researcher and their relationships with any 
participants. In my case, it is linked to how I decided to carry out the research and how I 
considered and constructed the information given to me. Here, in Part Four, I start by arguing 
the case for my choice of methodology and the methods I used. I also give a brief overview of 
my interviewees and how I selected them. Further, I elaborate on the interpretation of data 
analysed during fieldwork, reflect upon myself as a researcher and the research context, and 
explore my relationships with the participants. Thereafter, I describe how I analysed the data, 
in order for readers to understand how I constructed and made sense of the data collected 
during and after fieldwork and to increase the validity and reliability of the data collected. 
Finally, I reflect upon the ethical choices that emerged during the research process.
4.1 AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH
The choice of methodology was closely related to my objectives and to my theoretical 
framework urban political ecology. My aim was to understand and explain the underlying 
reasons for the solid waste services provided in Addis Ababa. Since my focus was on 
exploring actors’ subjective views and agendas and how these are negotiated in the local 
context, I chose an ethnographic approach in my study. The aim of an ethnographic approach 
is to understand the world more or less as it is experienced and understood in everyday life by 
the people under study (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1996). I see the social world as dynamic 
and constantly constructed through the intersection of cultural, social, and political processes 
at various scales (Creswell, 2007). In line with UPE, I believe that each person has their own 
social constructions of reality; in my case, the reality concerns solid waste management. 
Further, I believe that social constructions are not seen as equally important within society, 
due to the distribution of power and how power circulates in a given context. My focus has 
therefore been on the stories told by the participants involved in solid waste management, in 
order to understand their lived experiences and how their subjective views have been linked to 
their actions. This was done in order to identify the causes of and reasons for actions and 
decisions made within solid waste. My emphasis was therefore on obtaining first-hand 
empirical knowledge about solid waste management, in the belief that experience is the best 
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way to understand social behaviour (Crang & Cook, 2007). Ethnography is rooted in 
phenomenology, where the aim is to identify the subjective experience of people in order to 
understand and describe their world in relation to a particular phenomenon, which in my case 
is solid waste management. However, in order to understand a person’s experience, one also 
has to see that person as part of a larger context and the interaction between them and their 
social world. It is only through social interactions that meanings are established and learned 
(Owens, 2007: 301). Ethnography is therefore an approach that involves the collection of 
subjective facts, and the interpretation of meanings, functions, and consequences of human 
actions and cultural practices and how these are implicated in the local context (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 1996). 
In the next section, I describe my research design, and argue the case for the methods 
chosen. In addition, I describe the process of selecting and gaining access to participants 
included in the research.
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN  
The research was based on five sessions of fieldwork conducted in Addis Ababa. The first 
session was carried out between September and December 2009, and was followed up by 
fieldwork in March–April 2010, October–December 2011, April 2011, and October–
November 2011. My presence in the field over a relatively long period of time was part of my 
theoretical approach. I wanted to follow developments within solid waste management and 
the also implementation of policies and their outcome. The long period of time spent in the 
field also proved essential for my understanding of the solid waste management, and enabled 
me to become more familiar with the local context and the participants.  
4.2.1 SELECTION OF METHODS 
The main method used in the study was semi-structured interviews. Through the interviews, I 
was able to gain information about the participants’ subjective views and thoughts. However, 
other methods such as personal observation, participation in workshops and seminars, 
document and newspaper reviews, and field notes were also used. It was essential to combine 
the methods in order to collect different types of information and to compare and cross-check 
the data collected. The different methods have distinctive strengths and potential and were 
been combined to understand better the social complexity of solid waste management in 
Addis Ababa. The purpose of combining the methods was not to answer one specific research 
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question or to analyse a specific part of the data collected, but rather to facilitate the analyses 
done in the field. In this way I was able to confirm and cross-check information collected 
through semi-structured interviews and to gather additional information about the solid waste 
situation that I was not able to collect through interviews (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). A 
description of the methods used and my aim are described in the following subsections.
Semi-structured interviews were the main method used and were conducted with all actors 
involved in the research, with the purpose of collecting their views on solid waste 
management. The reason for choosing semi-structured interviews was that I had certain main 
topics that I wanted to discuss with the participants (see Appendix 6 for the interview guides). 
At the same time, I wanted to be open to other information and aspects that could come up 
during the interviews, i.e. that I had not thought about in advanced or was not aware of (Kvale 
& Brinkmann, 2009). As the research progressed, I realized that I needed to hold several 
interviews with some of the participants. Although prior to undertaking the fieldwork I had 
not planned to do this, I became aware of the importance of talking to some of the participants 
several times, for three main reasons. First, I wanted to gain an understanding of the 
participants’ situation over time and then relate their views and actions to decisions or events 
that had occurred in the local context in order to have a better understanding of the reasons for 
them. Second, several interviews were conducted with some participants in order to confirm 
or dispute information provided by other participants. Third, I wanted to gain more trust from 
some of the participants involved in the research. I did not plan to hold a fixed number of 
interviews with each group of participants, but continued to arrange interviews as long as I 
felt that this was necessary in order to obtain more information. As the research progressed, 
new knowledge about the topic led to new participants, and this contributed to a fuller 
understanding of the subject under study. The interview process was stopped when I 
considered that I had reached saturation level and no new information seemed to emerge. I 
conducted 175 interviews in total. An overview of the interviews, my aims, and the 
constraints to the interviews is listed in Appendix 7.
Observations were made every day during fieldwork. Upon my return to Addis Ababa, I 
first walked around in the city and observed the solid waste situation. Solid waste 
management is one of the most visible urban services and can provide much information 
about what is going on in the city as well as being a good indicator of local governance. 
While walking, I observed the amount of waste in the streets, rivers, and open fields and 
whether the refuse containers had been emptied or were overflowing with waste. In this way it 
was possible to observe whether there had been any change in the solid waste situation in the 
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city compared to the situation during my previous visit. I found observation to be essential for 
gaining an understanding of the everyday practices of solid waste management and in order to 
compare my personal observations with the narratives of the various participants (Bailey, 
2007). I also participated in workshops arranged by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP)17, the Ministry of Urban Affairs18, and Addis Ababa City 
Administration19. During the workshops, my emphasis was on observing their views and 
listening to their arguments, and also to collect general information about the solid waste 
situation in the city.
Newspaper reviews were conducted for two newspapers, namely the Addis Fortune and 
Ethiopian Herald, published between 2004 and 2011. The reason behind their selection was 
that both of them are English newspapers and therefore I was able to perform the reviews 
without the assistance of an interpreter. There were three main reasons for conducting the 
reviews. First, I wanted to explore the image of solid waste presented in the media and 
compare it to what was observed and said during interviews. Second, I wanted to see whether 
there is a link between events in the city, such as the millennium celebrations, and the 
frequency of solid waste articles. Third, I wanted to collect additional information about solid 
waste management in the city. The relevant newspaper articles I found are listed in Appendix 
8.
In addition to the above-mentioned sources, I intended to read through municipal
documents in order to collect background information on the solid waste situation in the city. 
However, in practice it was quite difficult to access such documents from the city 
administration. The only document I was able to view was a PowerPoint presentation from 
2010. I experienced the same problem in Addis Ketema Sub-City, when I asked about reports 
on solid waste. However, the experience was not just limited to the Solid waste Management 
agency. When I tried to obtain from the Planning Department a copy of a local development 
plan for Männ alleh/allesh tära, I was informed that the report had disappeared. Similarly, at 
EPA, I was informed that the person responsible for the documents and reports was not 
available. When I visited a project office established for collaboration between AACA and the 
Agence Française de Développement (AFD), I was told that the reports were not official 
material. However, because I had carried out my master’s degree in Addis Ababa in 2004, I 
                                                     
17 Training workshop on Integrated Solid Waste Management (ISWM) base don 3R organized by UNEP 
(22-24 February 2010). 
18 Ethiopian Landfill and Solid Waste Management workshop arranged by Ministry of Works and Urban 
Development (25 October, 2009). 
19 Panel discussion about the national cleaning day arranged by Addis Ababa City Administration (24 
October, 2009). 
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already had copies of some reports on solid waste dating from 2002 to 2004 that I was able to 
use. It should be mentioned that the ILO was the only organization willing to give me a copy 
of their studies and reports conducted on solid waste in the city. 
During fieldwork I always had a field notebook with me, in which I recorded my 
observations and thoughts about possible understandings or misunderstandings of a situation 
or an interview, and how participants had acted or reacted during interviews. Throughout the 
research process, any new questions and new thoughts or relationships that came to mind 
were written down with a view to exploring them later. While the notebooks were important 
during fieldwork they were equally important at a later stage in the research process, as 
reading them helped me to ‘return’ to the field and remember details and feelings and 
recollect details of the data collection (Bailey, 2007; Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011).  
4.2.2 SELECTION OF INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS OF ACTORS 
Before going to the field I had not planned to interview a fixed number of participants, 
although I had selected institutions and groups of participants based on my knowledge gained 
during the preparation of my master’s thesis and my theoretical framework. Representatives 
of the following institutions and organizations were selected for interview. 
Addis Ababa Environmental Protection Authority (AAEPA). AAEPA is responsible for the 
overall environment in the city and is involved in research, planning, and pilot projects 
concerning solid waste management. I selected two representatives (and one follow-up 
interview) of the authority in order to collect background information about solid waste in the 
city, the official norms and regulations, and AAEPA’s views on the solid waste situation and 
future plans regarding solid waste management. Addis Ababa City Administration (AACA).
The Solid Waste Management Agency in Addis Ababa comes under the AACA and has the 
main responsibility for the overall solid waste services provided in the city. I selected five 
AACA representatives for interview (and eight follow-up interviews) in order to gain more 
information about its role and responsibilities, the current solid waste services, its views on 
the current services, and its plans for solid waste management in the future. Sub-City. Each 
Sub-City has a solid waste department responsible for solid waste management in the Sub-
City. The departmental manager of Addis-Ketema Sub-City was therefore interviewed on four 
separate occasions in order to collect information about his views, role, and activities carried 
out at Sub-City level.  
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Kebeles. Each kebele has a solid waste department responsible for solid waste services. 
The solid waste manager of the selected kebeles was therefore interviewed in order to collect 
information about his views, role, and activities carried out at kebele level. In total, I 
conducted seven interviews with the various solid waste managers. Micro- and small-scale 
enterprises (MSSEs). MSSEs operated as pre-collectors until 2009, when they were forced to 
reorganize themselves into cooperatives. I interviewed three former representatives 
(managers) of the MSSEs (and five follow-up interviews) and the cooperatives in order to 
collect information about their views and experiences regarding their work and the 
reorganization process they have undergone. Households. Members of households were 
interviewed in order to explore households’ opinions on the solid waste services provided and 
how the new provision of services compares to the services provided earlier. The information 
collected through the interviews with 20 households in Addis Ketema Sub-City was included 
to increase the reliability of the study, with the aim of identifying whether the provision of 
services had improved or decreased following the implementation in 2009 of a new regulation 
in line with BPR. Scavengers. Currently, there are c.500 scavengers who make a living by 
collecting waste from the municipal landfill, for their own consumption, reuse, or recycling 
(ILO, 2009). I interviewed five scavengers (and three follow-up interviews) that operated at 
Repi, in order to explore their views, agendas, activities, and role related to solid waste 
management. Qorqoro alleh. Young boys who go from house to house to buy reusable or 
recyclable items, which they sell to wholesalers operating in Männ alleh/allesh tära, are 
known locally as Qorqoro alleh. In total, 30 Qorqoro alleh were interviewed (and 6 follow-up 
interviews) in order to explore their views, agendas, activities, and role related to solid waste 
management in the city. Wholesalers. Waste items for the reuse and recycling trade are 
purchased by wholesalers who form the central link between the actors operating in the 
informal recycling system in Addis Ababa. In common with other actors in the informal 
recycling system, I selected six wholesalers for interview (and four follow-up interviews) in 
order to explore their views, agendas, and activities related to solid waste management. 
International organizations. Several international organizations have been involved in solid 
waste management in Addis Ababa. I aimed to explore their activities, views, and agendas by 
interviewing representatives. A total of eleven interviews were conducted with participants in 
international organizations.
Local NGOs. Many local NGOs are involved in solid waste management. For my case 
study, ENDA Ethiopia is the main NGO, not only in terms of the length of time it has been 
involved but also because it has been involved in most projects concerning solid waste in the 
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city. I conducted eleven interviews with representatives of ENDA Ethiopia and other NGOs 
in order to explore their views, agendas, and activities related to solid waste management. For 
a more detailed overview of the interviews see Appendix 7. 
The participants involved from AACA, Addis Ketema Sub-City, and kebeles were 
selected purposively. This was also the case for some of the international organizations, 
MSSEs, cooperatives, and local NGOs involved in solid waste management. However, some 
of them were selected using the snowball technique because I was unaware of them as 
potential actors before going to the field (Bailey, 2007). They were therefore included as the 
research progressed. With regard to actors operating in the informal recycling sector, all were 
selected randomly using the snowball technique. In some cases, it was a challenge to access 
participants, particularly the scavengers and wholesalers. During fieldwork several attempts 
was made in order to approach them, as described in Textbox 3.  
TEXTBOX 3: ATTEMPTS TO ACCESS SCAVENGERS AND WHOLESALERS
Scavengers: The easiest way to access the scavengers would have been to go through the city 
administration, since it controls the dump site and is familiar with the people who make a living 
from the site. However, approaching the scavengers through the local government would, from the 
outset, have destroyed my relationships with the participants. Given the tense political situation in 
the city at the time when I conducted my fieldwork and my previous experience of accessing the 
scavengers, I was concerned that I could be viewed as someone from the municipality and I was 
not willing to take this risk. My focus was therefore on ensuring a positive first meeting with the 
participants. My first attempt to access the scavengers was with my interpreter, when we decided 
to visit the dump site. When we stopped our car, we were immediately surrounded by boys who 
occupy the landfill and it was clear that we were not welcome. The first question I was asked was 
‘What do you want?’ It became apparent that I was not the first person who had tried to contact 
them when one of the boys said ‘We are not monkeys. You guys just come here to take pictures of 
us and ask us questions. You take what you want and you disappear.’ After trying to explain who I 
was and what my interests were, they told me that I could enter the site if I paid 1000 Ethiopian 
birr for one interview. I then decided to leave and wait for another opportunity to access them.  
A few weeks later, at a seminar I came in contact with a local NGO representative who had been 
working on a methane gas project at Repi and that person was willing to accompany me to the 
site. The person knew the ‘boss’ and arranged a meeting between us. When we arrived at Repi, we 
received more or less the same greeting as I had on the previous occasion. It turned out that the 
previous ‘boss’ was no longer present. A new boy had taken his place and we were asked to leave. 
However, I was able privately to arrange meetings with the previous boss and held four informal 
interviews with him in the city. Still, I wanted to access the scavengers at Repi in order to gain 
information from other scavengers elsewhere. 
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During my next fieldwork session, I decided to contact an NGO who ran a school close to 
Repi. My hope was to be introduced to a student with some form of relationship with the 
scavengers. I talk to the school principal and asked him whether any of the students collected 
waste at the landfill or had done in the past. I was fortunate to make contact with one boy who 
made a living as a scavenger and was willing to introduce me to other scavengers. Upon entering 
Repi with the boy, again the boys that occupied the site clearly indicated that they were displeased 
to see me and acted aggressively. Nevertheless, they allowed us to walk around and talk to the 
other scavengers. The scavengers who were willing to talk to me were clearly slightly stressed and 
the atmosphere was tense.  
Also the wholesalers were difficult to access. I knew that they had organized themselves into 
associations, but had no idea of their locations. Therefore, I went to the Chamber of Commerce in 
Merkato to ask for the names of some of the associations and any contact information. I was 
provided with contact information for one man, who telephoned to arrange for a meeting. 
However, he failed to turn up, and instead sent another man to meet me. I did not reflect much 
upon the change of plans at the time, but as research progressed I experienced such behaviour 
several times with other participants. Given the tense political atmosphere in the city at the time 
when the fieldwork was carried out, it may have been a strategy to check first that it would be safe 
to talk to me. The selection of other wholesalers was done using the snowball technique. Some of 
the participants seemed quite reluctant to meet me and give information about other participants. 
Most of them seemed to fear what could happen if they talked to me and were clearly sceptical of 
me and my agenda. I developed the feeling that they did not want to place some of their friends in 
the same position. In some cases, it was plain that they did not want to talk to me and adopted 
different strategies to avoid me, most often by not answering my phone calls or showing up at 
prearranged meetings. In one case, one of the participants showed up at a meeting only to tell me 
not to try to contact him ever again. As research progressed some of the wholesalers also realized 
that they were not going to gain any benefits from talking to me and then seemed even more 
reluctant to be interviewed. At the end of my last fieldwork session, I contacted one of the 
participants who I had frequently met and had developed a good relationship with, and asked him 
about his first impressions of me. He responded: ‘We thought you were an investor interested in 
Männ alleh/allesh tära. We were therefore not sure if we could trust you, but we decided to meet 
you and check things out. You know, we can never be sure that you are telling us the truth and that 
there is another reason for contacting us.’ After having met a few of the wholesalers, I sensed that 
some of the new interviewees already knew about me. I had the impression that the interviewees 
had talked to each other about me, because they seemed prepared for my questions, knew who I 
was, and were aware of my agenda. My suspicions were confirmed when I arranged a meeting 
with one participant, and upon asking where we should meet, he replied ‘We can meet at the same 
place you were asking about Korkoro tära last week’.
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The selection of scavengers and wholesalers in the two cases presented in Textbox 3 was 
random. The cases also show how the political context had made the participants sceptical of 
strangers and their agenda, and in some cases had resulted in them being reluctant to become 
involved in the research. In both cases, some of the participants also had their own agenda, 
including the hope of payment or other benefits such as a good contact, and did not only 
become involved to give me information (as further discussed in Section 4.6, on ethical 
reflections). In the case of the scavengers, it is possible that if previous researchers had not 
fulfilled their promises and it may explain the reluctance to participate. Also, the dominant 
view of the scavengers within society has affected their own view of themselves and could 
explain their unwillingness to be involved in the research. These two cases show how the 
political context, participants’ agendas, and their views of me as a researcher affected my 
access to them and also information they provided (Bailey, 2007). In the next section, I 
explore how the research context, the use of an interpreter, actors’ agendas, and power 
relationships affected the information collected and the research process. 
4.3 ‘TRIPLE HERMENEUTIC’: THE EFFECTS OF USING AN INTERPRETER 
Because I did not speak the local language I had to use an interpreter during some 
interviews.20 I chose to use the same interpreter as I had used during the research for my 
master’s degree. My reasons for choosing him were that we had a good relationship, I trusted 
him, and he was familiar with the research topic and my interests. Since the political 
atmosphere in the city was tense, it was important for me to have an interpreter with a 
personality that made people feel relaxed. The interpreter was a man in his early thirties and 
without a formal education. However, I regarded him as a reflective and engaged man. He 
was down to earth, a good listener, and did not interrupt the participants when they talked. He 
was also good at breaking up a formal and tense atmosphere by telling a joke or discussing a 
current topic of conversation. In addition, he was very observant and during interviews he 
helped me to decode words such as ‘bee’, which in Addis Ababa refers to the ruling party, as 
well as words frequently used by the ruling party, such as ‘transformation’, which could 
indicate that participants were member of the EPRDF. As Clark & Michailova (2004) point 
out, the roles of my interpreter were not just a decoder of words and an interpreter of 
                                                     
20 The use of my interpreter was mainly with participants involved in the informal recycling system, the 
cooperatives, and officials at sub-city and kebele level.  
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interviews; he was also my local and cultural guide, who explained local customs and 
everyday practices, and a person with whom I could discuss my findings and thoughts.
As a result of the political atmosphere in Addis Ababa,21 I chose not to use a tape recorder 
and in some cases not even a notebook during the interviews, mainly to avoid scepticism on 
the part of participants who did not know whether they could trust me or my intentions (as 
shown in the case of the wholesalers). After interviews, my interpreter was a valued 
discussion partner regarding what the participants had said and to ensure that we shared the 
same understandings of the interviews, including the different meanings of what had been 
said and how participants had acted during the interviews.  
The way we see the world is based on social constructions, and in my case the data I 
collected represents the world seen by the participants involved in my research. However, the 
kind of information they chose to impart was affected by the context, my interaction with 
them, and their attitude towards me. The interviewees were responsible for information 
collected and translated by the interpreter. In turn, the interpreter was selective and analytical 
in his translation. Thereafter, I analysed the information and attributed meaning to it. Thus, 
the information was constructed and given meaning in three phases, and hence was selective 
by nature. It may have therefore have been a case of a triple hermeneutic rather than a double 
hermeneutic (Giddens, 1987). However, I would argue that even though I did not record the 
interviews, the data collected were cross-checked, followed up, and analysed throughout the 
whole process of data collection, in order to increase the validity and reliability of the 
information collected. Further, I consider my data to be reliable and valid because I used a 
range of techniques to validate them. In my opinion, the approach was the best way to deal 
                                                     
21 The tense political situation in the city is evident from the following quotes from two informants: 
‘Ohh … I would never talk about politics anymore … not even with my family and neighbors because you 
never know anymore … the brother of my best friend has become a member now. I know it, but he is to ashamed 
to tell us … but he comes here and acts like nothing has happened … we know, so we don’t talk, so he has 
nothing to report. You know … even the children of my neighbors are told to go out in the street and observe. 
The reason I know is [that] on the Election Day they were standing on the corner right over there already at five 
[o’clock] in the morning … usually they are not up and out before eight [o’clock], so what were they doing 
standing at the corner just doing nothing?’  
‘They came from the kebele and asked me how many election cards I had in my house and controlled the 
number of people and rooms in the house. Before leaving, they asked me what kind of party I was going to elect 
for in the coming election … I was afraid … you know the house I live in belongs to the kebele … so you never 
know what will happen if I do not support them.’
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with data collection in a highly politicized context, although the outcome of the work is 
clearly limited in space and time.  
4.4 POWER RELATIONS IN THE FIELD
Many have argued the importance of reflecting upon power relationships in the field and how 
they affect any information collected. In this section, I reflect upon me as a researcher, my 
relationships with the participants, and the process of collecting and analysing data collected 
in the field.
4.4.1 THE ROLE OF A RESEARCHER
During my research I was primarily an ‘outsider’ – a person who does not share the same 
characteristics as their participants, such as gender, ethnic background, language, and 
experiences (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). As a young Norwegian female PhD student, my way of 
seeing and understanding the world was quite different from the participants involved in the 
research.
During my final session of fieldwork, I asked my interpreter to record in writing some of 
his thoughts and how he had experienced me and the research process. The following passage 
is quoted directly from his text: 
The first time I know what for she is here, I thought, what kind of education is it and she is too 
young I said to myself. In the first place the research she is doing was funny to because I am 
expecting all researches will be in terms or titles of, like: medical things, agriculture, new 
technologies, etc. After days and years of hard working she shows me that my assumption was 
wrong. And also through her work she teaches me never to give up before I get what I’m up 
to. The good thing is she is my good friend and employer, the best thing I see is although we 
speak different languages and we had different skin colours we both can’t see the difference 
because there was no any difference! 
The quote provides insight into my interpreter’s view of me and my work. First, I did not fit 
with his expectations of a researcher: I was too young and my research topic was far from 
what he considered to be research. He also pointed out that I never gave up before had I found 
the information that I was after. At times when I was unable to follow the logic and 
understand the contradictions in the participants’ narratives, this personality trait proved 
important for enabling the research to continue and progress. It took me some time to 
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understand the actors’ agendas and actions, especially because I was unfamiliar with their 
‘ways of doing’ in the study context. In the above quote, my interpreter also makes the point 
that even though I was an ‘outsider’ with very different characteristics from his, ultimately we 
proved to be very similar. This is in line with Dwyer & Buckle’s (2009) argument that 
researchers are neither purely outsiders nor insiders. As we engage with our participants we 
are in some way or another involved and distinguished from them. Dwyer & Buckle (2009) 
talk about the space between, where the two positions cannot be conceived as absolute but as 
constantly changing, moving between the two positions. Being an insider or an outsider has 
benefits and limitations. One has to adapt to a different way of doing research and different 
techniques depending upon one’s position. In both cases, it is important to reflect upon the 
data collected and the social relationships that found place, and any misunderstandings that 
might have occurred.  
4.4.2 SUBJECTIVITY, AGENDAS, AND POWER RELATIONSHIPS  
I found the process of collecting and analysing data interesting and challenging, and it also 
enabled me to develop a deeper understanding of the context, and reasons for the participants’ 
actions and interactions. It is not easy to explore people’s views and agendas. Societies are 
much ‘messier’ in practice than the theories about them. People are complex, ambivalent, and 
inconsistent. The ability to engage with the messy world is seen as the most valuable 
contribution to ethnographic research. Researchers should not take a naïve stance and assume 
that what they are told is the truth. Instead, their research must involve a struggle to produce 
intersubjective truths, in order to understand why so many versions of an event are produced 
(Clark & Michailova, 2004).
Research participants make sense of the actions taking place around them and engage in 
the actions based on their culture, social class, experience, and their private interests. We 
cannot understand a person’s narrative or action without seeing it in relation to the context 
that the participant is part of (Wertsch, 1991). People have different experiences and act in the 
world at multiple points, times, and places. All these experiences and actions are rooted in 
gender, class, and ethnicity, and have to be understood in relation to a participant’s history. In 
order to understand a person’s narrative it is not enough to identify where people are (both 
socially and spatially), one must also question where they are coming from, going to, and 
where on these paths the research encounters have occurred (Crang & Cook, 2007). Further, a 
person’s identity can be understood as an assemblage of thoughts, feelings, and memories that 
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might not always fit together. In most cases, people’s views and thoughts are pragmatic, and 
in a state of flux and should be seen in relation to the context that they (people) are part of. 
The task for researchers is to recognize and come to terms with participants’ partial and 
situated subjectivity, in order to gain a deeper understanding of their narratives (Crang & 
Cook, 2007). The stories told can therefore not be seen as an absolute truth, but as constructed 
by the social actors themselves. Few people are completely honest or consistent in what they 
say in different contexts. On reflection, I have realized that some of the narratives presented 
during meetings with participants cannot be completely reliable. On some occasions the 
interview context affected the information given to me. For example, when kebele officials
observed some of the interviews, the participants indicated that they had given what they 
thought was the ‘correct’ answer. On other occasions, the participants’ narratives changed, 
especially in the case of civil servants, whose narratives shifted from idealistic stories when 
they were employed by the city administration to a friendlier attitude and more honest 
answers after they had lost their jobs. The differing responses also reflect their agendas and 
position at the time, which varied from being committed to assisting me to trying to obtain 
some benefits in return. From the kebele level up to minister level, participants asked about 
the possibility of receiving, for example, scholarships and doctoral degrees. This shows how 
agendas are always changing and that participant are not always consistent regarding their 
narratives. This awareness enabled me to reflect upon the research process, the way the 
research was carried out, and the choice of methods used to try to uncover some of the messy 
realities in the field. However, in order to reflect, it was essential to be in the field over time 
and to identify where the participants were and where they were heeded. In the next section, I 
describe the research process in more detail and explore how it was shaped by power 
relations, actors’ agendas, and the local context. The purpose is to discuss how I dealt with 
power relations and changing agendas and how I dealt with the gap between the narratives 
presented to me and the practice I observed on the ground. 
4.5 MAKING SENSE OF THE DATA – THE PROCESS OF COLLECTING AND 
ANALYSING DATA 
Staeheli & Lawson (1994) argue that the relationships between a researcher, their participants, 
and the participants’ narratives will affect the information generated from them. Researchers 
cannot avoid the power relations that exist between themselves and their participants and 
therefore they should be more aware of these processes in the field. Researchers are also in a 
position to name categories, control information about their research agenda, and define 
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interventions. Such choices should be made more explicit in research, in order for others to 
understand the production of the data collected and to increase the reliability of the research 
(Crang & Cook, 2007; Flick, 2007; Harrison, MacGibbon, & Morton, 2001), and I intend to 
do this in this section.
The research process was not a straightforward task but was developed over time. During 
fieldwork, I soon realized that there was always an agenda behind the stories told to me and 
that part of my job was to understand why the stories were told. I therefore had to be flexible, 
patient, and adapt to a variety of different roles. By choosing a qualitative methodology, I had 
the flexibility to change focus during the research process (Hay, 2000). The research design 
was not rigid and was modified as my understanding of the topic changed, and new aspects 
were included that I had not previously considered. Sometimes I felt more like an 
investigator, lifting all the stones I could find in order to see whether there was anything of 
interest underneath. At every step of my fieldwork it was important to relate the information 
to the research context, the participants’ background, and my own relationships with the 
participants, in order to analyse the information and to be able to look for new 
understandings, relationships, and aspects. An essential part of the analysis done in the field 
in order to construct and make sense of the information was triangulating the information 
collected and not taking anything for granted. The more information I collected about a topic, 
the more I realized how complicated the social world is and at some point the complexity 
seemed infinite. For this reason, I used the constant comparative method (CCM), an approach 
used in qualitative research to analyse data, whereby collected data are compared 
continuously with previous data collected (Postholm, 2005). During the whole research 
process each interview was analysed and then compared with all other interviews. From the 
first interview and throughout the whole research process this led to new information, new 
questions, and new participants, in order to clarify issues, understand contradictions, to 
confirm or dispute information, and to try to understand the logic behind the data collected. 
This resulted in a continuous development of my understanding of the topic under study. In 
order for readers to understand and to judge the validity and reliability of my research, I 
adapted Boeije’s (2002) suggestion for how to conduct CCM. In the following subsections, I 
show how I analysed one interview, then interviews within a group of actors, and then 
between groups of actors. Further, the participants’ narratives are related to my own 
observations in the field and information collected through document and newspaper reviews, 
in order to evaluate the reliability of the information given to me. I have chosen to present the 
process of analysis by using one example of how I analysed an interview with a participant 
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from AACA. I show how I used open coding and how the analysis led to the integration of 
new actors and to new questions. Thereafter, I compare the subjective views and narratives 
told by participants within the municipality and then between different groups of actors 
involved in solid waste. However, when data were collected and analysed in the field, there 
was much more across different groups of actors and the process was not as linear as 
presented here.
4.5.1 ANALYSING SINGLE INTERVIEWS  
Following an interview, my first action was to discuss the interview with my interpreter. It 
was vital for me to spend a lot of time with my interpreter for three main reasons. First, given 
my interpreters knowledge of the spoken language it was easier for him to read the body 
language of the participants (e.g. whether they were nervous, arrogant, sceptical, or reacted to 
some of the questions). Second, since I chose not to use a tape recorder and in some cases did 
not take any notes during interviews, he helped me to memorize what was said, and hence I 
could be certain that my notes taken after the interviews were complete. Third, since he was 
Ethiopian and an insider, I found it helpful to discuss with him what had been said by the 
participants. Our discussions enabled me to reflect upon the information collected, to see it 
from different perspectives, and relate it to the context. After an interview, I needed to 
question whether some aspects needed to be explored further, whether new questions had 
arisen, and whether I should include new participants. All interviews were analysed using 
open coding, to determine what exactly was said and to label each quote with a code. My aim 
at that stage of the analysis was to find the core message of the interview, to reduce the 
information into codes and sub-codes, and to relate the information to the context and to my 
theoretical framework (Creswell, 2007). Table 1 shows an extract of part of my records of an 
interview with one participant from the city administration and how I coded the information. 
It also lists some of the new questions that rose after the interview, which led me to involve 
new participants and aspects in the research process. 
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TABLE 1: Example of open coding of one interview and new questions that arose. The transcript is my own 
notes taken after the interview. 
Actors Transcripts Categories New questions 
C
ity
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
 
Our future plans for solid waste is that we want to 
apply the best technology available to our system. 
One of these is a new GPS system that we are 
planning for. This means that I can sit in my office 
and control the trucks operation in the city. A 
computer system where all the trucks are registered 
and I can see where the trucks are, how many trips 
the trucks has taken…We are also working on a 
ISWM plan that will be finished within three 
months and we have also planned to close Repi the 
old landfill within a few months and to construct a 
new sanitary landfill. We will also construct four 
transfer stations in the city in order to make the 
transportation more efficient. When the transfer 
stations are in place we will start sorting out organic 
materials there. The first years, this will be done 
manually and by time other materials will be sorted 
out. Have you thought about entering partnership 
with the Qorqoro alleh and the wholesalers in 
Männ alleh/allesh tära when you will start with 
source separation? No, they are an un-modern 
system and we want to establish a good system for 
reuse and recycling. They will be allowed to 
continue to work but will not be included in our 
system.  
Modern, high-tech, control, 
ISWM plan, new landfill 
and transfer stations, source 
separation, ignorance of the 
informal actors, traditional 
How will the new system 
affect the current system? 
Try to get the ISWM plan. 
Talk to those who has 
worked with the plan – 
how has the process been 
what are the main findings 
and plans? Talk to those 
responsible for Repi – what 
will happen to the 
scavengers? Talk to the 
scavengers – what is their 
view and have somebody 
given them any information 
aobut the closure of Repi? 
Talk to official at higher 
levels about future plans 
within solid waste – why 
isn`t the informal recycling 
sector taken into 
considerantion? What will 
happen to the informal 
recycling sector if they 
implement the new system? 
Which of the systems will 
be most efficient?  
In some cases the information from interviews was not used due to the interview setting. For 
example, when I conducted interviews with representatives of the cooperatives, I had planned 
to hold them a quiet café, where I thought we would not attract too much attention from 
people around us. However, when we started to walk towards the café nearby the kebele
building, one person from the kebele came and told us that the kebele manager would not 
allow us to do the interview outside the kebele office. Upon entering the kebele building, I 
headed for an open room in the middle of the building. However, I was told that we were not 
allowed to sit there either, but instead had to hold the interviews in the manager’s office. 
Consequently, the interviews were conducted under the observation of the kebele manager 
and three other kebele officials. During the interviews, I sensed that none of the participants 
were honest but gave me ‘official’ answers. Although I finished the interviews as intended, I 
did not ask all of the questions I had intended to ask. I was concerned about the reaction of the 
kebele officials and did not want to put the participants in a difficult situation. Although the 
data collected through these interviews were not used in my analysis, the event was an 
experience of the type of control that the kebele officials have over the cooperatives and gave 
me a more in-depth understanding of the way power is distributed and used by actors in the 
city.
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4.5.2 ANALYSING INTERVIEWS WITHIN A GROUP OF ACTORS AND BETWEEN 
GROUPS OF ACTORS 
When conducting new interviews, the same procedure was followed as described in Section 
4.5.1 above. All interviews were then compared with previous interviews conducted with 
participants within the same group of actors. I considered whether any new aspects to the 
topics, whether there were any contradictions among the information collected, or whether 
there were different meanings represented among the actors within the group. The process of 
comparing the interviews helped me to identify common views and information that differed 
between the participants. The interviews with representatives of the city administration serve 
as an example of how I compared the information given to me by the participants in one 
group of actors, how this affected the research process, and how I constructed the 
information.  
Common to the city administration participants’ narratives was that everything seemed to 
be working well within solid waste management in the city. However, when I related this 
information to my own observations in the field, I found that it was contradictory. This 
resulted in some confusion at the beginning of the fieldwork and I often wondered how I 
could establish the truth when information given to me clearly did not fit with what I had 
observed on the ground. Also, when discussing plans for the future, I was given different 
information depending on who I was talking to. Since I was unable to access any reports on 
solid waste in the city, it was difficult to identify what source of information on plans was 
most reliable. This led to interviews with other participants, in order to confirm some of the 
plans that I had been informed about, such as the Minister of Works and Urban Development, 
EPA, the ILO, the AFD, and the city manager. After several interviews, I was able to rely 
upon one account more than others. Further, the plans presented to me did not correspond to 
what is seen as technically the best way to approach waste22. This left me confused and I had 
to start to question the plans.
During interviews with officials, it became clear that most of them had limited knowledge 
related to solid waste management. In order to understand the participants’ background and 
whether they had any experience or education related to solid waste, I asked them about other 
officials and participants and soon discovered that only a few of them had any formal 
education or experience relate to the management of solid waste. Moreover, my experiences 
in the field showed that it was difficult to have an overview over who was responsible for 
                                                     
22 An example is given in Article 3 where I describe how some officials informed that organic waste 
collected from households was to be sorted out for composting at the planned transfer stations. That would lead 
to contamination of the organic waste and in turn to low quality compost.  
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what within the city administration because the turnover was high at all levels. As a 
consequence, I found it difficult to identify various participants’ roles and responsibilities and 
to obtain the contact information for relevant persons. In addition, it was difficult to have 
continuity in my relationships with most of the participants within the city administration. My 
presence in the field over a relatively long period of time proved essential for identifying and 
understanding the underlying reasons for the narratives and behaviour of the participants. My 
relationship with one of the participants serves to illustrate this point quite well. During the 
first interview with one civil servant I was more or less told ‘fairytales’ about the solid waste 
situation in the city and in an interview with the same participant one year later the narrative 
had changed, as the notes from my field diary show: 
You know Ato … has not even completed his first degree, so he got the job only because of 
political reasons. That’s the problem ... politics comes first and because he doesn’t have any 
education it is difficult for him to take a decision because he don’t know what is best for solid 
waste in the city and they don’t listen to us professionals. That’s the problem with Ethiopia, it 
is only politics. There is a misuse of human resources and we are not able to use our skills and 
we have to do what they say. It’s all about politics and control. 
I had not anticipated that he would impart such information, and therefore started to think 
about the reasons for the sudden change in behaviour. After the interview, I started to talk to 
other participants within the municipality and soon realized that the participant had just lost 
his position, which may explain why he felt that loyalty to the party was no longer 
important.23 This information also revealed that the poor level of knowledge among officials 
was a result of the political culture within the city administration, where loyalty to the party is 
the most important criterion for employment and not knowledge, education, or any other 
experience.  
As a result of the process of going back and forward to confirm and dispute information 
and relate it to the context, I was able to figure out the contradiction in the information given 
to me. Given the political culture characterized by upward accountability, I realized that 
officials would never question orders given from the top. They would never admit to failure 
or reveal that there are problems or lack of knowledge, but instead adhere to the success 
                                                     
23 It seemed as though his agenda had changed. By being honest and telling me what he thought I wanted to 
hear, he was hoping to benefit personally. During the interview, questions about studying for a doctoral degree in 
Norway came up, and his attitude towards me changed from being authoritarian to suddenly inviting me for 
Sunday dinner with his family.  
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stories through fear of being fired. The city administration participants’ narratives were 
therefore idealistic stories about the solid waste situation, and are part of the reason why I had 
trouble identifying the logic in the information I received, because it did not match the 
situation I observed on the ground. My suspicions were also confirmed during several 
interviews with civil servants over time.  
There were many groups of actors involved in the research, and I although I do not 
discuss all of them here, one example serves to show how I analysed the information provided 
by representatives of the city administration and the wholesalers. From the interviews, it was 
clear that their views and agendas relating to solid waste management differed and were 
conflicting. I was therefore able to identify possible areas of conflicts between the two groups 
of actors. Due to my awareness of the city administration’s views and agendas, it was easier 
for me to understand the views, agendas, and actions of the wholesalers. Through the 
wholesaler’s narratives and their experiences of their relationships with the city 
administration, the wholesalers confirmed the bureaucracy and high turnover rate of officials 
within the city administration. By comparing the information given to me by the different 
group of actors I was able to cross-check the narratives and increase the reliability of the 
results. This was just one example of how I analysed and compared interviews and how I 
related the information to the context in order to understand the narratives and to identify the 
participants’ positions in terms of their agendas and power in the field.  
4.5.3 CODING AND ANALYSING DATA AFTER RETURNING FROM THE FIELD 
According to Bailey (2007), analysing data means breaking down the data collected into 
components, in order to interpret the meanings and place them in context. As described in 
section 4.5, my analysis started already in the field, when I tried to identify meanings and 
understand the information given to me. When I returned to my office in Norway, I started to 
read through my records of the interviews and the analyses done in the field, and enter the 
open coding into Excel. I then read through my interviews and field notes one more time and 
coded the data. As Bailey (2007) argues, at this stage in data analysis it is important to reduce 
the amount of data collected. By doing this, I found it easier to identify the different 
categories among the actors, whether there were any relationships between them, and whether 
there were any similarities or differences between the actors (Gibbs, 2007). At this stage, I 
used axial coding (Creswell, 2007), whereby categories developed in individual interviews 
were compared and related to each other. When doing this, I tried to relate phenomena to each 
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other, to key events, and to contextual factors, in order to identify a storyline by relating the 
different categories to each other and to the research context. I also started to read through my 
field diary, looking for reflections and thoughts that could be linked to some of the categories. 
This enabled me to identify any relations between attitudes, strategies, behaviour, and 
decisions taken by the various actors. The final stage in my analysis of the data was to relate 
the coding of the data to my analytical framework. Organizing my data in line with the 
analytical framework allowed me to see the production of solid waste at the various locales 
over time more clearly and to understand the underlying reasons for the development.  
4.6 ETHICAL CHOICES AND REFLECTIONS 
Doing fieldwork involves interfering in the lives of the participants involved research. As 
Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) argue, this affects the participants in several ways, and therefore 
doing research is an ethical and a moral issue. According to Hay (2000: 25), ethics is about 
‘the conduct of researchers and their responsibilities and obligations to those involved in the 
research’. Research should therefore be founded on the expectations that it will not harm the 
participants. At best, research should give something back to the participants. However, in the 
field it is not always easy to ensure that ethical principles are upheld. As I have outlined in 
this section on methodology (Par Four), fieldwork involves interaction between researcher 
and participants, and in such relationships there are always expectations and struggles over 
the power that influences the interactions (Hay, 2000).
Ethics usually refers to informed consent, privacy, and confidentiality, and the avoidance 
of any actions that could harm participants. Informed consent means that participants agree to 
be involved in research and that they understand what they are agreeing to (Hay, 2000; 
Silverman, 2011). All the participants involved in my research were informed about the aim 
of the study, the topic, and why I wanted to include them in my study. In addition, I informed 
them that that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time 
(Bailey, 2007). However, my experience of informed consent proved not to be 
straightforward. Even though the participants had been informed about the aim of the research 
and why I wanted to talk to them, it was clear that some of them did not trust me and were 
clearly sceptical of me and my intentions. In other cases, the participants had first agreed to 
participate and later told me not to disturb them any more (as in the case of the wholesalers 
described in Textbox 3). Some of the participants also tended to avoid me after our first 
meeting (i.e. the time when they agreed to become part of the research) by not answering my 
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phone calls and not showing up at meetings.24 During the research process the informed 
consent change with time and as research progressed, with the result that some of the 
participants initially agreed to participate but later decided to withdraw from the research.  
Confidentiality means protecting participants, not revealing private information, and 
ensuring that it is not possible for participants to be identified. In my case, confidentiality was 
important due to the political context in Ethiopia. Some participants were fearful of becoming 
involved and being honest, due to the possible consequences it could have for them. Some of 
the officials within the city administration placed themselves in a situation where, if they were 
identified, they could lose their job due to not being loyal. Hence, in this thesis I do not 
mention any names or personal characteristics, and the participants are only referred to 
collectively as groups of actors. However, as a researcher one never has full control over the 
research context. In the field, there is likely to be many people who observe who one is 
talking to, and in my case I was never completely sure whether anyone had observed me with 
a participant and informed others about it. Such ethical and moral questions arose throughout 
the research process and changed in nature depending on the participant and the research 
context. I had to address the questions every day, in order to evaluate whether or not I would 
have to exclude certain participants.
Also reciprocity is a central issue when doing fieldwork in developing countries, and is a 
debated issue because it involves moral issues about what is right and wrong. The practice of 
offering gifts or paying participants can affect local expectations, power, inequality, and 
personal discomfort, which in turn presents ethical and moral dilemmas (Hammett & Sporton, 
2012). The ethics of paying participants is widely debated, and Van Blerk (2006) argues that 
researchers cannot expect to interfere in people’s daily life and just take without giving 
anything in return. Payment is seen as important in order to compensate participants for their 
personal time. However, it is acknowledge that paying participants might affect the reliability 
of any information collected, leading to participants only becoming involved in research due 
to the economic benefits. By contrast, Meth & Malaza (2003) argue that providing 
participants with some financial benefits might acknowledge the power relations between the 
participants and the researcher, thus leading to more honest relationships. McKeganey (2001) 
argues that the practice can lead to a culture of expectations that participation in research 
involves financial rewards. I experienced this during my fieldwork, when some of the 
scavengers refused to take part in the study unless they received financial compensation. 
                                                     
24 From my field notes, I estimate that the participants did not turn up at 34% of my meetings. 
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Also, in my relationships with the Qorqoro alleh, I experienced that some of them expected 
some kind of payment, as they had heard rumours from other Qorqoro alleh involved in an 
international research project who were receiving 30 birr per interview. In the case of the 
scavengers (group of boys), I decided not to pay them for interviews because I consider it 
unethical to pay 1000 birr and I was also concerned about what the money would be used for. 
I was uncomfortable about the prospect of contributing to the culture and concerned that the 
information given to me would not be reliable (Ensign, 2003). In the case of the Qorqoro
alleh and the other scavengers, I decided to pay each of them 30 birr for an interview. The 
main reason for this choice was that I wanted to compensate them for their time and to give 
something back to them. However, as discussed in previous sections (4.5), I reflected upon 
the information they provided, in an attempt to increase its reliability.  
4.7 THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING IN THE FIELD OVER TIME
My experience showed that research is not a straightforward process, and that it was affected 
by power relations between me and the research participants, the participants’ agendas, and 
the local context. The process of collecting data gave me a deeper understanding of Ethiopian 
society, the accepted behaviour, and everyday life, and proved to be an essential part of my 
findings. I could not have gain this experience and understanding without have spent as much 
time in the field. Further, the fieldwork made it possible for me to confirm or dispute the 
information I received and without it my analysis would have been based purely on 
assumptions. If a researcher is unable to see developments over time, they lose access to 
essential information that otherwise may explain the current situation.
During the research process, I also experienced self-doubt and doubts about my findings. 
On several occasions I questioned whether the solid waste management system in Addis 
Ababa was really as bad as I thought it was. I asked myself whether I had buried myself in my 
own views and theories, and was failing to recognize other understandings and underlying 
reasons. At such times, I returned to my data and tried to abstract my experiences and instead 
to look for other understandings. It was therefore important for me to return to the field and 
observe and to discuss my thoughts and understandings with Ethiopians. However, I tried to 
acknowledge the complexity of representation inherent in transcriptions and to disclose how 
the transcription process unfolded throughout the research. This in turn, contributed to the 
reliability of the empirical data collected and analysed, and has affected the rigor or 
trustworthiness of the overall findings. However, the research presented in this thesis focuses 
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on the participants’ stories, and therefore the outcome of the research has subjective aspects in 
terms of my experience and relationships with the participants.  
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PART FIVE: SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
In this section I present a short summary of the five articles included in Part Seven and the 
relation between them. I also synthesize the arguments that emerge in the articles, put them 
into a broader perspective, and see them in relation to my research questions and theoretical 
framework. I start with a brief summary of the articles and then discuss the main topics that 
have emerged, before ending with the conclusions of the research.
5.1 SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLES 
My aim has been to understand the production of solid waste management in Addis Ababa by 
focusing on power and politics using governance and UPE as a theoretical framework. In all 
of the articles my focus has been on exploring the subjective views and agendas of the actors 
involved and the power relationships between them in order to understand who is included in 
the governance process and how the process operates and affects the management of solid 
waste in Addis Ababa. The main findings of the study are presented in the five articles, all of 
which deal with the issue of solid waste management and governance in Addis Ababa and 
analyse it in relation to various scales. 
Article 125 was written early in the preparation of this thesis and shows the consequences 
and problems involved in the partnerships between the informal actors and the city 
administration. The article argue that the political context, which is characterized by political 
manipulation, poor accountability, lack of opportunities for participation, and lack of trust 
towards local authorities, has prevented the successful integration of the actors. Article 226
builds on Article 1, but the focus is only on the relationships between the city administration 
and the pre-collectors from 2004 to mid-2011. The article is framed in a governance 
perspective, with the aim of exploring how the adoption of good governance policies has been 
implemented and how governance operates within solid waste management in Addis Ababa. I 
argue that the city administration has used ‘good governance’ to promote its own interests, 
such as increasing control over civil society and creating jobs in pre-election times. I show 
how this has resulted in the exclusion of actors instead of increased participation and in 
inefficient management of solid waste. Article 3,27 uses UPE as a theoretical framework and 
address the relationships between the informal recycling sector and the city administration. 
                                                     
25 ‘Between neglect and control: Questioning partnerships and the integration of informal actors in public 
solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ 
26 ‘Governance on the ground: A study of solid waste management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ 
27 ‘Power in waste: Politics and conflicting agendas in planning for integrated solid waste management in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’ 
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The focus is on the actors’ views and agendas and how these are negotiated in the local 
context. The article shows that the way power is distributed in an authoritarian context is 
closely related to access to the state. Hence, it is the views and interests of the city 
administration that are heard, and this has resulted in the exclusion of informal actors. 
However, I show that the political culture within the city administration is the main obstacle 
to the city administration’s efforts to reach their goals of a high-tech solid waste management 
system and has resulted in the informal recycling sector being able to continue their activities. 
Article 428 focus on the ‘politics of scales’ and shows how the involvements of international 
organizations that aim to improve solid waste and empower the poor (pre-collectors and 
informal actors) has affected solid waste management in Addis Ababa. The article explores 
four projects supported by international organizations and shows how the governance process 
and power relationships between the actors have created new arenas for negotiations. This has 
resulted in a reinforcement of the existing power relationships, and an exclusion of the 
informal actors that the projects are intended to empower. Article 529 is written as a book 
chapter and compares solid waste management in four different cities in Africa. The article 
shows how the promotion of neoliberal policies and governance policies has taken place in all 
cities. I report that similar trends can be seen and show that solid waste is a political issue 
across different scales.
Central themes in all articles are governance and the power relationships among actors 
within these processes. In common with Heynen et al. (2006), this thesis shows that urban 
environments and in this case solid waste management should to be regarded as a product of 
‘urban metabolism’ and the outcome is closely related to how power operates and the politics 
in a given context. In the following sections, I discuss some of the common themes that have 
emerged in the articles: waste as a resource, the governance and the politics of solid waste 
management, and the role of power and culture for understanding solid waste management, 
all of which have led to the question concerning exclusion and strategies to claim the right to 
resources in Addis Ababa.
                                                     
28 ‘Questioning the contribution of international organizations in urban services: The case of solid waste 
management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’  
29 ‘The politics of solid waste management in Accra, Addis Ababa, Maputo and Ouagadougou: Different 
cities, similar issues’ 
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5.2 WASTE AS A RESOURCE: DIFFERENT AGENDAS AND CONCERNS  
In line with UPE, the subjective views and agendas of actors have been important in order to 
understand the production of the urban environment in Addis Ababa (Heynen & 
Swyngedouw, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2006). The various actors’ social background and 
experiences have been shown to affect their views of waste and also their agendas regarding 
solid waste management, and show that their views and experiences are socially constructed 
and should be seen in relation to their social background and experience (Heynen et al., 2006; 
Keil, 2003). In all five articles, solid waste is shown to be viewed as a resource by the 
informal actors and recently also by the city administration. In Articles 1 and 2, the pre-
collectors are reported as seeing the possibility to start providing a service to the households 
in order to make an income. As shown in Article 3, the actors operating in the informal 
recycling sector have consider solid waste a resource for reuse and recycling, and therefore 
waste is an important source of livelihood for the scavengers, Qorqoro alleh, wholesalers, and 
small-scale craftsmen. In recent years, solid waste has been viewed as a resource also by the 
city administration. Article 3 shows how the city administration aims to implement a new 
integrated solid waste management (ISWM) system, where waste is viewed as a resource for 
recycling. In the same article, the city administration is reported as having created a new 
corporative to collect metals and this can be linked to the economic value of collecting metals 
for recycling. The implementation of the new solid waste system described in Article 2, 
whereby the waste fees are included in water bills and where cooperatives are paid per cubic 
metre, is also related to the acknowledgement of waste as a resource.
With the development of the city, solid waste has also become an issue related to 
modernity. According to this view, solid waste is seen as something negative and associated 
with a poor and undeveloped city, and its management is closely related to the actions taken 
by the city administration. Primarily, the image of a modern and clean city is reflected in the 
name of the waste agency, the Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Authority. 
Further, a green and clean city is also reflected in newspaper reviews (Appendix 8) and the 
various awareness campaigns conducted by the city administration (Appendix 9), where the 
focus on the cleanness of the city is readily visible whenever there are meetings such as the 
African Union summits: street sweepers visible cleaning the main streets and the evictions of 
beggars show the increased importance of the image of the city. The view of modernity is also 
shown in Articles 2, 3, and 4, where I describe how the city administration aims to introduce a 
modern and high-tech solid waste system. However, the view of the modern and clean city is 
not compatible with the current solid waste situation in Addis Ababa and the informal actors 
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involved. The planning for a new system is therefore done by ignoring the informal actors, 
who are seen as traditional, poor, and even socially shameful for the city. The subjective 
views and interests of the actors within solid waste management are presented in the articles 
as the basis of the struggles over access to solid waste as a resource, which in turn have 
affected the actors’ agendas and action taken and how solid waste is managed in the city.  
5.3 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE POLITICS OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT  
The overview and the articles have shown that the Ethiopian Government has adopted and is 
committed to implementing good governance, with the official aim of improving governance 
and urban services. Articles 1 and 2 show how the decentralization processes and the 
implementation of business process re-engineering (BPR) has not led to increased capacity, 
legitimacy, accountability, or an improved responsiveness to the citizens, despite the promises 
in the good governance policies. The articles show that the political culture has continued to 
exist within the new structure of the state. This, by adopting good governance policies the 
Ethiopian Government has been able to hide its real agendas and at the same time use good 
governance to promote its own interests, namely to secure its power and to increase its control 
over civil society. Articles 2, 3, and 4 show how the structural changes in the city 
administration, designed to give more power to lower levels of administration such as the sub-
cities and the kebeles, have been used to increase employers’ control in line with the 
traditional way of exercising power. This has resulted in upward accountability and the 
persistence of a highly centralized structure.
The creation of partnerships with the MSSEs and later the cooperatives, which are 
discussed in Articles 1 and 2, have been used in a rhetorical way, as a false increase in 
employees, whereby the creation of ‘pre-collectors’ in pre-election times in 2005 and 2010 
excluded existing actors and created new jobs for 13,000 unemployed persons in the city. In 
the articles, I argue that this may have been done to show voters that the ruling party was 
acting in the interests of the citizens. However, the actions were far from the aims of 
partnerships and instead show the political aspects of governance. The politics of governance 
is further shown in Article 3, where I describe how the informal actors have been used as 
‘vote banks’ in pre-election times, by giving the wholesalers and the Qorqoro alleh promises 
of support prior to elections, yet the city administration has not follow up their pre-election 
promises. In contrast to the World Bank’s technical approach to good governance, the articles 
have shown that governance is not only a technical issue, but also a highly political issue, and 
99 
should be treated as such. The articles show the capability of an authoritarian state to 
implement policies and simultaneously consolidate their own plans and interests, of which the 
machinery of governance is the most apparent example. By using governance as an analytical 
approach combined with an UPE approach, I have shown how the focus on actors’ subjective 
views and power relationships in a given context has been useful in order to understand how 
the urban metabolism metaphor works and to examine critically the governance process. 
Comparing this with the official claims of good governance has made it possible to reveal the 
rhetorical use of good governance by the Ethiopian Government and to understand better how 
the governance process operates at the local level.
5.3.1 THE RELEVANCE OF POWER AND CULTURE FOR UNDERSTANDING SOLID 
WASTE MANAGEMENT  
In line with UPE, the articles shows that by focusing on power relationships and how power is 
distributed and acted upon it is possible to understand the reasons behind the unequal 
distribution of resources and the management of urban services (Grove, 2009; Heynen & 
Swyngedouw, 2003; Heynen et al., 2006). To gain a deeper understanding of how power is 
distributed and acted upon, it has to be seen as a historical product of the social interaction in 
a given context over time and in relation to scales. Seen in a historical perspective, the 
Ethiopian culture has been characterized as hierarchical, where individuals are defined 
according to their socio-political status such as class, gender, and ethnicity (Poluha, 2004; 
Vaugan & Tronvoll, n.d). Despite official attempts to decentralize the state and give more 
power to lower levels of city administration and empower the poor through improved 
participation, the articles show that the political culture in Addis Ababa is still characterized 
as authoritarian and highly centralized. Most decisions are still made at the top and 
implemented down the state’s bureaucratic structures, in line with Weber’s view of power as 
capacity, whereby the city administration has used its power to decide how things should be 
organized (J. Allen, 2003a; Engelstad, 2005). This is shown in Article 2, where I discuss how 
the city administration created a new law that denied existing MSSEs the right to continue to 
work and forced them to reorganize themselves into cooperatives without first discussing the 
new regulations with existing actors. In Article 3, this is illustrated in the case where the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED) formed a new law that denied the 
metal industry the right to buy waste from Männ alleh/allesh tära and created MetEc to secure 
the metal market for itself. Article 4, shows further how the government created a new law 
that restricted members of civil society from engaging in issues related to human rights. Due 
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to the persistence of the political culture within the society, the Ethiopian Government has 
been able to use its power to secure its own interests and control actors and their activities by 
implementing new laws and policies for how solid waste should be organized. Hence, the 
space for members of civil society to express their interests or claim their rights has decreased 
in recent years, and there are few possibilities for them to engage in the governance processes 
and have their interests heard. 
The side effect of the political culture is a city administration that is not able to perform its 
self-appointed tasks. The articles show that almost every time the government has interfered 
with current activities, they have not consulted or considered the existing actors and the 
realities on the ground. Evidently, the government is more concerned with implementing its 
own interests, which in most cases has been modern and high-tech systems that are not 
adapted to the local context and do not recognize informal actors. In none of the cases 
described in the articles, have the new laws or systems operate properly. In most cases, the 
new systems and laws have resulted in even more problems and complications. This is shown 
in Article 2, where I describe how the creation of new cooperatives leads to even more 
problems. The city administration was not able to collect money from the clients, not able to 
pay the salaries of the pre-collectors, and not able to provide enough trucks to transport and 
dispose of the collected waste. The waste regulations are not adapted to the realities on the 
ground and therefore not followed by the citizens or the city administration. This has also 
been the case for the new ISWM plan, which has no foundation in reality, and the new metal 
corporative has not been able to supply the industry with enough materials. In all cases, the 
new systems have not been efficient and their inefficiency can be seen in relation to two main 
factors. First, most decisions concerning solid waste management are made by politicians 
with limited experience and knowledge of solid waste management. In most cases, the 
decisions are not adapted to the local context or discussed with the actors involved, and 
therefore are not adopted by the local actors who instead adopt new strategies to avoid the 
new structures. Second, the failure of the new system introduced has to be seen in relation to 
the political culture within the city administration, where civil servants are controlled and 
evaluated for their loyalty. As pointed out in Articles 2, 3, and 4, in most cases civil servants 
are employed due to their political alliance rather than based on their knowledge of solid 
waste. The way power is distributed and delegated is limited due to loyalty, and this has 
resulted in the distribution of power within the city administration being concentrated at the 
top and civil servants obeying orders from above in order to secure their jobs. This in turn has 
led to accountability to the top and limited legitimacy and accountability towards civil 
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society. This finding is reported in Articles 2 and 3, where I describe how civil servants at all 
levels (kebele, Sub-City, and city) have obeyed and tried to implement orders from the top 
without questioning them. As argued in Articles 2, 3, and 4, the side effect of this political 
culture is a city administration with a high turnover, lack of institutional memory, and lack of 
capacity to manage the city. This has been argued as one of the main reasons why the city 
administration in most cases fails to reach its own goals of a modern, high-tech system of 
solid waste management in the city. Due to the inability of the state to provide an efficient 
solid waste service to its citizens, informal activities are essential in order for solid waste 
management to function in the city. As long as the state remains unable to increase its 
capacity and efficiency or to respond to the needs on the ground, informality will most likely 
dominate due to the fact that the informal sector has developed a system that works, is 
adapted to the needs on the ground, and delivers a level of service that the state has not yet 
been able to achieve.
However, the distribution of power in Addis Ababa should be understood as more than the 
local context, but as relationships made possible by actions at other scales (Swyngedouw, 
2000). As shown in Article 4, the involvement of international organizations aiming to 
empower the poor and improve the efficiency of solid waste management has resulted in the 
creation of a new scale for negotiation and in reinforcement of the current power 
relationships. This in turn has resulted in further exclusion of the informal actors. This finding 
shows the importance of the ‘politics of scales’ in order to gain a deep understanding of the 
production of solid waste in a given context, and the marginalization processes taking place 
and the outcome of this (Swyngedouw, 2000). It also shows that even thought intentions may 
be good, the outcome of actions may not be as intended. This insight is in line with Foucault’s
argument that the intention of an action is irrelevant and that the focus should be on the nature 
of the power relations and the outcome of the processes in the relations.  
5.4 EXCLUSION AND STRATEGIES USED TO CLAIM RIGHTS IN THE CITY 
In theory, good governance has been promoted to make government more efficient and 
subsequently to reduce the gap between the poor and the elite. In practice, and as shown in 
this thesis, the rhetorical use of good governance has increased the gap and reinforced 
existing power relationships between the actors involved in solid waste management. In line 
with UPE, the articles have shown that those with access to the state have been able to express 
their interests and it is therefore their views that have been heard and taken into consideration 
when decisions have been made regarding solid waste in the city (Heynen & Swyngedouw, 
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2003). In all articles, I describe how the informal actors have been excluded from 
participating in the governance processes within solid waste management. They are also 
excluded from the new plans created by the city administration and in some cases also 
excluded from their livelihoods, as will be the case of the scavengers when Repi is closed. 
The outcome of the power struggles among the actors involved in solid waste management 
has resulted in both inclusion and exclusion of actors, where loyalty to the ruling party and a 
certain social status are required in order to be included in solid waste management in the 
city.
Within solid waste management, as in other urban services apparently, power as capacity, 
whereby the government controls and decided how things should be organized, dominates all 
relationships. These power structures have existed in Ethiopia for many decades, and continue 
to dominate the social organization of Ethiopian society. However, in line with Foucault 
approach to power the state cannot be seen as an object holding power, but as power 
relationships exercised between individuals within the state and their access to power in terms 
of their position or rank which is exercised over other power relationships (J. Allen, 2003a). 
The Ethiopian Government is both authoritarian and weak. Outside the state there are several 
arenas where power is exercised within more informal structures such as religious groups, the 
family, places, ethnic groups, the informal economy, and friendships between people. Such 
informal relationships have shown to be an important strategy adopted by informal actors to 
deal with the exclusion they are faced with and their struggles over meaning and access to 
waste and their rights to Addis Ababa. Due to the culture in Ethiopia, people do not openly 
question new rules or regulations, but accept the reality they are faced with and find new 
ways of acting in order to continue making a living. In this thesis, I have viewed informality 
as power as technology, with its own rules and social organization developed over time as a 
social collective action seen in relation to the state, in order to avoid the established structures 
of exclusion and control. Article 1, 2, and 3 show how informal actors have adapted to 
informal ‘ways of doing’ in order to counteract the established structures of control. In Article 
2, this is shown where I describe how the cooperatives accepted their denied right to work 
each day, and started to collect waste from institutions at night in order to earn an income. 
The informal strategies and practices can be seen as horizontal power structures, in contrast to 
the state’s hierarchical power structures. Every time the state makes a proclamation and 
makes a decision, such as creating and implementing new rules and laws for governing civil 
society, they disturb the existing practical arrangements and structures that have evolved and 
that are adapted to the needs and realities on the ground. When a new law is proclaimed, the 
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horizontal power structures within society are immediately put into motion in order to find 
alternative solutions and new ways of doing in order to be able to continue with their 
activities. The power relationships can be compared to ‘cat and mouse’ relationships, where 
power as capacity dominates in most relationships but where informality is used as strategies 
to escape and evade the structures of control and domination. Sometimes the relationships 
mean cooperating with the state, if that is what is needed in order to continue with activities, 
while at other times their is avoidance of the state, depending on the political context at a 
given time. This has lead to a plurality of norms, ranging from social, official, and practical 
coexistence. For example, in Männ alleh/allesh tära, wholesalers went from avoiding the state 
to organizing themselves into associations, to becoming members of the ruling party, and to 
becoming involved in corruption in order to improve their chances of being able to invest in 
Männ alleh/allesh tära.
5.5. MINIMUM CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR IMPROVING SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
The UPE approach has been criticized for being too destructive and critical of current 
practice, without giving any suggestions for what should be done in order to improve the 
current situation and to achieve a more equitable distribution of resources and a more 
democratic society (Zimmer, 2010). As an external observer in a highly authoritarian society 
such as Ethiopia, I find it difficult to make recommendations for improving the situation. 
Regardless, any suggestions for improving solid waste management will be meaningless as 
long as the dominant power relationships and political culture continue in this context, and 
therefore it will be up to the Ethiopian themselves to resolve matters. The distribution of 
power in Ethiopia has been hierarchical and authoritarian for centuries. However, this cannot 
be seen as a result of the government alone but should also be seen in relation to the 
production of various norms (i.e. social, official, and practical) that form systems of 
knowledge and shape the behaviour of the actors. In order for the distribution of power to be 
changed, changes in social and practical norms need to take place at every level and in every 
sphere of Ethiopian society (Vaugan & Tronvoll, n.d). 
I have taken into consideration Andrews’ (2008) argument that one should focus on 
evaluating what works, why, and how. Accordingly, in Articles 1 and 2 I describe how Mayor 
Arkebe showed that it is possible for the city administration to act in the best interests of the 
people, and where urban services in Addis Ababa improved for some years, despite the 
political context. There may be many reasons for the success, such as a genuine commitment 
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to improve the poor condition of urban services and the fact that the poor urban services were 
becoming an embarrassment to the city administration. A further reason may have been that 
the ruling party was politically motivated to gain support in pre-election times. Based on my 
findings, I believe that the minimum conditions for an improved solid waste service in Addis 
Ababa include a genuine commitment on the part of the government to improve urban 
services (which has been argued as one of the reason for Arkebe’s achievements during his 
period as mayor). A further condition, as argued by researchers of most studies of the 
informal recycling sector, recognition of informal actors is essential. Ignoring informal actors 
has not solved existing problems, and in most cases ignorance has resulted in conflicts and 
struggles over resources, often affecting the efficiency of both the existing system and the 
new system. A third condition is that the political culture of loyalty to the ruling party should 
be changed. The existing culture is one of the main reasons for poor solid waste management 
in the city, and in this respect the city administration has been shown to be incapable of 
performing its tasks efficiently. Only with recognition of and commitment to existing actors 
and competent people – employed on a long-term basis in order to have continuity in the 
management of urban services – will a good basis for improving solid waste management in 
the city be provided. In relation to donors’ and international organizations’ involvement in 
urban services, a good place to start would be to acknowledge the political aspects of their 
activities. I consider that they should to be more critical of the facts they are presented with 
and they should dare to set more requirements or even withdraw their projects if their 
requirements are not met. By not being critical and by ignoring the realties on the ground, 
donors and international organizations are unable to reveal the rhetorical use of their projects. 
As a consequence, and as shown in this thesis, they may even contribute to the opposite 
outcome to that intended – they may contribute to ‘bad governance’.
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
I started my research by asking why solid waste management in Addis Ababa has not 
improved despite several structural changes and reforms introduced to improve urban 
services. In this thesis I have critically analysed the way that governance operates, using 
governance and UPE as an analytical framework. The study contributes to our understanding 
of how the governance process works within solid waste management in Addis Ababa. It 
offers a critical view and reveals the rhetorical use of good governance policies by the city 
administration, by showing how the Ethiopian Government has used good governance to 
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promote its own agendas and interests in order to secure its own power. The study shows that 
by promoting good governance as a technical issue, one ignores that governance can be 
misused and end up as bad governance. This study of solid waste management in Addis 
Ababa shows that good governance as advocated by international organizations and the 
Ethiopian Government has not led to improved democracy or a more equal distribution of 
resources in urban management. Instead, ‘good governance’ has resulted in more control and 
increasing inequality between the actors, where the elite benefit at the expense of the poor.  
I have shown how UPE can be used as a theoretical framework to study the provision of 
urban services and in addition I have provided an analytical framework for applying UPE in a 
constructive way. This approach has proven to be a suitable framework and shows that a 
critical approach is needed to treat governance as a political issue, not only in order to 
improve solid waste but also to draw attention to the main obstacles to obtaining a more 
democratic society for all. A more critical approach to urban services and the ways that 
governance operates is needed, in order to have a better understanding of the reasons for the 
uneven development in urban areas today and to be able to identify what is needed in order to 
improve urban services and obtain a more equitable development.  
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Between Neglect and Control: Questioning Partnerships and 
the Integration of Informal Actors in Public Solid Waste 
Management in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
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Abstract: The paper addresses the long-standing role of informal actors in solid waste 
management in Addis Ababa. Large numbers of people make a living through 
scavenging, waste collection and recycling. The varied and shifting relations between 
these actors and the local authorities are examined. For the most part, the authorities 
have largely neglected informal waste collectors. Recently, however, the role of 
informal actors was recognized and the authorities attempted to establish a 
“partnership” with informal actors in the waste sector. The paper discusses the 
consequences and problems involved in this partnership and how it facilitated 
political dominance and surveillance in a context of authoritarian governance. 
Informal actors have frequently resisted attempts at taxation and have avoided any 
collaboration with and control by the authorities. More generally, the paper concludes 
that political manipulation, poor accountability, lack of opportunities for 
participation, and the ensuing mistrust among informal actors towards local 
authorities prevent any successful integration of the actors and their interests in the 
public management of waste in the studied setting. 
Introduction 
Informal forms of work are the dominant income activities in many cities in developing 
countries, providing livelihoods for millions of people.1 A proportion of these people make a 
living through activities in the informal waste sector as waste pickers or scavengers, itinerant 
buyers, and small-scale recyclers. They are often stigmatized and many are poor. In some 
cases, though, people working in this sector earn non-negligible incomes.2 Scavenging also 
stimulates other economic activities by producing raw materials for industry and artisans. 
Informal waste recycling also has value from an environmental point of view. More 
generally, the informal waste sector plays an important role in the context of fast growing 
cities experiencing inadequate formal service provision. In spite of these various benefits, the 
attitudes of local governments are often characterized by neglect, lack of recognition, 
harassment, or even attempts to eradicate informal activities.3   
  A growing number of scholars advocate proper recognition and support of the informal 
sector in solid waste management (SWM).4 Rouse, for example, states:  “There is a need for a 
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paradigm shift in the way informal sector service providers are viewed … these enterprises 
are vital parts of the urban services simply responding to and effectively meeting customers 
needs.”5 There are also calls, in both the academic and donor literature, for policies aimed at 
integrating informal actors into municipal SWM strategies.6
Categorizing relationships between informal actors and the state 
 Such calls are often underlined 
by the view that an efficient SWM cannot be achieved by municipalities alone but rather in 
association with several partners, including private, formal and informal as well as 
community-based organizations (CBOs). On the ground, however, we have witnessed in the 
course of our research in Ethiopia serious conflicts in the concrete relationships between 
authorities and informal operators in the solid waste sector. In some cases, as this paper will 
show, the conflicts are so serious that informal actors, far from seeking recognition, prefer to 
“escape” by refusing any contact with the municipality. Alternatively, local authorities 
totally ignore the contribution of the informal sector. In this paper, we explore the troubled 
and changing relationships between informal actors and local government in the solid waste 
sector in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
The attitudes of authorities towards informal waste actors reflect cultural perceptions, 
including those relating to caste, ethnicity, and social class. Social stigmatization is 
particularly pronounced when it comes to workers in the waste sector.7
Repression – Many governments and social groups consider scavengers as backward 
and a source of shame for “modern” cities. These hostile attitudes lead to repressive 
policies, punishments, harassment, and attempts at eradication, even to the extent of 
organized murder: “Approximately 2000 ‘disposable’ individuals have been killed by 
the end of 1994 as a result of [the] ‘social cleansing’ campaign in Columbia.”
 Although 
governments often view informal waste actors in a negative way, their attitudes and 
relationships with these actors can vary. Medina classifies these attitudes and relationships, 
with reference to the waste sector, into four categories:  
8
Neglect – In many cases, authorities simply ignore scavengers. They do not take their 
contribution to waste management into account. In addition, authorities often ignore 
aspects of sustainable waste management, such as waste reduction, separation, and 
recycling that are dealt with by informal actors. This lack of recognition or neglect can 
have quite negative consequences on the lives of individuals in the informal sector. 
For the informal transport sector, Rouse described how the banning of rickshaw 
drivers from main roads in Dhaka threatened their activity, yet without solving the 
city’s transport problems.
 
9 Not taking into account the consequences of actions 
affecting the informal sector is also a form of neglect. In Addis Ababa, a “successful” 
policy for replacing fuel wood with kerosene, gas and electricity, which are supplied 
by the formal sector, led to a reduction in the use of fuel wood from 80 percent to 13 
percent but also to widespread unemployment among informal suppliers of fuel, 
including transporters and retailers.10
Collusion – Collusion is a form of partnership between local authorities and the 
informal sector, but it is a “criminal partnership.” Political clientelism, corruption, 
and bribery can flourish between authorities and scavengers, as has happened in 
Mexico between the ruling party and the caciques (the local bosses of scavengers’ 
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cooperatives).11
Stimulation – Stimulation ranges from tolerance (slightly better than neglect) to active 
integration or partnership. Most researchers and even planners agree that the 
informal sector is a resource. According to Medina, in some countries, such as 
Indonesia, China (in particular, Shanghai), Egypt, and Brazil, recognizing the 
economic, social, and environmental benefits of scavenging and recycling has led 
governments to change their previously negative attitudes towards scavenging.
 Scavengers have even been used as musclemen by the party during 
election campaigns. The term “collusion” suggests that participation or partnership 
are not necessarily positive. 
12
There have been other attempts to categorize the relationships between local authorities and 
informal actors. For instance, DiGregorio uses the categories of eradication, incorporation, 
accommodation, and collaboration. By introducing “accommodation,” he brings in a more 
positive relationship than neglect.
 
Scavenger cooperatives receive recognition and financial support (Indonesia), 
scavengers become more or less integrated into the municipal collection system 
(Shanghai), and they are provided with infrastructure and municipal services (Cairo, 
Egypt and Korea). In such cases, one could speak of a form of Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) with informal actors. Nevertheless, these examples are still 
relatively few. 
13
Current international models for urban development place great emphasis on public-
private partnerships, as a means of capitalizing on the strengths of different actors in the 
pursuit of common goals.
 Incorporation and collaboration correspond to Medina’s 
stimulation concept. DiGregorio’s notion of incorporation includes both instances where the 
municipality controls and restricts scavenging to delimited areas, as well as cases of near 
integration of scavengers, where they become “quasi-public servants.” We consider 
“integration” too strong a word and prefer to use the term “partnerships,” as it introduces 
more variability and does not necessarily imply a high degree of formality. 
14 Such models advocate the involvement of, and collaboration 
with, the private and community sector in order to solve waste management and other 
problems. And indeed, it has been noted that the informal private sector and community 
groups are also gradually being seen as partners by municipalities in developing countries.15 
Official recognition of informal service providers may be seen as a means for supporting 
employment and combating poverty and social inequality. It may also be a means of 
avoiding public expenditure for services, a strategy currently pursued by many governments 
in the neoliberal age. Partnerships may also be driven by political agendas and may 
constitute a way for the state to extend its influence into the informal sector. 
 Partnerships can exist between private and informal sector operators, as is the case in 
Bangkok, Thailand, where the latter engage in informal alliances with both public collectors 
and construction entrepreneurs, behind the back of an inefficient administration.16 In other 
kinds of partnership, such as those between a municipality and the private sector, one can 
observe unintended but quite common consequences. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, when 
analyzing public private partnerships, Mkwela showed a “classic” consequence of the 
collaboration of municipalities with the private sector.17 Proper services are provided to high 
status areas where customers are able to pay the required fees for waste collection, while low 
status areas are more or less left to themselves with an improper waste collection. This is 
quite a common problem with private sector-municipality partnerships in other countries, 
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such as those where municipalities are unable or unwilling to properly monitor their 
partners.18                  
 This paper examines how the relations between informal actors and the local authorities 
in the waste sector in Addis Ababa have changed through time. It shows how they have 
evolved from total neglect towards authoritarian partnerships for waste collection or 
continuous neglect for recycling. The paper discusses the consequences of and problems 
involved in this partnership and how it has facilitated political dominance and surveillance. 
The responses of informal actors are also presented. With “informal activities” we use the 
following definition: “... unregistered, unregulated or casual activities carried out by 
individuals and/or family or community enterprises that engage in value-adding activities 
on a small scale with minimum capital input, using local materials and labor intensive 
techniques.”19 Such activities differ from authorized and registered small enterprises—such 
as the micro and small-scale enterprises which are also referred to in this paper—in that 
informal activities occur outside existing legal frames. The notion of “informal sector” is 
problematic and should be viewed as a common-sense notion rather than a concept with 
analytical value. Among other problems, it is difficult and inadequate to draw a clear 
separation between a formal and an informal sector given the linkages that often exist 
between them. Instead, one should think in terms of fuzzy boundaries, the shifting contours 
of which are a key concern in this paper.            
 The researchers conducted two to three months of fieldwork and used a range of 
research methods. They conducted semi-structured open-ended interviews with a wide 
range of involved actors, including members of private enterprises, NGOs, informal 
enterprises, government-sponsored enterprises, and administrators at different levels of the 
city administration (at kebele, sub-city and city levels).20 They complemented their sources 
with their own observations, including observing scavengers at work and recording the 
frequency of container collection by municipality trucks. Participant observation was 
practiced when participating in garbage collection with NGOs, in city cleaning campaigns, or 
events such as the annual Cleaning Day. Whenever possible, the researchers undertook 
informal discussions with the people involved. The use of secondary literature was 
somewhat limited due to the scarcity of publications. A quantitative survey of plastics 
delivery to the largest market place in the city was also conducted.21 In her research on 
plastics recycling, Bjerkli interviewed 63 waste collectors across the city and 150 households 
in the sub-city of Addis Ketema (kebeles 6, 13 and 15). She also conducted interviews with 
two owners of plastics factories, five municipality employees in charge of solid waste 
management and the staff of two relevant NGOs: ENDA Ethiopia and GTZ. Zelalem 
interviewed both formal and informal actors, as well as operators in government-induced 
micro and small-scale Enterprises (a total of 23 interviews). He also carried out interviews 
with a few households and with the relevant officials at several administrative levels.22 
Yirgalem interviewed forty scavengers operating at the Repi landfill site, as well as 
employees in small-scale informal industries located in proximity to the landfill site.23 
 The next section describes the solid waste situation in Addis Ababa and discusses the 
important role of the informal sector. The different categories of informal actors conducting 
waste-related activities are presented, followed by a discussion of the relations between them 
and the local government prior to 2003 and also the ways in which informal actors attempt to 
avoid the authorities. The paper then analyses the change in governmental strategy towards 
the informal waste sector between 2003 and 2005, the official justifications, and the hidden 
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agendas behind its intervention, as well as the outcomes and responses of informal actors to 
it. The paper ends with a summary of the findings and concluding remarks. 
The informalizing waste sector: neglect, distrust, and avoidance 
Addis Ababa is a fast growing city with a population of over three million. Among other 
problems associated with rapid urbanization, the management of solid waste poses a serious 
challenge. The management approaches and techniques employed by the municipality of 
Addis Ababa to manage solid waste have been largely inadequate. Compared to other 
sectors, solid waste management has been given too little attention in terms of resource 
allocation and establishing effective institutional arrangements. It has been estimated that 
geographical coverage and frequency of disposal by the public collection system has been by 
far below the existing needs, ranging between 40–70 percent of the total generated waste.24
  Informal actors play a critical role in the solid waste sector in Addis Ababa. Activities 
related to the sector are a source of income for many urban poor. Such activities include 
waste picking and door-to-door collection, recycling, composting, and reprocessing. The sub-
studies conducted on activities at the landfill site and within the plastic waste sub-sector 
revealed that diverse actors are involved.
  
Thus, a considerable portion of the city and its population is not adequately serviced by the 
public collection system. In addition, the city is still awaiting the establishment of new and 
properly built sanitary dumping sites. The current system for waste disposal is unsafe, with 
high social and environmental costs. The existing solid waste disposal site, the Repi landfill 
site, is an open landfill site, devoid of any infrastructure. The Repi landfill site does not meet 
the necessary criteria, not least in terms of minimum buffer distances required for safe waste 
disposal, between the site and other land use activities, such as settlements, schools and 
recreation. Communities settled around the landfill are exposed to great health risks due to 
the high levels of environmental contamination, including ground and surface water 
contamination. 
25 Interviews carried out with a variety of actors 
involved in these activities make it possible to identify some of the key actors and the 
relations between them.                
 Foragers collect materials from municipal containers and from the streets while 
scavengers collect items at the municipal landfill site. It is estimated that the Repi landfill site 
supports up to 500 on-site scavengers, including both temporary and permanent ones.26 On 
the basis of the interviews conducted with individuals in this group, it can be stated that 
permanent scavengers are mainly young people from the nearby settlements. They are 
organized into gangs which control the resources collected on the site and whose power is 
based on seniority and local residency. Newcomers are forced to pay a certain amount of 
cash or share the collected items with local bullies. Scavengers then sell the recovered items 
for reuse or deliver the materials to small-scale industry owners and farmers with whom 
they have arrangements. Some municipal employees are also involved in scavenging.  
 The qorales—the local term for small-scale unregistered waste collectors—collect or buy 
items such as plastic materials, tin cans, bottles, scrap metal, and paper directly from the 
households and to a limited extent from the foragers and small-scale enterprises.27 They 
deliver these items to the traders, locally called “wholesalers,” operating at Merkato, the 
largest market place in Addis Ababa. These wholesalers do not comply with governmental 
regulations, such as those relating to the payment of taxes. Qorales and wholesalers are 
linked through tightly drawn networks based on ethnic affinities, as both groups tend to 
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identify themselves as belonging to the Gurage ethnic group. Considerable differences in the 
income levels were found between the various categories of operators described above, with 
wholesalers being definitely better off and in an advantaged position in relation to the other 
groups.28                   
 The above operators are vertically linked, directly or indirectly, to the local recycling 
industry. Firstly, close to the landfill site, there is a small-scale industry which re-processes 
waste from the tanneries and carcasses to produce glue, locally called colla. There are two 
private “clandestine” colla producers in the area, each with approximately five employees. 
Five of them were interviewed informally by Yirgalem. The colla producers buy carcasses 
from on-site scavengers and/or gather the waste that tannery factories dump at the landfill 
site. Secondly, in the plastics sector, wholesalers supply the materials directly to factories 
located in Addis Ababa.29 Solid waste collection is also performed by a few private registered 
enterprises and NGOs, whose role is relatively limited.        
 The informal system for the collection, trade and transformation of plastic and other 
waste materials appears to be highly organized. The informal plastics recovery system is 
particularly efficient, in that an estimated high volume of plastic materials (23 tons) is 
informally collected on a daily basis in the city and recycled.30
Despite the important role of informal operators in the handling of solid waste in Addis 
Ababa, the dominant attitude of the authorities was, until the early 2000s, one of disregard. 
Although the existence of informal operators in the sector was acknowledged at different 
levels of the city administration, their significant contribution to waste reduction, reuse and 
recycling was either unrecognized or ignored. No sound policy or incentives were directed 
at supporting and developing their activities, nor were there any attempts to integrate them 
into the formal waste management system.          
 Informal operators, on the other hand, tried to avoid any contact with the city officials, 
opting to operate clandestinely due to lack of trust and confidence in the authorities. For 
example, the small-scale colla producers by the landfill site occupy rather inaccessible and 
hidden locations, mainly to avoid being discovered by government officials.
 This is related to the high local 
demand for plastic products manufactured from plastic waste, which in turn is related to the 
low purchasing power of a large part of the urban population. With regard to recycling in of 
plastics, as of other materials, the municipality has never developed any systematic efforts. 
Hence, recycling activities are mainly carried out by informal operators. 
31 The business 
owners try to avoid any discussion with unfamiliar persons regarding colla production and 
hide from outsiders, instructing their employees not to talk about their activities. Any 
stranger coming to the site is perceived either as a potential business competitor or as a 
government agent who is seeking to enforce legal measures against their activities.32 Among 
the major reasons for these informal operators to work clandestinely are fear of eviction from 
their location and of unfair, unaffordable taxes.33          
 In the plastics recovery system, similar secrecy and distrust were found on the basis of 
interviews with the various kinds of actors involved.34 During fieldwork, Bjerkli found it 
very hard to talk to people operating in the informal recovery system and obtain information 
about their activities. Outsiders to the system are not trusted; only those having social 
relations with others within the system and knowing the rules and norms operating within it 
can be trusted. For example, it was almost impossible to find out which factories the 
“wholesalers” sold their plastics to and from whom the factories bought their plastic waste. 
During interviews, it surfaced that a major reason for this secrecy was that those involved 
feared that the government would find out about their “illegal” activities. They perceived 
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that this would result in increased taxes or even in the closing down of their businesses. 
Their lack of confidence in the government also stemmed from the fact that the authorities 
do not recognize their contribution and make decisions without consulting the people 
concerned. Respondents feared that the government would make decisions that would force 
them out of business. For example, at the time of fieldwork, the government had plans to 
relocate Menalish Terra (the area within Merkato market where “wholesalers” operate) to a 
site located far away on the periphery of the city. Since the informal operators could not 
count on any governmental support and were not consulted about decisions affecting them, 
many of them felt that they were better off without the government’s involvement. A new 
strategy by the municipality to introduce micro and small-scale enterprises (MSSEs) into the 
sector would only deepen these feelings and make informal actors wary of the government’s 
intentions, as will be further discussed below.  
A tentative partnership between the municipality and the informal operators   
In the early 2000s, there were increasing concerns about the image of Addis Ababa. When 
visiting the city, President Khadaffi stated that Addis Ababa was too dirty to be the 
headquarters of the newly created African Union. This and other pressures apparently had 
an impact on the city administration. The strategy of the municipal government to tackle the 
waste problem took an important turn in 2003, when a provisional city government and a 
new mayor, Arkebe Oqubay, were appointed.          
 Prior to 2003, the municipality placed small containers in particular locations for waste 
collection at the housing block level. The municipal trucks emptied the containers irregularly 
and transported the waste to the Repi landfill. The collection of waste from the households to 
the containers was either done directly by the households themselves or by informal 
collectors paid by the households. This system was based on informal and oral arrangements 
between the informal waste collectors and the municipality. Having formerly ignored the 
role of informal waste collectors, the city authorities in 2003 initially appeared interested in 
recognizing and facilitating their work. Government officials apparently recognized that 
informal waste collectors were capable of collecting more waste than the municipal trucks 
operators. They realized that they could reduce the cost of waste collection by leaving the 
door-to-door collection to the informal waste collectors (i.e. the pre-collection stage). The city 
government withdrew from waste collection at the housing block level practiced earlier by 
the municipal truck fleets, as reported by Zelalem.35 It restricted its operations to the 
transportation of waste from fewer and bigger containers that were   placed at readily 
accessible locations. Informal waste collectors started to organize themselves into small-scale 
informal enterprises and were to some extent recognized or supported by the municipality.
 In a second phase a few months later, however, the new city administration gradually 
developed an interest in fully controlling the pre-collection component of solid waste 
management. By the end of 2003, it started to advocate the need for further formalizing the 
pre-existing informal solid waste collecting enterprises. The government intervened in the 
sector by institutionalizing it and introducing new actors in the form of micro and small-
scale enterprises (MSSEs). These enterprises were organized under an agency, the Micro and 
Small-Scale Enterprises Development Agency (MSSEDA), with offices at all levels of the city 
administration (city, sub-city, and kebele). According to Zelalem, this intervention was made 
without any kind of preliminary consultation and consensus with the pre-existing actors. 
The newly introduced actors, whose members were selected from among the unemployed by 
36 | Baudouin, Bjerkli, Yirgalem, & Zelalem 
African Studies Quarterly | Volume 11, Issues 2 & 3 | Spring 2010 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v11/v11i2-3a3.pdf  
the local authorities, therefore appeared as rivals to the pre-existing informal enterprises 
(and even to established formal private waste enterprises). Semi-structured interviews 
conducted by Zelalem with pre-existing formal private and informal actors, with the new 
MSSEs, and with kebele, sub-city, and city officials, elicited insights into this intervention and 
the responses to it.36                
 The kebele authorities, played an important role in implementing the new strategy. 
Experiences varied across different kebeles in the city. The MSSEDA officials operating at 
kebele and sub-city levels adopted three different approaches. The first approach was to 
dispossess and evict the pre-existing solid waste collection enterprises from their service 
areas. Secondly, government officials adopted another mechanism by which the pre-existing 
enterprises were forced to be reorganized under the umbrella of MSSEDA, which in turn 
meant denying their rights and interests in organizing themselves as independent 
enterprises. In some cases the pre-existing enterprises were forced to merge with the newly 
organized MSSEs. Thirdly, in other cases the government officials avoided conflicts and 
evictions by deliberately organizing and deploying the MSSEs only in areas that were not 
served by any other enterprise.              
 The authorities employed various overt and covert means of intervention in areas where 
pre-existing enterprises were to be evicted. According to informants from private formal and 
informal enterprises, one of the overt interventions involved issuing official letters signed 
and stamped by kebele authorities and distributed to each household. The letters gave the 
impression that the MSSEs were the only legitimate enterprises and urged the households to 
terminate their contract with the former collectors and to enter into a new contract with the 
newly institutionalized MSSEs. This led to a systematic eviction of pre-existing enterprises 
from their established service areas. In other cases, the pre-existing enterprises were directly 
ordered to leave part or the whole of their service area for the newly established MSSEs. Due 
to such harsh interventions by the kebele officials, even the private formal enterprises were 
expelled from their service areas in favor of government-sponsored MSSEs. Similarly, the 
informal operators were offered few alternatives: at best, to share part of their service area 
with the MSSEs, or, in the worst case, to leave.37 Another form of intervention used by the 
government officials to capture clients from pre-existing enterprises was to reduce the 
service charges to a lower level than those set by the pre-existing enterprises. According to 
Zelalem, the kebele officials along with the MSSEs promised to deliver their service at lower 
fees, often below a workable minimum price.           
 The pre-existing solid waste collectors, particularly the informal ones, responded in 
different ways to the newly introduced government-sponsored MSSEs, as revealed by 
interviews with formal and informal operators. They increased the frequency of collection, 
reduced collection fees, and rendered free supplementary services to improve their 
competitiveness.38 They used informal networks to gather information, discuss current 
developments, and strategize how to react to government interventions. Most importantly, 
almost all of the interviewed pre-existing solid waste collectors, formal and informal, were 
strongly negative towards the newly integrated MSSEs. Hence, conflicts and hostilities 
developed as the dominant kinds of relationships between government-sponsored MSSEs 
and other formal or informal operators. Conflicts became sometimes serious and triggered 
clashes. One of the interviewed informal operators told how one man was killed in such a 
fight. There were also instances where in order to be heard the pre-existing actors used 
conflicts as a strategy to attract the attention of the kebele authorities and other government 
officials.  
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Justifications and outcomes of governmental intervention 
From the interviews with officials at city and sub-city level it became apparent that the city 
government justified the need for the above-mentioned interventions in solid waste 
collection on the basis of two objectives. One objective was to ensure a more efficient and 
cost-effective solid waste collection by discouraging the more random waste collection 
activities carried out by the informal sector. The second objective was to generate 
employment opportunities in the sector through sponsoring MSSEs. These stated objectives 
were far from achieved and the intervention appeared to be more of a political exercise. The 
intervention was instrumental in recruiting new party members and ensuring political 
dominance and local surveillance. In this regard, Bjerkli underlined that the city 
administration of Addis Ababa was “highly politicized.”39
The integration of MSSEs into the pre-existing solid waste collection system has 
contributed to the emergence of three predominant patterns of change in different city areas. 
The first is that the MSSEs have expanded at the expense of pre-existing informal and formal 
enterprises, as the latter were displaced or absorbed into the MSSEs. The second pattern is 
that both pre-existing and newly integrated actors have been functioning together in the 
same area with little conflict. A third pattern indicates that the pre-existing actors are on the 
recovery and reconquering collection areas as most of the MSSEs were dissolved shortly after 
they were established, as discussed below.          
 From the interviews, it became clear that the MSSEs faced serious challenges and intense 
conflicts involving the pre-existing informal and private formal actors. The informal and 
private enterprises were forced to spend their time, resources, and efforts engaging in a 
series of conflicts rather than focusing on their actual work. Moreover, the levels of income in 
both informal enterprises and MSSEs – that is, of the individuals engaged in waste collection 
across all enterprises – appear not to have increased to a reasonable level. Rather, judging 
from the interviews it seems that incomes have deteriorated further, mainly due to the 
prevailing “unhealthy competition” implemented simply for the sake of pushing some 
enterprises out of business. Most of the enterprises, and particularly those organized under 
MSSEs, had become weaker in terms of finances, material capacity, and employment 
stability.                   
 The MSSEs were introduced mainly by the entrenched interests of the kebele authorities. 
Each kebele had its own target quota and officials were responsible and accountable for 
ensuring the realization of the intended targets. Their aim was to establish as many 
enterprises as possible so as to appear as loyal champions in implementing the city 
government’s program for creating “new employment.” To this end, putting pre-existing 
enterprises out of operation by offering lower service fees resulted in reducing employment 
in the pre-existing informal sector. It was a belief held among the interviewed officials that 
more than 10,000 new job opportunities were created in solid waste collection, but this seems 
far from having been achieved. In real terms, what the city government did was to 
institutionalize new enterprises under its auspices while simultaneously evicting the pre-
existing actors. It created “new job opportunities” for those organized under the MSSEs, 
 Consequently, the result of the 
interventions was almost entirely to marginalize the pre-existing solid waste collecting 
enterprises and to disrupt the existing system, even though it was thriving in terms of both 
the volume of waste collected and the service catchment areas. Some areas were left without 
any door-to-door collection. Garbage piled up in the streets and along the streams of Addis 
Ababa.  The number of illegal dump sites also increased. 
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while individuals working in the informal enterprises lost their jobs. This can only be 
described as “fake employment creation.”           
 Imbalances developed in the spatial distribution of enterprises operating across different 
kebeles, as some kebeles were oversupplied with solid waste collection enterprises, while 
others suffered from inadequacies in waste collection. MSSEs were mainly deployed in areas 
that were already served by the pre-existing enterprises, further contributing to the 
geographical imbalance in coverage. According to the interviews, MSSEs usually failed to 
sustain service delivery at the newly introduced collection rates and often dissolved after a 
short period of operation. This appeared to provide an opportunity for pre-existing informal 
actors to re-conquer their spaces of operation. But, the earlier slushing of fees by the MSSEs 
has complicated the situation, as households may refuse to accept newly adjusted collection 
fees. 
Caricatures of partnerships and unresolved problems  
The authors’ studies of the waste sector in Addis Ababa have shown varied and shifting 
relationships between the municipal authorities and small-scale operators in the sector. The 
attitudes of the local authorities towards small-scale operators have ranged from total 
neglect to authoritarian forms of partnerships that could be characterized as a form of 
control. The latter kind of relations are absent from DiGregorio’s and Medina’s 
categorization of relationships between informal actors and the state presented earlier in this 
article. These forms of control, however, should thus be included as a separate category 
within such categorizations.              
 Barriers or resistance to institutionalized relations have been expressed by both 
governmental actors and informal operators. In the studied setting, the nature of these 
relationships has reached the stage where, for the most part, informal operators (particularly 
in recycling) try to avoid any contact with the municipality. The local government is 
perceived as only interested in trying to impose new or increased taxes on people. In plastics 
recycling, the activities are run completely by informal actors and carried out totally outside 
the control of the municipality, which is unaware of and unconcerned about recycling. Many 
municipal employees were not aware of the magnitude or even existence of the activity.40 
Informal actors have also shown a remarkable level of agency. They have demonstrated an 
ability to negotiate, a flexibility to adapt to changes, and willingness when necessary to fight 
for their interests. This was evidently the case when informal collectors had to cope with the 
threat posed to their activities by the introduction of MSSEs.        
 The period 2003–2006 under Mayor Arkebe represented a new trend, as for the first time 
there was an attempt to support and collaborate with groups in the informal sector, which 
had traditionally been ignored by the authorities. This support was, however, short-lived as 
the local government soon proceeded to support competing actors, i.e. authorized small 
enterprises in the sector. This marginalized and threatened the livelihoods of pre-existing 
local scavengers and waste collectors and disrupted the informal waste collection system.41 
The authorities employed authoritarian methods in order to impose their own political 
agenda, one driven by social control and opportunities for clientelism. The whole process 
was dictated by political motives of merely boosting employment figures and aimed at 
extending local political control. This finding is in accordance with what Bjerkli mentioned as 
the presence of a “highly politicized” government structure which was dominated by a high 
degree of upward accountability. The findings show that the authoritarian top-down 
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approach failed because it did not consider existing informal operators in the sector as 
possible partners. In planning and implementing development projects it is vital to 
understand and appreciate the existing service delivery mechanisms by informal 
entrepreneurs and seek ways of working with, rather than against, existing individuals, 
businesses, and structures.42 Ignoring and even undermining the existing informal system, 
and creating a clientele among another group of unemployed which was supposed to replace 
the former operators, can thus be described as a caricature of a partnership. 
 Undoubtedly, problems of competence and capacity in the local government have also 
hindered appropriate responses to the waste challenge. Among many problems, there is a 
high turnover of staff in charge of waste management due to politicization and frequent 
reforms of the administrative structures. Government officials have poor knowledge of the 
real situation of the informal solid waste sector and the resources for conducting studies on 
the sector may be lacking. While the difficulties faced by the local administration are 
important, however, the problem cannot be reduced to one of lack of competence, or lack of 
the appropriate technology, or of the “right” organizational set-up. The political and 
governance context is far more important. The outcomes of particular attempts at 
establishing collaboration with informal actors depend to a great extent on the nature of 
relationships between the state and/or local administration and other actors in particular 
contexts. In a way, what we have shown is a municipality temporarily adopting a strategy of 
collaboration and partnership with informal actors, in accordance with the calls of both 
donor agencies and some scholars, yet doing it within the framework of an authoritarian 
political culture that has dominated the history of Ethiopian administration. It is therefore 
doomed to fail.                
 According to UN-HABITAT, good governance involves the adoption of an “enabling 
approach” that allows all actors to be involved in all matters and decisions that affect their 
activity.43 In contrast, as Onibokun remarks, in a number of African countries, “lack of good 
governance is at the root of most of their urban problems, particularly in waste 
management.”44 In his view, “Both central and local governments lack democracy, 
transparency, accountability and cooperation with the public in their operations and 
processes and in their relationships with civil society.”45 Others have also pointed to the 
central importance of the issue of governance in relation to service provision.46
 
   
 In the study setting, the authoritarian methods and the hidden agenda of the local 
authorities deepened the general mistrust of informal actors. The only realistic possibility for 
collaboration requires democratic accountability and participatory governance, more 
precisely a genuine recognition of informal actors and willingness to involve all actors in 
decision-making. In addition, it requires the provision of support in the form of access to 
credit, vocational training, and the provision of equipment and social and health services. 
Only then will informal actors trust the government and achieve some form of “social 
contract.” Participative governance also requires the strengthening of collective 
organizations among informal operators in order to facilitate collective representation of 
their interests when negotiating with other partners. 
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Notes 
1. Demeke (2002) reported that according to the survey conducted by the CSA (the 
office of statistics in Ethiopia) up to 80 percent of the population in Addis Ababa was 
engaged in some form of informal income earninging activity in 1997. 
2. See for example Aagesen’s study of Bangkok (2000), Medina (1997) on Cairo, and 
Bjerkli (2005) on Addis Ababa. 
3. Naas and Rivke, 2004. 
4. For example, Naas and Rivke (2004); Rouse (2004) as well as Asmamaw (2003), for 
Ethiopia. 
5. Rouse, 2004, p. 9. 
6. See for example, Azam and Mansoor, 2004. 
7. For example, in Ethiopia, informal waste operators did not qualify for the Small Scale 
Income Generating Scheme which was intended to provide micro-credit facilities and 
training for poor urban dwellers (Demeke, 2002). 
8. Medina, 1997, p. 14. 
9. Rouse, 2004. 
10. Rouse, 2004. 
11. Medina, 1997. 
12. Medina, 1997, pp. 16–17. 
13. DiGregorio, 1994. 
14. Azam and Mansoor, 2004, p. 471. 
15. Van de Klundert and Lardinois, 1995, p. 16. 
16. Aagesen, 2000. 
17. Mkwela, 2001. 
18. See for example Mugagga (2006) on Uganda. 
19. Van de Klundert and Lardinois, 1995, p. 10. 
20. The lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia. 
21. Bjerkli, 2005. 
22. Zelalem, 2006. 
23. Yirgalem, 2001. 
24. Yirgalem, 2001. 
25. Yirgalem, 2001; Bjerkli, 2005. 
26. Yirgalem, 2001. 
27. The term qorale is the short form of the Amharic ‘Korkoro yaleh’ (Have you any scrap 
metal?), which is what the young boys shout when out collecting. 
28. The incomes of wholesalers were sometimes as high as 85 USD per day (Bjerkli, 
2005). 
29. Bjerkli, 2005. 
30. Bjerkli, 2005. 
31. Yirgalem, 2001. 
32. Yirgalem, 2001. 
33. Yirgalem, 2001. 
34. Bjerkli, 2005. 
35. Zelalem, 2006. 
36. Zelalem, 2006. 
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37. Zelalem, 2006, p. 78 
38. Zelalem, 2006. 
39. Bjerkli, 2005, p. 89. 
40. Bjerkli, 2005. 
41. Zelalem, 2006. 
42. Post et al., 2003. 
43. UN-HABITAT, 2002, p. 8. 
44. Onibokum, 1999b, p. 240. 
45. Onibokum, 1999a, p. 231. 
46. Nunan and Sattertwaite, 2001. 
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Governance on the Ground:
A Study of Solid Waste Management
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
CAMILLA LOUISE BJERKLI
Abstract
This article examines the management of solid waste in Addis Ababa from 2004 to
mid-2011. It describes how solid waste management has evolved and how relationships
between the informal sector and the local authority have shifted in relation to the
political atmosphere in the city. The author shows how good governance promoted by
international donors does not necessarily result in improved service delivery on the
ground. In line with the principles of good governance, the Ethiopian government
decentralized the city’s administration and entered into partnerships with non-state
actors in order to improve service delivery. However, these structural changes have not
led to improvements in providing services for dealing with solid waste, nor have they
improved accountability to or participation by civil society. The study shows that the
established ways of exercising power are continuing within the new structures of the city
administration, resulting in increased control over the actors involved in the process,
and more conﬂicts and deeper mistrust of the city administration. This, in turn, has
prevented the successful integration of the informal sector and provision of an improved
solid waste service in the city. The city administration in Addis Ababa claims to have
adopted good governance, but in reality it has adapted good governance to suit its own
interests and agendas.
Introduction
Solid waste management (SWM) is becoming one of the most serious challenges urban
areas in Africa face today. Most municipalities are unable to collect the increasing
volumes of waste. SWM is critical for protecting urban environments, public health and
the image of cities. A rapid urbanization rate means that the challenges relating to the
collection and disposal of solid waste will increase in years to come, and therefore there
is an urgent need to resolve the current problem (UN-Habitat, 2010a). In order to achieve
improved SWM, international donors place a strong emphasis on the adoption of
the principles of good governance. Consequently, development agendas focus on
governance, and the United Nations (UN) even uses the term ‘good garbage governance’
in its most recent report (UN-Habitat, 2010b: 9). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) and
decentralization have been used as central strategies in efforts to bring non-state actors
into SWM in order to make SWM more cost-effective, to create employment and to give
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more power to lower levels of the city administrations. The body of literature that
discusses and analyses the role of the private sector in improving solid waste services is
growing (Post, 1999; Azam and Ali, 2004; Baud et al., 2005; Kaseva and Mbuligwe,
2005; Post et al., 2005; Azam and Ali, 2006; Oteng-Ababio, 2010; Tukahirwa et al.,
2010). Such studies have shown that the private sector is contributing to improved
service delivery in terms of SWM, but argue that the main obstacle that private sectors
face is lack of good governance, such as accountability and transparency, as well as lack
of resources and capacity within city administrations, which prevents these from entering
into successful partnerships with non-state actors. Other studies have shown that, even
though local governments have adopted and implemented principles of good governance,
there have been few positive outcomes at ground level (Onibokun, 1999; Schalkwijk,
2005; Adama 2007; Allen et al., 2008; Davies, 2008; Blundo and Meur, 2009;
Oosterveer, 2009; Bhuiyan, 2010). Schalkwijk (2005) shows how the adoption and
implementation of good governance in Bolivia has not signiﬁcantly changed
management practices. The Bolivian government lacks the will to change and use good
governance policies to promote its interests, and therefore, concludes Schalkwijk, the
government itself is the main obstacle to development. Although it has been observed
that many governments have ‘adopted’ good governance, it remains to be seen whether
declarations of good governance policies materialize and reﬂect a genuine or partially
genuine commitment to good governance or whether these are mostly rhetorical — that
is, formulations and use of a new ideology responsible for concealing the realities of
misuse of power on the ground.
This article contributes to the ongoing debate about the way in which some
governments have adopted and implemented good governance policies, as promoted by
international donors. The focus is on SWM inAddisAbaba over a period of 8 years, from
2004 to mid-2011, on good governance and the way in which decentralization and PPPs
have been promoted and implemented by the city administration, and on practice on the
ground. I start by arguing that there is a need to shift from a normative to an analytical
approach to governance. I continue by presenting a review of the political context in
Ethiopia, followed by a historical description of the development of SWM in Addis
Ababa. I analyse everyday practices by linking them to the political context in the
city, with emphasis on the interests of various actors and how these interests are acted
upon in the local context. I argue that the promotion of good governance by international
donors has resulted in the reorganization of the city administration and in changes
to solid waste management on the ground. However, despite these changes, the
established way of exercising power has continued within the new structures of the
city administration, resulting in few improvements to the solid waste disposal service
being provided and an even deeper mistrust towards the city administration among
actors.
From a normative towards an analytical approach to governance
Governance has become a central concept in development discourses, and the promotion
and use of the concept by international donors has led to the reorganization of
government institutions and the implementation of various policies designed to make
government perform their duties more efﬁciently and to become accountable towards
their citizens (Bevir, 2009). The concept of governance was ﬁrst introduced by theWorld
Bank, in the belief that it would lead to the implementation of neoliberal policies. This
introduction was based on the argument that lack of good governance is the main
obstacle to ensuring an efﬁcient urban management that is more accountable and
responsive to its citizens (World Bank, 1992; Mkandawire, 2007).
To date, there is no commonly agreed deﬁnition of governance. The World Bank
(1992: 1) deﬁnes governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the
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management of countries’ economic and social resources for development’. Common to
most deﬁnitions of governance is that the term governance is distinct from the concept of
government. Its use implies that power is not limited to formal authorities and
institutions but that non-state actors have a right to participate in decision making. The
concept also implies that governance is not a simple frame of action but a process, since
decisions have to be made based on complex relationships between actors who all have
their own priorities (Bevir, 2009). All deﬁnitions of governance entail more or less
the same elements, including accountability, participation, rule of law, transparency,
efﬁciency, equity and decentralization, as well as efforts to decentralize governmental
institutions in order to give more power to the lower levels of administration, with the
aim of improving accountability and increasing the efﬁciency of public institutions. In
addition, the emphasis is on entering into partnerships with non-state actors in order to
empower them and give them equal access to development and decision processes
(Devas, 2004; Schalkwijk, 2005; Davies, 2008; Myers, 2011).
It cannot be denied that the core elements of good governance, such as accountability,
participation, decentralization and transparency, are relevant elements, which, if
respected, could improve the functioning of societies to the beneﬁt of all. According to
Grindle (2010), the concept of governance has become inﬂated owing to its popularity
and has become one of many buzzwords in development discourses. Donors’ emphasis
on governance imposes a technical recipe for what governments should do in order to
improve governance, but this recipe is not adapted to the local context (Hoebink, 2006;
Grindle, 2007; 2010; Hufty, 2009). The question is why good governance policies,
although adopted and implemented by many governments, have not produced the
expected results on the ground. Studies have shown that there is a large gap between the
ofﬁcial aim of governance policies and the actual practice on the ground, with scholars
arguing that the implementation of good governance policies is a political process
inﬂuenced by power relations and institutional pluralism (Schalkwijk, 2005; Crawford,
2009; Hufty, 2009; Myers, 2011). The World Bank uses the concept of good governance
with reference to ‘what should be’ and not ‘what is’ (Hufty, 2009). By focusing on what
should be done, donors seem to ignore the possibility that governments might misuse
their projects or in some cases even promote bad governance. If we continue to promote
good governance and struggle to attain it, what are we struggling towards? Grindle
(2004) argues that the expectations of good governance are too high, and points out that
there is a need to focus on ‘good enough governance’, with goals that are more realistic
for countries to achieve. She calls for empirical research that is more grounded, in order
to help us understand what works and what does not work, rather than a focus on the gaps
between everyday governance and idealistic goals. Andrews (2008) argues that it would
be better to understand the factors that inﬂuence what works, and when and how, instead
of merely having a list of what should work, that is, to focus on what is rather than on
what should be. There is a need to look into the reasons behind the normative use of
governance and to critically analyse its implementation and use on the ground in order
to gain a better understanding of the outcome of governance policies and the underlying
reasons for them. It has been argued that governance is relevant and offers a framework
for the analysis of public services, with emphasis on how social actors articulate their
views and use governance (Blundo and Meur, 2009). Governance includes a wide range
of actors and institutions, and it is the relationships and interactions between such
actors and institutions that determine what happens within the context of a city. The
relationships between actors in cities are not equal, and governance as a process deals
with power relationships among different actors in cities and between scales. Thus, there
is a need to emphasize social processes and to focus on power relationships between the
actors involved in governance processes at various scales (Devas, 2004; Heynen et al.,
2006; Hufty, 2009).The aim of this article is therefore to explore everyday practices
within solid waste management in Addis Ababa to promote an understanding of how
governance processes operate on the ground through a focus on politics and power
relations among the actors involved.
Solid waste management in Addis Ababa 3
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
© 2013 Urban Research Publications Limited
Methodology
This article is based on data collected during three ﬁeldwork sessions conducted inAddis
Ababa between 2009 and mid-2011. Data collected in 2004 as part of my master’s degree
(Bjerkli, 2005) are also included in the analysis. The data were collected through
interviews with various actors operating within SWM in Addis Ababa, including solid
waste managers (9), members of cooperatives involved in pre-collection of waste (19), a
city manager (1), former managers of solid waste (2), former managers of micro- and
small-scale enterprises (MSSEs) (3), households (20) and actors in the private sector (2).
A total of 56 actors were interviewed and, with the exception of the households and the
city manager, follow-up interviews were held with all respondents to collect information
on the situation regarding SWM over time and to clarify, conﬁrm or discard information
collected from other sources. Data were also collected from newspaper reviews
published from 2004 to mid-2011, ofﬁcial documents, workshops and by means of
observations.
During data collection, a constant comparative method (CCM) was used, whereby
collected data were continuously compared with previously collected data. Accordingly,
during the whole research process, the results of each interview were analysed and then
compared with those of earlier interviews. From the ﬁrst interview onwards, newly
acquired information led to new questions and to new participants in an attempt to clarify
issues, understand conﬂicting information and conﬁrm or reject information given to me
(see Boeije, 2002).
The political context in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has a long history of highly centralized government with authoritarian rulers.
During the reign of Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974, the culture
of the city administration was characterized by loyalty to the emperor (Vaughan and
Tronvoll, 2002; Kapuscinski, 2006). In 1974, Mengistu Haile Mariam of the Provisional
Military Administrative Council (PMAC), called the Derg in Amharic, took control of
Ethiopia. The Derg promoted the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia under a new
constitution modelled on a Marxist-Leninist state. During the Derg’s rule, Ethiopia
experienced a centralized state and during the last years of rule, when the regime was
threatened, personal loyalty to the party was essential for survival. Thousands of people
were killed for not being faithful to the ruling party in a period referred to in Ethiopia as
the Red Terror (Harold, 1994).
The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in
1991, when it took over after removing the Derg (African Development Bank, 2009). The
EPRDF established a federal state and formed a republican government that it called a
democratic multiparty system, in contrast to the Derg’s single-party regime. Since 1991,
there have been four national elections in Ethiopia. The ﬁrst two elections, held in 1995
and 2000, respectively, were dominated by the EPRDF, and although the opposition
boycotted both elections it won some seats in the House of Representatives (Vaughan and
Tronvoll, 2002). In the run-up to the national election in 2005, the EPRDF appeared
willing to allow more open competition to take place between the parties. An
unprecedented level of openness was observed in the media and representatives of the
opposition parties were permitted to broadcast on state-owned radio and television and
allowed to organize large rallies in the capital. Countrywide, the opposition won the
election, with one-third of the seats in the House of Representatives, but it had to be
suppressed in order for the EPRDF to secure a solid victory of 75% to 85% of the seats
(Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009). After the 2005 election, the EPRDF used excessive force
when dealing with urban protests against the controversial election, which led to
approximately 200 people being killed and leaders of the main opposition party and
journalists being detained. In addition, thousands of youths were picked up from the
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streets ofAddisAbaba and sent to detentions camps without being formally charged. The
EPRDF’s low score in the 2005 election led the party to increase its efforts to ensure that
such a weak performance would never occur again.
After the 2005 election, the political atmosphere in Addis Ababa changed. People
were reluctant to demonstrate and talk freely. In order to gain more control over its
citizens, the government employed a carrot-and-stick strategy. The EPRDF made
efﬁcient use of the time prior to the 2010 election and increased its numbers of party
members from 760,000 in 2005 to 5 million in 2010 (Tronvoll, 2011). People were forced
to register as party members in order to secure jobs and/or keep their jobs. To ensure that
there were always loyal people employed within the city administration, the party
frequently evaluated ofﬁcials (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Cadres went from door to
door and instructed people to collect a voting card and to go to registration centres (see
methodology above). They also visited households to register all family members, record
the number of rooms and ask for which party the family members were going to vote.
Many people feared that they would lose their home if they did not have a voter’s card
and did not vote for the EPRDF. The voter registration cards were also compulsory ID
cards in certain circumstances, to show support for the ruling party (Tronvoll, 2011).
Furthermore, mass registration of street vendors, shoe shiners and other tradespeople
took place. They were forced to register as members of the ruling party in order to be
allowed to continue to operate. As a further method of persuasion, party members were
given free food and pocket money if they attended party meetings. Thus, for many
citizens membership and loyalty to the ruling party became a way of ensuring their daily
food supplies. As a consequence, it was possible ﬁnd that in any given kebele up to
one-third of the inhabitants (about 30 to 1,000) were members of the local branch of the
ruling party, and this would have resulted in members of the ruling party having most of
the control over the local community.1 In total, 31,926,520 million voters registered out
of an estimated 37 million potentially eligible voters (Tronvoll, 2011). The EPRDF won
the elections in 2010 with 99.6% of seats in Parliament; the remaining two seats went to
the opposition and to an EPRDF-friendly independent candidate, respectively.
Solid waste management in Addis Ababa before 2003
Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, is one of the fastest-growing cities in East
Africa. Its growth has accelerated dramatically in the past 30 years. In the 10-year period
from 1984 to 1994, for example, its population increased from 1.4 million to 2.1 million
(Yirgalem, 2008). According to the most recent statistics, Addis Ababa has a population
of approximately 4 million and it is projected that this ﬁgure will reach 12 million in
2024 (UN-Habitat, 2008). In addition to its rapid growth in population size, the physical
city has also grown extensively, more than doubling in size since 1984 to cover an area
of approximately 530 km2 (UN-Habitat, 2008). Like other African cities, Addis Ababa is
facing increasing problems related to waste generation and lacks efﬁcient management to
handle this growth. There is only one open dump, established in 1964 — almost half a
century ago — which does not have any drainage or top cover. The site reached capacity
several years ago (SBPDA, 2003). When the site was chosen, it was located at a safe
distance from settlements, but since then the city has gradually extended towards the site
and beyond it so that it is now surrounded by residential neighbourhoods (Yirgalem,
2001).
Prior to 2003 there were few developments within SWM in the city. Addis Ababa
Health Bureau was responsible for managing solid waste in the city and the municipal
system for waste collection was based on door-to-door collections and the use of
1 The kebele is the lowest administrative unit in Addis Ababa.
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containers. The door-to-door collection service was available to households near main
roads, with containers being placed in open spaces close to the main roads. People
complained because the trucks did not come at regular intervals, either owing to lack of
trucks or frequent breakdowns of existing trucks. There were few containers and the
majority of households had to travel long distances to dispose of their waste in a proper
manner.2 People also complained that the containers were often not collected and were
then overfull. Therefore it became common practice to dispose of waste in the rivers or
open ﬁelds. The city administration, in turn, complained about a lack of trucks, high
operational costs, lack of awareness among people, and the lack of a proper landﬁll site
(SBPDA, 2003).3
In response to the need for better service, in the year 2000 the informal sector offered
to collect households’ waste once or twice a week for a fee of 5 to 10 Ethiopian birr
(US $0.5–1). The city became cleaner as a result, but the service the informal sector
provided was unevenly distributed and favoured well-off areas (SBPDA, 2003 ; Bjerkli,
2005; Zelalem, 2006).
Decentralization and formalization of the pre-collectors
In 2003, Addis Ababa city administration, under Mayor Arkebe Oqubay, announced a
reorganization of the city’s administration. This was part of a national decentralization
process under the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme
(SDPRP), supported by international donors. The aim was to give more power to lower
levels of the city administration and to empower local communities and their institutions
to participate in decision making at local level in an effort to reduce poverty, promote
good governance and improve public services (Taye and Tegegne, 2007). At the time, it
was widely known that the city administration was suffering from bad governance.
Arkebe (2005: n.p.) described the situation in the city as follows:
The city of Addis Ababa and its citizens were experiencing poor urban governance as
manifested in a highly centralized government system, un-participatory governance, poor
service delivery, and lack of transparency . . . Delivery of municipal and public services was
often inefﬁcient and non-transparent, while levels of corruption were high in some areas.
The reform was also achieved by dismissing hundreds of civil servants on the basis of
allegations of inefﬁciency and corruption. The city administration was divided into
10 sub-cities, which were further divided into 99 kebeles. The reorganization of the
city administration was also marked by changes in the organization and management of
solid waste. A new agency was established, the Sanitation Beautiﬁcation and Park
DevelopmentAuthority (SBPDA). The SBPDA’s main responsibility was the collection,
transportation and disposal of solid waste in the city. Compared to the previous system
under the Health Department, more power was given to the sub-cities and the kebeles. A
solid waste manager was appointed for each sub-city and kebele. The aim was to
stimulate more efﬁcient delivery of urban services by promoting decentralization,
participation, transparency and accountability, in line with good governance in service
delivery.
During the period of reorganization,AddisAbaba’s city administration recognized the
potential of the informal pre-collectors operating in the city. The city administration
seemed quite amenable to the informal pre-collectors who were registered and had been
given licences to allow them to operate as private enterprises without paying taxes. Many
private enterprises were established as a consequence of easier access to the solid waste
2 One container would serve, for example, 7,500 households (SBPDA, 2003).
3 Most of the time, only 36 out of the 78 trucks were in running order (SBPDA, 2003).
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sector and to favourable working conditions. Initially, the system seemed to work quite
well, and the SBPDA started to place containers at sites that were readily accessible to
the private enterprises. This was done mainly for three reasons: ﬁrst, the ofﬁcials
recognized that it was possible to reduce the cost of waste collection; secondly, they
realized that the informal pre-collectors were more efﬁcient at collecting waste than
municipal employees; and thirdly, the partnership with or support of the private
enterprises was in line with the government strategy of creating more jobs in the city.
Within a few years, the number of private enterprises within solid waste collection had
increased enormously and operational problems relating to areas where waste was
collected had started to emerge. The various private enterprises were highly competitive,
which resulted in a fall in the prices they charged for their services. In order to cope with
the problems, the sub-cities started to divide the kebeles into zones, and in order to limit
conﬂicts between the private enterprises, each enterprise was allocated a zone in which
to operate. The problems related to solid waste in the city were subsequently reduced;
more waste was collected and the city became cleaner. However, the problem of illegal
disposal of solid waste still existed owing to a lack of containers and collection trucks.
Apparently there were no resources nor any attempts to improve the transportation
situation or to invest in more containers. Instead, the city administration started to control
the use of the containers by posting guards from the kebeles. Private enterprises were
punished if they failed to dispose of waste in a proper manner. No attempts were made
to cover poor households that could not pay for the service, and consequently there was
continued segregation in the provision of the service, so that poor households continued
to dispose of their waste in rivers or open ﬁelds.
The pre-election situation within solid waste management
The situation regarding SWM inAddis Ababa changed prior to the election in 2005. The
city administration decided suddenly, and without any preliminary dialogue, to create
government-supported micro- and small-scale enterprises. MSSEs were one of the major
elements of an urban development package (UDP) that was designed to reduce urban
poverty and unemployment (Taye and Tegegne, 2007). The newly introduced actors,
whom the local authorities had selected from the unemployed, were regarded as rivals
by the established private enterprises. At ﬁrst, the private enterprises were simply
dispossessed and evicted from their service areas, but later the government ofﬁcials
forced the pre-existing enterprises to become reorganized under the umbrella of the
MSSE administration, which meant that they were denied their right to organize
themselves as independent enterprises. The city administration distributed ofﬁcial letters,
signed and stamped by kebele authorities, to households in order to make the newly
established MSSEs appear to be the only legitimate enterprises. The administration also
urged households to terminate their contracts with the former collectors and to accept
a new contract with the new MSSEs. This resulted in the systematic eviction of
pre-existing enterprises from their established service areas. The former private
enterprises were offered few alternatives; at best they were allowed to share part of their
service areas with the newly established MSSEs, alternatively, they had to leave
(Zelalem, 2006).
The MSSEs ability to capture clients from pre-existing enterprises was made possible
by lowering service charges, often below a workable minimum price, compared to the
prices the pre-existing enterprises were charging. The city government defended the
implementation of MSSEs by stating that they wanted to ensure more efﬁcient SWM and
to generate employment; 13,000 jobs were created within SWM (Ethiopian Herald,
2006: 6). However, the intervention appeared to be a political exercise introduced by the
authorities, who were eager to organize as many enterprises as possible in order to appear
as loyal champions of the city government’s programme to create ‘new employment’.
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The kebeles had their own target quotas, and ofﬁcials were made responsible and
accountable for implementing the quota system in the kebeles. This suspected
politicization was conﬁrmed by the fact that immediately after the elections of 2005 the
city administration abandoned the active formation of new enterprises. Conﬂicts and
hostilities developed between the former private enterprises and new MSSEs, who were
now the dominant service providers. These conﬂicts were sometimes serious and
triggered clashes and hostilities directed at the newly integrated actors. Competitive
strategies included increasing the frequency of collection, reducing collection fees and
rendering supplementary services free of charge (Baudouin et al., 2010).
In 2006, the city administration ceased its interference with the MSSEs and made no
further efforts to deal with existing problems or to improve the efﬁciency of the SWM
system. The situation quietened down and the MSSEs were able to operate as they
wished. However, segregation in terms of service delivery, and the provision (or lack of)
containers and collection trucks, as well as illegal dumping, continued to be signiﬁcant
problems.
City administration’s new policy to improve solid waste services
In 2009, the city administration introduced a new policy called Business Process
Re-engineering (BPR). This policy was part of a national capacity-building programme
to improve public services further and was also supported by international donors. The
aim of the policy was to increase efﬁciency within the city’s administration, develop its
capacity, cut operational costs and improve public services. The SBPDA was now
reorganized into three agencies: the Solid Waste Management Agency, the Landﬁll
Project Ofﬁce and the Beautiﬁcation, Park and Cemetery Agency. Thereafter, even more
power was to be given to the kebeles, which were to take responsibility for waste
collection, whereas the sub-city administration would only play a monitoring role and be
responsible for the transportation of waste by truck. The city administration had the main
responsibility for the overall management of solid waste and the landﬁll site. The new
SWM policy was aimed at reorganizing the former MSSEs into government-supported
cooperatives.4 According to the city administration, these changes were introduced
because the previous service had not worked well. The city administration accused the
MSSEs of being ‘rent collectors’ or ‘rent seekers’, of handling the waste in an illegal
manner, of favouring collection from high-income households, and of only engaging in
the sector to earn money, not caring about the cleanliness of the city.5 Conversely,
members of the MSSEs blamed the city administration for lack of containers and for not
arranging for the containers to be collected. Regardless, these changes and decisions
related to SWM in the city had once again been made without consulting the various
actors involved, such as the MSSEs and households. As a result of the policy, all
managers of the former MSSEs had to reorganize their enterprises and either become
members of the cooperatives or cease working altogether. The change in policy resulted
in most of the former managers of the MSSEs opting to cease looking for other contracts,
and their employees had no other choice than to join the new kebele-controlled
cooperatives. One of the previous managers stated:
4 The cooperatives are formal organizations that operate within the bounds of the law. Members elect
their own ofﬁcers to handle ﬁnances and undertake administrative activities. The ofﬁcers are also
expected to set up an audit committee to look into their ﬁnancial records. The uppermost level of
authority of a cooperative is exercised by an assembly of all members of that cooperative.
5 The terms ‘rent collectors’ and ‘rent seekers’ have been introduced recently and are used by the
ruling party to refer to someone who does not work but earns money by exploiting others. The
concepts are also used in a political sense to close doors to those who are not loyal members of the
ruling party (interview, 2010).
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[T]oday the municipality is taking over solid waste management in Addis Ababa and is
destroying the private sector’s initiatives. The private sector had a lot of plans within solid
waste but the municipality destroyed it [the sector]. The main reason for the new system is
mainly political, in order to control the activities, create employment, and control the money
involved in the businesses (interview, 2009).6
Under the new policy, the administration of fees for solid waste disposal was included in
the scheme for collecting water fees. Under the scheme, the amount paid for solid waste
disposal was calculated as a percentage of the total amount paid for water supplies:
households connected to a communal water tap were to pay 5%, households with a
private water tap were to pay 20% and non-residential consumers were to pay 42.5%.
However, many problems were encountered with implementing the scheme because
some of the non-residential consumers did not have water taps and were responsible for
a lot of waste, whereas others who did have a water tap were producing relatively small
amounts of waste. Moreover, the system was implemented before the payment system
was in place. Representatives of the kebeles responsible for collecting the waste fees had
to go from door to door to collect payments during the ﬁrst months of the scheme’s
operation. During that time, the majority of households refused to pay, thus making it
difﬁcult for the kebeles to collect enough money to pay the members of the cooperatives.
As a consequence, the workers did not receive their salaries, and the city administration
provided no ﬁnancial support to resolve the problem (interview, 2010).7 Many employees
ceased working because they could not afford to work without pay, and some chose to
leave because they had been forced to register as party members in order to be allowed
to continue to work.
An awkward, complicated, bureaucratic
wage system for cooperatives
Under the BPR policy, workers who are members of the cooperatives are paid by the
kebeles and not directly by the households, as had been the case under the previous
system. The government pays the cooperatives 30 Ethiopian birr (US $2.1) per cubic
metre of waste collected. In theory, this means there is an incentive to collect as much
waste as possible in order to earn more. However, the areas allocated to the cooperatives
are limited and some areas that previously had one MSSE operating within each of them,
for example, now may have three cooperatives operating within each. Some of the
cooperatives claimed that they had only 600 customers but had been promised 1,500. In
addition, MSSEs that had previously operated with, for example, six employees, now
have to have a minimum of ten to 15 employees. This means that cooperatives have few
opportunities to increase their income. Monthly income for members of cooperatives has
decreased in comparison to the previous situation, and consequently many workers have
opted to leave. However, owing to the high proportion of poor people in Addis Ababa,
there is no shortage of potential employees to replace those who opt to leave (interview,
2010). Furthermore, each kebele appears to have its own quota for employment within
the waste sector, and the city administration can boast of having created 13,000 new jobs.
After the introduction of the new system, the sub-cities were not able to provide
enough trucks to transport the collected waste. When trucks were unavailable, the
members of the cooperatives did not receive any pay and therefore they refused to collect
waste. According to some of the pre-collectors interviewed in 2010, this happened at
least one day per week. One member of a cooperative stated:
6 All quotes included in the article are translated from Amharic to English by the author.
7 In the ﬁrst months after the introduction of the new system in 2009, payment of salaries to the
cooperative members was delayed by up to two months.
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Our salary will be reduced because we are not able to ﬁll one container. To get a truck tomorrow
you have to call the day before, so today I had to call the sub-city, but usually the guy is not
around there . . . [T]here is a lot of bureaucracy, but if we pay the drivers, they will come, even
if the truck is included in the schedule. If we do not pay him, he will ignore us and give us the
service at the end of the day or not prioritize us, and then we have to wait for a long time. So,
by paying 30 birrs we will get the service and not be the last one to get the service.
Households complained about the lack of service and the reduction of the number of
collections from twice to once a week. In addition, many low-income households were
confused by the service and claimed that the system had been implemented without
involving them. During ﬁeldwork, it was also revealed that many of the households were
not aware that they were paying for a solid waste service that they did not receive.
The current status of solid waste management in Addis Ababa
In May 2010, the Solid Waste Management Agency purchased 44 new trucks, and
according to the agency this increased the total number of trucks to 104. The trucks
started to run 24 hours per day in order to transport all the waste collected within the city,
and initially this seemed to solve the transportation problems; for a few months the
system appeared to be working better. However, in March 2011 matters seemed to
change again. Respondents said that the agency was only able to collect 4,614,300
Ethiopian birr (US $270,000) per month but needed 5,537,160 Ethiopian birr
(US $324,000) to cover the salaries payable to members of the cooperatives. Another
respondent said that the dumpsite was full and that the cooperatives had encountered
problems with disposal of waste at the site. The extent to which this information reﬂects
the reality of the situation is unclear, but discussions with some members of cooperatives
revealed that they had been forced to reduce their number of working days, so that
instead of collecting waste to ﬁll one container every day, they now ﬁlled ten containers
per month. One worker said:
[B]efore, we could collect a lot of waste because we paid the drivers, but we collected too much
waste and the kebele said we were not allowed to collect so much waste because our salaries
were too high. We were only allowed to collect waste equivalent to 500 birrs [US $30]. The
municipality is only after the money. They do not care about solid waste and the cleanliness of
the city. A lot of my friends have quit working . . . [I]t is not a good feeling to feel useless and
I feel bad when I wake up and have no job to go to. It is not good for me.
To compensate for their lack of income, some workers made private arrangements with
hotels and institutions that were not covered by the municipal system and that were
expected to pay for waste removal themselves. Although workers were able to secure an
income, they had nowhere to dispose of the collected waste legally and therefore they
collected it during the night and disposed of it illegally. Thus, the solid waste situation in
the city was clearly deteriorating.
Decentralization and PPPs: A strategy to
control and secure ruling-party interests
At the entrance to the ofﬁces of the SolidWaste Management Agency and other agencies
in Addis Ababa, large information boards proclaim the vision and mission of the agency.
In the case of the Solid Waste Management Agency, the vision reads (see Figure 1):
Addis Ababa will be a liveable city where it is clean, green, naturally balanced, favourably
environmentally suited to the living and working of its people and visitors . . . [The agency’s
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mission is] to provide effective, efﬁcient, sustainable, technically and economically feasible,
and socially and environmentally acceptable solid waste, greening, beautiﬁcations and parks
and cemetery services through integrated efforts of the public, the private sector and the
community.
The Solid Waste Management Agency’s mission is to cooperate with the public and they
intend to do this based on 12 principles of ethical services, which are listed as: integrity,
loyalty, transparency, conﬁdentiality, honesty, accountability, serving the public interest,
exercising legitimate authority, impartiality, respecting the law, responsiveness and
exercising leadership (see Figure 1).
On paper, the vision and principles appear to be good and if applied in practice they
would lead to improved SWM in the city. From the history of SWM in Addis Ababa it
is apparent that the city still has a long way to go before these principles are respected
and put into practice, with the exception of the second principle (loyalty), which has been
shown to be the most important principle within the city administration. Since 2004, the
city administration has implemented one administrative reform and several policies
in order to improve SWM in Addis Ababa. The ofﬁcial aim of the administrative reform
and policies has been to decentralize administration and to give more power and
accountability to the lower levels of the administration in order to make solid waste
management more efﬁcient. On paper, these measures have succeeded in decentralizing
the city administration. As a result of the implementation of BPR, the Solid Waste
ManagementAgency is now able to present positive statistics, showing that 82% of those
employed within solid waste work at kebele level (interview, 2010). However, interviews
and observations in the ﬁeld revealed that, although most people are employed at kebele
Figure 1 Information boards at the entrance of the Solid Waste Management Agency
proclaiming vision, mission and principles of ethical services (photo by the author, 2009)
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level today, the power to take decisions is still highly centralized. Moreover, ofﬁcials
employed at kebele level and sub-city level not only lack education and experience
related to SWM, but also the basic tools for doing their job, such as computers,
photocopiers, paper and pencils.
Because loyalty to the ruling party is the single most important criterion for securing
a job and keeping it, ofﬁcials do not take any decisions themselves for fear of making a
wrong decision that ultimately could result in them losing their job. It is also common
practice among ofﬁcials not to report problems to top-level management staff and not to
question decisions made at the top even if they disagree with them. At the city level,
general managers responsible for SWM are employed because of their political
allegiance. However, those under the general managers are employed because of their
ability and their political allegiance. Interviews with several professionals (after they had
terminated their employment or lost their job) conﬁrmed that it is difﬁcult to work
professionally within the city administration under the current conditions. All the
respondents stated that they were unable to prepare plans for and manage SWM
effectively because they had to follow orders from those above or risk losing their job. In
many cases, they were unable to act owing to lack of decisions or permission from the
top. As a result, high-ranking ofﬁcials make all of the decisions related to SWM in the
city without being aware of the reality on the ground, instead taking decisions based on
the ruling party’s interests. Thus, power is still highly centralized within the structures of
a decentralized city administration and ofﬁcials are controlled and frequently evaluated
for their loyalty to the ruling party and their interests.
In line with good governance practices, the city administration has also entered into a
partnership with the private sector, with the aim of improving solid waste collection and
creating employment among the urban poor. The promotion of the private enterprises
and MSSEs and subsequently the cooperatives can be described as a caricature of
partnership, as these have been implemented mainly to gain control over the actors
involved in solid waste collection and not to promote a more efﬁcient system. The
interventions appear rather to have been a political exercise to organize as many MSSEs
and cooperatives as possible to boast higher employment ﬁgures within the city right
before the elections in 2005 and 2010. The city administration is not solving existing
problems within solid waste but is introducing more bureaucracy, more complexity, and
new problems.All of these changes and policies challenge rational thinking and it is hard
to believe that these choices are made based on ﬁnding the best solutions to dispose of
the city’s solid waste. Further support for this assumption is provided by the fact that in
the post-election periods following the 2005 and 2010 elections the city administration
did not interfere with the work on the ground. Clearly, this contrasted with the principles
of good governance. The situation has opened up participation opportunities for loyal
party members and has closed all opportunities for those who are not members of
the ruling party. It has created job opportunities for party members as well as
opportunities for showing citizens that the administration is doing something good for
them in the run-up to the election. However, it has destroyed working conditions on the
ground and introduced more problems and conﬂicts between actors than previously. It
has excluded many actors who were formerly involved in solid waste management and
replaced them with loyal unemployed members who have no experience in managing
solid waste.
Conclusions
This article shows that the promotion of good governance policies such as
decentralization and partnership with non-state actors has been adopted and
implemented by the city administration in Addis Ababa with the ofﬁcial aim to improve
solid waste services. The analysis of solid waste management from 2004 to mid-2011
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reveals that what is actually being done on the ground challenges the aim of the good
governance policies that were being promoted. The adoption and implementation of
good governance policies in Addis Ababa have not resulted in an improvement to the
management of solid waste, and the city administration is still unable to fulﬁl its task
efﬁciently. The article shows that there is a large gap between what the city
administration is doing and what it should do in respect of the principles of good
governance. The implementation of administrative reform and policies has resulted in
considerable restructuring of the city administration and major changes on the ground in
terms of how solid waste should be managed and which actors should be involved, but
it has not resulted in improvements in actual service provision. The deﬁciencies in
delivering solid waste services demonstrate that the real agenda of the government is not
to solve the problems concerning solid waste management in the city. The government
does not seem to be committed to implementing good governance but is using good
governance policies in a rhetorical way to secure its own power and promote its own
political interests, particularly in pre-election times. This has resulted in false
decentralization, which hides the persistent established ways of control and makes
government ofﬁcials mainly accountable to those higher up in the political system
instead of to the citizens. In line with Schalkwijk’s study (2005), this study shows that
the government has been the main obstacle to implementing good governance policies
and improving SWM in Addis Ababa. The article shows that politics and power are
central issues in the implementation of good governance policies and the outcome
thereof.
Based on an analytical approach to governance, as suggested by Andrews (2008) and
Hufty (2009), it is possible to gain a fuller understanding of actions taking place on the
ground and the agendas and power relationships between actors at various scales. In this
way, we are able to critically examine everyday practices to reveal the rhetorical use of
good governance policies and to evaluate any outcomes.
This leaves us with the question of how to interpret deﬁciencies in public service.
In the case of Addis Ababa it seems to refer to the political culture within the city
administration and a lack of commitment to implementing good governance.
In order to be able to evaluate what works and what ‘good enough governance’ is, as
suggested by Grindle (2004), it is critical that the Ethiopian government be willing to
genuinely commit to the policies it has adopted and to change its ways of asserting
control. Without a genuine commitment to change, as shown in the case presented here,
it seems meaningless to talk about what works and what is ‘good enough governance’.
As long as the culture within Addis Ababa city administration and its political control
persist and as long as this political control dominates the relationship between the city
administration and civil society it is most likely that there will not be any improvements
in the city’s solid waste service.
Camilla Louise Bjerkli (camilla.bjerkli@svt.ntnu.no), Department of Geography, Norwegian
University of Science and Technology, NTNU, NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway.
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The politics of solid-waste management in Accra, Addis Ababa, Maputo and 
Ouagadougou: Different cities, similar issues 
Jeremy Grest, Axel Baudouin, Camilla Bjerkli and Hélène Quénot-Suarez  
At first sight, solid-waste management may be considered a technical challenge, but 
over the last 15 years, it has also become a major political challenge for African cities. 
Solid-waste management is not studied here in its technical aspects, but rather as a 
metaphor for a whole range of questions relating to urban governance in Africa, and 
especially the relationship between local authorities born of the decentralisation process 
and urban society. These are especially salient in capital cities because they are, 
simultaneously, both decentralised and the incarnation of central state power. Solid-
waste management provides a lens through which to look at the broader power relations 
behind the technical questions of urban management, which any discussion of the 
subject must also address. 
Waste is a resource for some people and a nuisance for others. Solid-waste management 
is a complex issue. It is much more than the simple collection and dumping, or 
destruction, of waste. For many urban managers and politicians, it still only entails 
waste collection and disposal. In reality, solid-waste management includes waste 
minimisation, separation, transport, disposal, destruction and recycling. It also includes 
the people and organisations involved in these processes. Among these actors, those 
designated ‘informal’ would appear to have a particularly efficient and important role. 
This chapter examines the cases of Accra, Addis Ababa, Maputo and Ouagadougou. 
Each of these cities has different geographical, social and political contexts, but each 
has had to implement waste-management reforms in response to both social demand and 
external pressure from international donors. The Ethiopian government launched its 
Urban Good Governance Package in 2006, aimed at stimulating efficiency in the 
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delivery of urban services by promoting decentralisation, participation, transparency and 
accountability. In Maputo the key factor that unlocked the door to improved municipal 
capacity was a technical cooperation agreement in 2000 between the city and the 
German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), in the form of the Apoio à Gestão de Résiduos 
Sólidos Urbanos na Àrea de Grande Maputo (AGRESU). In Ouagadougou, municipal 
authorities launched the Schéma Directeur de Gestion des Déchets (SDGD, or Waste 
Management Master Plan) in 1996 to reorganise waste collection, transportation and 
storage. This plan was a part of the third urban development plan, the Projet 
d’Amélioration des Conditions de Vie Urbaines, or the Project for Improving Urban 
Living Conditions. The Accra Sustainable Programme was launched by the Ghanaian 
government and the UN, and implemented by the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) 
and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. 
In most cases, decentralisation was a response to the challenge of providing proper 
services, as well as a way to satisfy donor demands in terms of good governance. This 
term is commonly used to define what appears to be a new kind of urban management, 
focusing on negotiations and discussion forums involving all local actors, both political 
and from civil society. The term is useful for describing the emergence of new non-
political actors at the local level and the growing complexities of the new relationships. 
But it is also an ‘elusive’ concept (Stren 2004: 3–4). On the one hand, good governance 
describes a new situation, based on decentralisation, participation and public–private 
partnerships. On the other, it describes an ideal situation, based on transparency and 
accountability. Furthermore, although it is used in political science, the term is derived 
from economics, as a mode of management ensuring good order and answering to 
market rules, especially in terms of the reduction of the role of the state and increased 
public participation, manifesting itself as ‘the ideologically acceptable side of a theory 
of economic efficiency towards the poorest’ (Dubresson & Jaglin 1993: 297). The 
concept should therefore be used with care. In this chapter, the authors use the term 
‘good governance’ to refer to the struggle for change in the cities under discussion. 
In this context, informality, previously an efficient local answer to garbage collection 
and recycling, became a challenge to the authorities. They had either to integrate or 
repress the informal sector in order to prove their efficiency and territorial control to 
citizens and international donors. This led to a reorganisation of the dynamics of the 
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local political field and to the emergence of new actors at the local level. Van de 
Klundert and Lardinois (1995) cite Furedi’s definition of the informal sector: 
The informal private sector is unregistered, unregulated or casual activities carried out by 
individuals and/or family or community enterprises that engage in value-adding activities 
on a small scale with minimum capital input, using local materials and labour-intensive 
techniques.
This definition emphasises the small scale – whether social, technical or financial – at 
which the informal sector operates, with the main point being its existence outside any 
legal framework. In the definition, being informal does not mean operating without 
rules, but without the rules of the state. The difference between formal and informal 
enterprises, however these are constituted, is that the latter are not legally registered and 
do not pay taxes. This last aspect is one of the main reasons, beyond social prejudice, 
why administrations often consider informal actors in waste management a nuisance.  
It is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the formal and informal sectors. We 
can talk of a ‘fuzzy’ separation. One reason is that the same actors may be participants 
in both the formal and informal sectors. The evolution of the informal sector may bring 
it into the sphere of the formal, because when the informal sector is organised, either as 
cooperatives or in the form of private companies, it becomes formal somehow.  
The informal sector can be considered as the dominant form of the economy in 
developing countries, providing a livelihood for millions of people who depend on it for 
survival. In waste management, the informal sector plays several crucial roles, including 
poverty reduction, economic production and environmental protection. The roles it plays 
are not reflected in the place given to it in the public arena. This is determined by 
attitudes and policies rooted in local culture, and originating from both the authorities 
and the public. Medina (1997) has classified these attitudes in four ways:
• Repression: An attitude commonly adopted by authorities.
• Neglect: When authorities simply ignore scavengers.  
• Collusion: A form of ‘criminal partnership’ between local authorities and the 
informal sector. Political clientelism, corruption and bribery can flourish between 
authorities and scavengers. 
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• Stimulation: This ranges from tolerance to active integration. Some countries, 
namely Indonesia, Egypt and Brazil (Medina 1997: 16–17), recognise the economic, 
social and environmental benefits of scavenging and recycling. 
The comparison between the formal and informal sectors is based on this definition, but 
one should keep in mind that being informal does not always have the same meaning in 
the four cities analysed here. Decentralisation reforms implemented in the 1990s gave 
more responsibilities to local governments. However, in many respects, the newly 
created local entities were not capable of assuming full responsibility for municipal 
services, and the accumulation of waste is proof of their failure. Decentralisation aimed 
at changing the rules of the local political field by introducing new kinds of actors, new 
practices and new local best-practice discourses. The persistence of inadequate solid-
waste management and the surprising neglect of the informal sector may be due to the 
way decentralisation was implemented, and therefore its reality has to be questioned. 
Waste management, the informal sector and governance in Addis Ababa 
Monitoring waste management  
During the last 10 years, the inhabitants of Addis Ababa, as well as visitors to the city, 
have witnessed improvements in waste management. The changes in solid-waste 
management were particularly noticeable after 2003, under the governance of Mayor 
Arkebe Oqubay. The city became cleaner and numerous small- and micro-scale solid-
waste-management enterprises were created. These changes were part of an ongoing 
local administrative reform. In 2006 the Ethiopian government launched its Urban Good 
Governance Package, intended to stimulate efficiency in the delivery of urban services 
by promoting decentralisation, participation, transparency and accountability. In Addis 
Ababa in 1997, up to 80 per cent of the population were engaged in one or another form 
of informal activity (Demeke 2002). However, the administrative authorities usually 
ignore, or are unable to enter into partnerships with the actors in the informal sector. For 
their part, informal actors may also refuse to become involved with the formal 
authorities through lack of trust and the belief that it would be detrimental to their 
activities.  
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Waste management in Addis Ababa before 2003
Some years ago, most households did not have any waste-disposal containers accessible 
within reasonable distance (ENDA-Ethiopia 1999). Waste was either dumped – 
particularly in rivers – burnt or buried in gardens. Before 2003 the geographical 
coverage and frequency of disposal was far below expectation (Yirgalem 2001: 75). 
Only 40 per cent of solid waste was collected. The authorities responsible for waste 
management (i.e. the Health Bureau) did not provide enough containers, nor did they 
arrange for these to be emptied on a regular basis. No one controlled waste disposal, and 
no penalties were imposed for mismanagement of refuse. Regulations existed but were 
never enforced. Potential agencies for waste management were not on the agenda, and 
apart from municipal employees (truck drivers), the households themselves and informal 
scavengers, there was neither community nor private-sector involvement. In 1999 
ENDA-Ethiopia claimed that ‘informal recyclers have to be encouraged through 
abolition or reduction of taxes and by providing them space to produce their materials 
etc. and with other incentives’ (ENDA-Ethiopia 1999: 12).
The Repi landfill site, established in the 1960s, has been the only solid-waste disposal 
site for the past four decades in Addis Ababa. The site is open, unfenced, with a poor 
disposal system, and devoid of any infrastructure. It exposes local communities to great 
health risks. Depending on the season, the Repi landfill site supports up to 500 on-site 
scavengers (Yirgalem 2001). Small-scale urban farmers make deals with truck drivers to 
dump organic waste at their farms. Close to the landfill, a small-scale private industry 
reprocesses waste from tanneries and dead animals to produce glue, known locally as 
colla.1
There are many reasons why the informal actors work discreetly: fear of eviction from 
their area of operation; unfair and unaffordable taxes; competition from other actors; 
and the very long bureaucratic processes involved in following formal procedures. 
Although the existence of informal operators in solid-waste management was 
acknowledged at different levels of the city administration, their significant contribution 
to waste reduction, reuse and recycling was ignored. Access to credit and other 
incentives to develop the management of the informal sector were lacking, and the 
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strategy of informal operators was to try to avoid any contact with the city officials.  
A new era (2003–2005)   
The situation surrounding solid-waste collection and the informal sector improved 
between 2002 and 2005 under Mayor Arkebe Oqubay.2 This progress, however, was due 
not only to the new mayor but also to the initiatives of earlier actors. One initiative, 
before the new administration came to power, was started by a popular musician, Gashe 
Abera Molla. Together with some NGOs, Molla launched a campaign to clean up the 
city. Other initiatives were prompted by Muammar Gadaffi’s provocative statement that 
Addis Ababa was too dirty to become the headquarters of the newly created African 
Union. This catalysed a response from the city’s inhabitants and administration, leading 
to better waste management. The heightened role of the media made the population 
increasingly concerned about the image of the city. Mayor Arkebe (2005) described the 
situation as follows:
The city of Addis Ababa and its citizens were experiencing poor urban governance as 
manifested in a highly centralized government system, un-participatory governance, poor 
service delivery, and lack of transparency…Delivery of municipal and public service was 
often inefficient and non-transparent, while levels of corruption were high in some areas.  
The city was well known for the inefficiency of its administrative authorities. Public 
servants’ positions were based on loyalty to the ruling party, and they often lacked 
formal qualifications for the positions they occupied. Staff turnover was high due to the 
political nature of the patron–client culture. 
Arkebe embarked on a huge administrative reform at three levels of administration: city, 
sub-city and kebele.3 These reforms involved decentralising services down to the kebele
level, and organising community participation, with people’s advisory councils at the 
three levels. The reforms were achieved by dismissing hundreds of civil servants on the 
basis of allegations of inefficiency and corruption. This might have been a popular 
decision had it not been driven by an underlying political agenda, which cast a shadow 
over the process.
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However, even if ‘any policies, programs and budget proposals initiated by the city 
government [had] to be deliberated by these councils before they [were] proclaimed for 
implementation’ (Arkebe 2005), the reality of the devolution of power to the people can 
be questioned, since the people’s councils had no decision-making power.  
To improve solid-waste management, the city administration transferred responsibility 
for it from the Ministry of Health to a newly established municipal department, the 
Addis Ababa City Sanitation, Beautification and Park Development Agency. Although 
the informal waste-collecting sector provided a door-to-door primary collection service, 
this activity had long remained unattractive to government officials, or was simply 
ignored, until 2003.  
In the early period of the new provisional city administration, officialdom was quite 
amenable towards the informal solid-waste collectors. They found themselves in an 
advantageous position when the city government withdrew from the primary collection 
service by placing containers in different locations to facilitate their work. Government 
officials adopted this arrangement for three reasons. Firstly, the officials recognised that 
they could reduce costs by abandoning the previous block collection service and 
concentrating only on transporting containers to the final dumping site. Secondly, they 
gradually learnt that the informal collectors were capable of collecting more waste than 
the municipal truck operators. Thirdly, it was viewed as a job-creation opportunity for 
individuals engaged in the sector on their own initiative. The introduction of 
government-sponsored micro- and small-scale enterprises (MSSEs) led to a boom in 
organised registered and taxable informal solid-waste-collecting organisations. 
Integration of the micro- and small-scale enterprises
The new city administration gradually developed an interest in fully controlling primary 
collection (Zelalem 2006). By the end of 2003, it had started to advocate the need to 
formalise the pre-existing informal solid-waste-collecting enterprises. It did this by 
institutionalising and integrating MSSEs, placing them under the control of the kebeles
without any preliminary consultation with the pre-existing agencies. The local 
104
authorities simply selected new collectors from among the unemployed. These became 
rivals to the pre-existing informal sector and to the established formal private solid-
waste-collecting enterprises. Initially, the latter were simply dispossessed and evicted 
from their service areas. Additionally, the pre-existing enterprises were forced to 
reorganise under the umbrella of the MSSE administration, and denied the right to 
organise themselves independently. In some cases, pre-existing enterprises were forced 
to merge into the new MSSEs. In others, officials avoided conflicts and evictions by 
deliberately organising and deploying the MSSEs only in areas not served by other 
enterprises.  
One overt municipal intervention was to issue official letters signed and stamped by the 
kebele authorities, distributed to all households, in order to make the MSSEs appear as 
the only legitimate enterprises. Officials also urged households to terminate their 
existing contracts with the former collectors and to accept new contracts with the 
MSSEs. This caused a systematic eviction of pre-existing enterprises from their 
established service areas. The informal sector was offered few alternatives: at best only 
to share part of their service area with the MSSEs, or to leave (Zelalem 2006: 78). 
Capturing clients from the pre-existing enterprises was achieved by lowering the service 
rates below those charged by the pre-existing enterprises, often below a workable 
minimum price. 
Objectives of the interventions
The city government claimed it wanted to ensure more efficient solid-waste collection 
and to generate employment opportunities. However, the intervention appeared to be 
more of a political exercise introduced by the kebele authorities eager to organise as 
many enterprises as possible so as to appear as loyal champions of the city government’s 
programme for creating new employment. Each kebele had its own targeted quota, and 
officials were made responsible for its implementation. The exercise seems to have been 
aimed at recruiting new party members and ensuring local political dominance of the 
ruling party. Immediately after the 2005 national elections, the municipality abandoned 
the active formation of new enterprises. Conflict and hostility rapidly emerged as the 
dominant types of relationships. These conflicts were sometimes serious and triggered 
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violence directed at the newly integrated actors. Competition strategies included 
enhancing the frequency of waste collection, reducing collection fees and rendering 
supplementary services for free (Zelalem 2006). In some cases, the informal waste 
collectors settled internal disputes through discussions and negotiations. 
All in all, the introduction of the government-sponsored MSSEs was to the detriment of 
the waste-collection service. Officials claimed that more than 10 000 new jobs had been 
created in solid-waste collection, but this figure seems far higher than what was 
achieved in reality.Some kebeles were overstocked with solid-waste-collecting 
enterprises, whereas others suffered from service inadequacies. In addition, the city 
government interventions were mainly focused on areas that were already served by pre-
existing enterprises. Thereafter, the MSSEs usually failed to sustain service delivery at 
the newly introduced collection rates. Consequently, they often terminated their service 
and/or were dissolved after a short period of operating. The provisional city government 
integrated the MSSEs as a way of dismantling the pre-existing enterprises, which were 
viewed as a nuisance, and the only outcome of this was a disruption of the mushrooming 
informal waste-collection system. In the period under consideration (2003–2005), the 
role played by informal solid-waste collection was recognised, and it became obvious to 
visitors and inhabitants that, at least in the central parts of the town, waste collection 
had definitely improved.  
The 2005 elections
As explained earlier, Mayor Arkebe introduced substantial changes in the municipality 
and its management between 2003 and 2005. However, the victory of the opposition 
coalition in the 2005 elections led to his being replaced by Mayor Berhanu Nega from 
the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). Claiming that the elections had been 
rigged in other parts of the country, the CUD called for a nationwide strike against the 
ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The strikes in June 
and October were violent and led to the detention of opposition figures, including the 
newly elected mayor. Following this turmoil, the EPRDF-led government appointed a 
caretaker administration under the leadership of Mayor Birhanu Deressa in May 2006. 
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Waste management after 2005    
In 2006 local government intervened only in cases of territorial conflicts among waste 
collectors or in the case of complaints made by clients. Either they had learnt from their 
failures or the issue of refuse collection was no longer politically important in the post-
election period. All of the enterprises were registered, paid taxes and had a licence from 
the sub-city authorities. Another important development was the coordination between 
door-to-door waste collectors and municipal truck drivers, who transport waste from 
transfer stations to the dumping site. If the truck drivers did not appear at their allocated 
time, the collectors reported the matter to the sub-city, and the driver would be held 
responsible for refuse not collected at the appointed time. This coordination was an 
improvement, but limited to the central areas and main avenues of the city.  
In 2009 the implementation of business process re-engineering signalled a further 
administrative reorganisation, with new practices aimed at improved, centralised service 
delivery. The city administration blamed the MSSEs for inefficiency, illegal disposal of 
waste and charging excessive fees. The city administration proposed reorganising the 
MSSEs into cooperatives and centralising the payment of the monthly waste-collection 
fees, which were previously paid directly to the waste collectors. The MSSE 
associations reacted strongly, disputing the municipality’s interpretation of the causes of 
illegal dumping, and instead blaming the municipality for the improper use of its 
collection trucks. They also rejected the proposed new fee-collection system as being 
imposed without any discussion. Additionally, they were being required to employ more 
people, who were to be selected by the kebeles. Salaries for waste collectors fell and 
people left in search of other work. The collectors claimed they were becoming 
‘employees’ of the kebele, and losing their independence and power of initiative.4
Various World Bank–supported policies to reform the civil service and improve 
administrative efficiency and service delivery have been launched. These reforms have 
been used to gain more control on the ground. 
Solid-waste management from below: Plastics recycling in Addis Ababa
At all times, parts of the informal waste-recovery system have been kept totally out of 
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the control of the municipality. The municipality is not involved, for example, in any 
systematic waste recycling of plastics or other materials. Consequently, the informal 
sector has recognised that there is a niche market for such activities, especially for 
plastic materials. This has resulted in the development of a highly organised system for 
source separation, collection, trade and transformation of plastic waste materials, yet 
one that is almost totally informal.  
The organisation of the recovery system is complex. Within the system, several 
collectors work at different levels, such as scavengers operating at the landfill, foragers 
collecting materials in the street and qorales,5 who buy materials directly from 
households and to a limited extent from the foragers and the MSSEs. The qorales are
different from the foragers and scavengers, in that they buy the materials before they 
enter the waste cycle, and, therefore, the quality of the materials they collect is much 
higher. Moreover, the qorales are a strong upward link to small traders, who are often 
called wholesalers. The wholesalers based in Mercato, the market area, form the central 
link between all the actors within the plastics-recovery system and are therefore 
essential to the function of the system. They make contact with the plastics factories 
operating at the top of the recycling hierarchy.
The relationships between these different types of collectors seem to be based on trade, 
with each seeking as much profit as possible. Within the urban plastics-recovery system, 
the clients are a business secret. It proved almost impossible to find out to which 
factories the wholesalers sold their plastics. Moreover, factory owners deny using waste 
in their production out of fear that the government would find out about this ‘illegal’ 
activity, which in most cases would result in increased taxes. In short, the social 
relationship between the actors within the plastics-recovery system can be characterised 
as a patron–client relationship based on dependence and mutual trust.
The recovery of plastic materials is mainly driven by the need to satisfy a huge domestic 
market. The growing demand for plastic waste stems from the poverty facing the 
majority of people in Addis Ababa. Products made from plastic waste have a market in 
terms of both quality and price. The high demand for plastic products ensures that 
almost all plastic is collected and brought back into the recovery system. In Addis 
Ababa, roughly 23 tonnes of plastic is collected each day in the city (Bjerkli 2005). The 
income generated from it differs markedly among the various actors operating within the 
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system. Foragers collect and trade materials at the subsistence level, whereas the qorales
are able to generate higher incomes. And the income earned by the qorales is lower than 
that made by the wholesalers, which may be as high as $85 a day. This shows that the 
wholesalers operate in a monopolistic market, and are in a position to exploit the 
collectors. The current plastics-recovery system in Addis Ababa may not be a perfect 
example of how to manage the recovery of such materials, but the informal system 
functions efficiently at all levels. The wholesalers are the winners in terms of profit, and 
play a key role in its functioning.
The main problem with the system is the relationship between its actors and the 
government authorities. The government is aware of the activities of the informal 
plastics-recovery sector, but its decisions are made without consultation with the people 
concerned or affected. The government planned to relocate Menalish Terra, where the 
wholesalers operate from, and develop a new system for source separation and recovery 
through MSSEs. Consequently, actors within the plastics recovery system do not trust 
the local government and are wary of its intentions.
Despite the earlier improvements, the collection and disposal of solid waste are once 
again deteriorating in Addis Ababa. The number of trucks is still limited, and they only 
cover certain areas. Refuse is still left on the streets because of a lack of regular removal 
from the transfer stations to the landfill site. Waste is returning to the streets of Addis 
Ababa, with overfilled waste containers waiting to be taken to the dumping site, and 
waste piling up on the city’s river banks and bridges. Relationships between the actors 
are changing. The municipality ignores, and even works against, the existing informal 
system and MSSEs, reducing any partnership between them to a mere formality. The 
municipality has consistently applied its own political agenda to the urban waste-
management strategy, using any opportunity to increase its control over the population, 
particularly in pre-election periods.
Barriers or resistance to the institutionalisation of the informal sector arise from both the 
institutional sector and the informal sector itself. In Ethiopia, the relationships between 
the state, the municipality and the informal sector in solid-waste management are such 
that the informal sector largely tries to avoid contact with the municipality. The latter is 
perceived as only interested in trying to impose new or increased taxes. In the collection 
of household waste and in its efforts to create employment and increase its control over 
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people, the municipality supported competing structures, thereby threatening the 
livelihood of the scavengers. It is therefore logical and understandable that the situation 
has deteriorated and that conflicts have increased. In this context, the informal sector in 
Addis Ababa has seen very little benefit from collaborating with a municipal authority 
that is unable to provide social services in return for taxes, or recognition or security.
The partially successful attempts at improving waste management under Mayor Arkebe 
between 2003 and 2005 nevertheless represented a new trend, as for the first time 
support and collaboration were organised by the municipality to the benefit of different 
categories of the informal sector – the street vendors, hawkers and scavengers – who 
had hitherto experienced only harassment from the authorities. An important issue 
concerns the general waste-management policy towards scavenging, recycling and reuse. 
This has not yet been addressed, and potential civil-society actors/partners, such as local 
communities and local NGOs, are not included or supported. Partnerships with 
enterprises exist only for the collection of solid waste, and they are not working 
properly.
Solid-waste management in Maputo    
Internal structures and capacities: The politics of waste from above    
After Mozambique gained independence in 1975, municipal organisation and 
infrastructure were not the new state’s priorities, and street cleaning and solid-waste 
removal were thoroughly neglected. When the local administrative system, still 
FRELIMO-dominated, was reformed in 1998, it was not capable of assuming full 
responsibility for municipal services, as it lacked financial and administrative capacity. 
In Maputo piles of uncollected rubbish remained the most visible sign of the failure of 
municipal services. The private sector was called in, but it too failed to deliver adequate 
services. In 2001 the collapse of the waste-collection system necessitated the 
intervention of central government, which de-legitimised the first ‘reformed’ local 
administration.  
In 2004 a new FRELIMO-led urban administration under Mayor Eneas Comiche began 
its four-year mandate. It demonstrated for the first time real seriousness of purpose and 
the political will to deal with a range of urban-management problems. The major 
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constraints on effective delivery of urban services were the same financial and 
organisational factors that had always existed, but a different approach emerged. 
Comiche managed to build a team of younger, more motivated and professional urban 
managers, and tighter system controls were introduced to counter misappropriation of 
resources and irregularities in the municipal tendering process. 
The key factor enabling improved municipal capacity was a technical cooperation 
agreement between the City of Maputo and GTZ/AGRESU.6 Comiche recognised the 
essential importance of a series of baseline studies, ignored by the previous 
administration, and provided the political and institutional support for the technical 
cooperation project to develop into a driving force for improved solid-waste 
management. 
Comiche was widely recognised as an effective mayor who had inherited a city with 
innumerable management problems and took positive steps to address them. However, 
many urban problems – poverty, unemployment, poor housing, defective urban 
infrastructure and crime – were national issues beyond the capacity of the local 
government to manage effectively. Popular disaffection, spearheaded by the alienated 
and unemployed youth, has twice erupted into violent urban protests against increases in 
the cost of living (in February 2008 and in September 2010). Urban middle-class 
frustration with FRELIMO policies has not translated into the development of any 
effective opposition voice, and FRELIMO’s political hegemony remains unchallenged, 
as demonstrated by the 2009 national election results.7 Comiche was not selected by 
FRELIMO to stand as mayoral candidate in the local elections of 2008. He was ousted 
for having been too independent from the party, and ‘disciplined’ because he was seen 
to put the interests of the city above those of the party.8 It remains to be seen how the 
new team of Daviz Simango will build on the foundations laid by Comiche’s 
administration.  
PROMAPUTO (2006) and the Plano Director (2008)
PROMAPUTO, the Maputo Municipal Development Plan of 2006 (Município de 
Maputo 2006), was a major initiative taken by the Comiche administration to address 
urban-management problems in general. It was drawn up on the basis of research and 
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stakeholder consultation, and Comiche’s team successfully negotiated financing from 
the World Bank and other donors, for a 10-year municipal development programme, 
which was approved by the Municipal Assembly in 2006. The project was largely driven 
by the municipality, and not simply by a project-management team of the World Bank 
(Stretz interview, 6 August 2009). The solid-waste component of PROMAPUTO was 
developed in detail by the Municipal Directorate of Health and Cleansing, with the 
technical support of AGRESU. In 2008 a 10-year master plan for urban solid-waste 
management was published. This aims to gradually extend cleaning services for the 
whole city ‘in an appropriate and economically viable manner’. A key component is 
financial sustainability. Financing comes from revenue generated by the sector, with 
phased-in tariff increases as the service is rolled out, and with affordability taken into 
account. The private sector is actively involved: two large companies provide secondary 
domestic collection, while another monitors their performance. It is envisaged that 
substantial civic education will be necessary to inform the public about the plan, its 
structure, costs and the changed behaviour necessary to implement it successfully. The 
plan makes provision for more community-based contracts for small-scale service 
providers. These are discussed in the following sections.  
The politics of waste from below: Formalising the informal   [C-head]
In 2000 generalised flooding affected Maputo profoundly, badly damaging the degraded 
urban infrastructure and exposing residents to environmental hazards, such as massive 
erosion and landslips, and disease, including a major outbreak of cholera. The 
municipality’s failure to maintain infrastructure and provide services was painfully 
evident, and gave impetus to the development of informal solutions to some of these 
problems. Two experiences in particular became pilot projects for the extension of 
primary solid-waste removal to previously unserviced areas.
ADASBU (Associação de Desenvolvimento da Agua e Saneamento do Bairro de 
Urbanização)9
The low-lying district of Urbanização was one of the areas worst affected in the city 
during the cholera outbreak. Médecins Sans Frontières intervened to bring in a fresh 
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water supply and storm-water drainage. Emerging from the relief work, a community 
association was created, its primary aim being the improvement of sanitation and solid-
waste removal. AGRESU designed handcarts, known as tchovas,10 with a steel mesh 
bottom to filter out sand, substantially reducing the total volumes of waste collected and 
deposited into the municipal containers. Work teamswere established, and a levy 
introduced to pay them. This was not sufficient for cost recovery, so the donors involved 
agreed to meet the shortfall for an interim period.  
In 2002 the municipality introduced the taxa de limpeza, a cleansing tax of Mt.20 (about 
$60) per month, bundled in with the electricity account, as prepaid meters were being 
introduced by the national electricity supplier. This threatened to destroy the solid-waste 
collection work of ADASBU without substantially improving municipal collection in 
the bairros.11 ADASBU and AGRESU negotiated with the municipality, which 
eventually ceded a service contract for primary solid-waste delivery to ADASBU. The 
municipal by-law had to be changed to allow non-municipal entities to provide the 
service. This was a significant legal step and opened the way to the development of the 
pilot scheme. 
Primary household collection by ADASBU was constrained by the inability of the 
municipality to regularly empty the containers on the main road into which the waste 
was deposited. The containers overflowed and created new mountains of waste in public 
spaces. When this occurred, the ADASBU teams abandoned their work in the bairros,
letting the waste accumulate there rather than on the main road.  
UGSM (Uaene Gama de Serviços Municipais)12
A private entrepreneur, Paulino Uaene, set up a waste-removal project in Maxaquene in 
1999, operating through the political and administrative structures of the local bairro.
By the end of 2000, he had a team and basic equipment, but relied largely on head-
loading to carry the waste. As his business expanded, he bought tchovas, developed a 
shift system and moved into nearby areas, as well as a local market. When the cleansing 
tax was introduced, his business nearly collapsed, as clients refused to pay both his 
charges and the municipal tax. He survived the crisis and in 2004 signed a service 
contract with the municipality as a micro-enterprise. His business has grown and he has 
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successfully moved into secondary collection from private companies in the ‘cement 
city’ using small trucks. 
Extending the system: Small-scale service providers     
In 2008 the system of primary collection was extended. Tenders were put out and 
contracts signed with 14 successful bidders in 19 bairros. Bidders had to comply with 
stringent financial and technical requirements, and to undergo capacity building. The 
tender document was specifically designed as a training workbook listing all the 
financial and technical requirements to be met. AGRESU’s conceptual support was 
significant, and various private companies and NGOs did the necessary training.
Contractors are not required to be residents of the areas they operate in, but team 
supervisors and workers have to live in the bairro they service. Cleaning routes and 
schedules are provided in the contract. Teams circulate with tchovas, blowing whistles 
to signal to residents to bring their waste out, which is taken to the nearest container and 
deposited to await secondary collection and transport to the landfill. The shortage of 
containers in the bairros is an endemic problem, and the secondary collection service 
very unreliable. The primary collection teams are monitored by a supervisor and 
municipal inspectors. Within each bairro, the secretàrio,13 an elected and paid 
municipal official, remains a key point of contact between the primary removal teams, 
municipal inspectors, residents, the contractor and the district administration.14 The 
secretàrio monitors compliance with the collection targets specified in the contract and 
has to sign off on the monthly service report before it is forwarded to the district, and 
from there to the central administration, which makes the payments. The secretàrio, who 
has a wide range of other local administrative functions, is assisted in this task by the 
chefes de quarteirão – responsible for units of around 50 dwellings – who report on 
neighbourhood issues on a regular basis.
Formalising the informal: Limits and possibilities      
It is estimated that currently about 400 000 residents receive primary waste collection, 
or about 65 per cent of the population living in those bairros.15 If this estimate is 
accurate, it represents a marked improvement on the former situation, where primary 
collection was restricted to three bairros in the entire city. About 65 per cent of total 
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estimated waste is actually collected from those serviced, but there is still a significant 
proportion of residents within these bairros with no primary collection. This is the 
outcome of choices made about the best use of limited resources: how to extend the 
service using the financial and technical capacity available. The introduction of the 
cleansing tax in 2002 provided a potential means to extend the service. It was ring-
fenced in 2005 as a revenue source dedicated to solid-waste collection only, but not 
exclusively to primary collection. But the levels of the tax, and thus revenues, cannot 
legitimately be increased without first providing an improved service.  
The primary collection process is now being ‘formalised’ and regulated. However, 
residents of the newly serviced bairros still encounter deficiencies in the service. Their 
rubbish is still collected irregularly, or at times not at all. And the workers decide, on an 
arbitrary basis, what sort of rubbish they are prepared to collect. Residents have 
resorted, in some cases, to contracting ‘informal’ collectors in their bairro as a second 
service. These are individuals who have no municipal contracts, but collect from 
residents using hired handcarts. They work irregularly, and charge on the basis of 
individual loads. Therefore there is still a parallel informal system of primary collection 
in areas where the municipality has seemingly formalised the system. Residents also 
maintain pits in their yards to store or bury uncollected rubbish. The informal treatment 
of waste through illegal dumping, burning and burying therefore remains a major 
challenge for the municipality. 
The monitoring of the primary collection in each bairro is carried out by the secretàrio.
A formal system has been conceptualised and put in place: inspections need to be made, 
and records of collection verified and passed up the chain of command to the district and 
municipality. If the secretàrio is not satisfied in the first instance, the small-scale 
collector does not get paid. They both have an interest in the system working. Both sets 
of actors are well-established members of their communities. In many cases, they both 
have strong party links, and may also be well known to each other. In practice, this 
means sufficient compliance with the formal norms to meet the requirements of the 
contract, and service levels that do not discredit either party in the eyes of the municipal 
authorities.
Residents’ views do not as yet seem to carry much influence. In cases where residents 
were not happy with the level of service, they seemed to be resigned to it and saw little 
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point in complaining to the secretàrio. There is a general and fairly deep disconnect 
between residents and the municipality, born of decades of municipal indifference, 
incompetence and neglect. Rubbish has often been at the heart of the issue, and it is only 
very recently that more serious attempts have emerged to deal creatively with a 
perennial problem.  
Recicla: Informal plastic recycling meets the formal economy
The Recicla project provides an interesting example of the synergies created by 
cooperation between the municipality, NGOs and the private sector in the search for 
creative solutions to solid-waste-management problems. It also highlights the possible 
benefits to all of engaging directly with informal waste pickers.16 In 2004 a project was 
started that involved the municipality (which made available a site adjacent to the main 
city landfill, at Hulene, and facilitated the administrative processes), CARITAS 
Mozambique (a charitable organisation) and AGRESU (as principal funders),17 waste 
pickers and interested businesses. The project was designed to address poverty reduction 
and meet environmental-protection goals at the same time. Employment opportunities 
and income generation would combine with waste management and environmental 
action.
The plastic waste collected by the waste pickers is weighed, purchased, sorted, washed, 
dried, cut up by hand, machine-milled, packed and sold to buyers as raw material for the 
manufacture of new plastic items. In 2005, 17 project workers were recruited from 
among the waste pickers. They self-selected on the basis of continued voluntary and 
unpaid participation over an extended period of time, in weekly sessions involving 
training in literacy, group participation and health matters.  
Construction of the facility was completed in March 2006, and Recicla opened for 
business. All the workers receive the same basic salary, regardless of their role in the 
production process, but weekend work is for their own accounts and earns a bonus. 
Recicla buys about 16 tonnes of plastic per month, divided into three categories: 
polyethylene jars, bottles, basins and boxes; polypropylene chairs, tables, buckets and 
domestic utensils; and plastic bags and film. 
The Recicla project became self-sufficient within three years. In August 2009, it became 
116
a cooperative and was officially handed over to the workers, who are now members and 
responsible for its operation. With their agreement, the former project manager has been 
hired as administrator to ensure continuity. Recicla’s aim to integrate the informal 
economy into the local economy has been partly achieved. One of the challenges is to 
maintain competitiveness in the market: informal private buyers of plastic waste attempt 
to intercept the sellers in the vicinity of the project and undercut Recicla by offering 
better prices.18
Recicla can be judged successful on a number of counts. It has provided a new life and 
regular income for 17 formerly marginal catadores, who between them have over 60 
dependants. The project has been able to balance its books and is economically viable 
without subsidies or donations. It has stimulated the market for plastic waste, 
encouraging waste pickers to use the facility, and at the same time has encouraged 
plastic recycling. It has also been a pilot for future recycling projects involving the 
municipality, the private sector and informal waste collectors in a symbiotic 
relationship. An irony that emerges from the case study is that Recicla needs municipal 
protection of its premisesto defend its market share against competition from informal 
buyers, who enjoy a competitive advantage because they are unencumbered by the costs 
of formality. 
Ouagadougou and Accra    
The solid-waste-management system: Reforms from above   
In Burkina Faso and Ghana, waste-management reforms are strongly connected to the 
political system, as an expression of a political ideology.  
In Ouagadougou, before 1986, waste collection was handled by the municipal services. 
Thomas Sankara, the military officer who led Burkina Faso’s revolutionary process until 
1987, created the Dinasene (Direction Nationale des Services d’Entretien, de Nettoyage 
et d’Embellissement) in 1986.19 Dinasene’s monopoly on the collection of both solid and 
human waste gave Sankara an opportunity to show his voluntarism by creating new 
services and to use the administration to handle the population’s basic needs. 
Characteristically, this new service did not run very well, particularly because it lacked 
funds (Bouju & Ouattara 2002: 69). 
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Waste management holds less importance than public sweeping and cleaning. In both 
Burkina Faso and Ghana, being clean has a moral dimension. During revolutions, 
participation was encouraged through popular actions such as cleansing exercises. This 
specific form of popular participation was possible because of a strong political project 
that motivated the people. The revolutionary powers tended thereby to give a formal 
frame to popular actions. 
In Ghana, Jerry Rawlings’s ambition was to create an ‘African type’ of democracy based 
on new kinds of bonds between state and society. With this in mind, he tried to organise 
local administrations in the form of the People’s Defence Committees and the Workers’ 
Defence Committees, which mobilised vigorously in terms of the environment and sanitation. 
This power at a local level hid the fact that Rawlings organised administrative 
decentralisation to have better control of the territory (Crawford 2004: 7). 
Ghana experienced a major economic crisis in the 1970s. The crisis brought into 
question the ‘Ghanaian model’, mainly based on the export of cacao, and brought about 
a period of political instability. Waste management became extremely disorganised, at a 
time when many rural migrants were arriving in Accra. The city’s waste collection 
worsened until 1985, when a Waste Management Department (WMD) was created, 
almost at the same time as the Onasene in Burkina Faso. The WMD still exists, but faces 
difficulties because its funding depends on the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), 
and because it has to deal with a lot of parallel private companies working in the waste-
management sector (Boadi & Kuitunen 2003: 212). 
While Ouagadougou focused on primary collection, in Accra the AMA tried to 
reorganise (secondary) collection itself by placing refuse containers in the city. Accra 
residents can ask an informal primary collector to collect for them or they can make use 
of the containers themselves. Municipal tax collection, consequently, became more 
difficult: when residents hire an informal pre-collector, they feel they are paying twice – 
to the informal primary collectors and to the AMA. People are also not prepared to pay 
for waste collection, which appears as a ‘non-service’, compared to water connection, 
for instance. This prompted the AMA to adopt a new kind of waste management and 
assign all the waste collection to a single company, City and Country Waste Limited 
(CCWL), a Canadian company. 
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From the mid-1990s, the rectification process led by the new Burkinabé president, 
Blaise Compaoré, in the 1990s allowed Burkina Faso to return to the international scene 
and to become eligible for donor funding programmes. A new constitution in 1991 and a 
structural adjustment plan modernised the law and began the process of decentralisation. 
In 1995 Ouagadougou elected its mayor, Simon Compaoré, a significant milestone for 
the capital. 
In 1994 the CFA franc was devalued by 50 per cent. The devaluation, which may be 
compared to Ghana’s economic crisis of the 1970s, radically changed access to the 
labour market and encouraged the development of informality. The establishment of 
many informal networks, especially women’s associations, was an answer to the 
financial crisis and a way for people to make money through small-scale activities such 
as soap production and waste collection. In this sense, informality protected the urban 
social structure. 
International donors funded the sub-metropolitan assemblies rather than central 
government. That was made easier by the fact that, at the time, the number of sub-
metropolitan assemblies had increased from five to thirteen. But this aid was mainly 
focused on equipment. All these projects were implemented by technicians, which led to 
a kind of ‘depoliticisation’ of waste management. Furthermore, civil society was not 
integrated within the analysis, and this led to a strong dualism between what was 
technical and official, and what was specifically from civil society and informal.  
Ghana followed the same pattern as Burkina Faso. Its decentralisation programme of the 
late 1980s was the first to adopt the neoliberal orthodoxy of the World Bank and IMF. 
In both countries, the civil-society aspects were managed by UNICEF through various 
programmes of participation to make the poor responsible for their own development. 
This participation was in some people’s view ‘the ideologically acceptable face of an 
economic theory of efficiency towards the poor’ (Jaglin 2005: 273–274). 
Informality was a very useful means of managing what the municipal authorities could 
not. It became an issue when the cities faced severe shortages and criticism of their 
management. They then tried to eradicate informality. Accra chose a kind of repression, 
trying to formalise the entire process, whereas Ouagadougou aimed at integration. Both 
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methods were hazardous, and had unexpected effects on urban life. 
Formalising the informal: Reforms during the early 2000s
The CCWL experiment in Ghana: A hazardous U-turn     
In an effort to rationalise the waste-collection system, the municipal authorities in Accra 
delegated waste collection to a single private company. Until mid-1999, waste collection 
had been shared between the public and private sectors. The private contractors were 
efficient (Obirih-Opareh 2004: 29), but labour conditions were very hard compared with 
the public sector. The city used to choose the contractors, and in some cases paid them 
directly. This way, the municipal authorities could control the private contactors, but 
also depended on them to keep the city clean.
The municipal authorities needed to show they were trying to find solutions to improve 
their waste collection. The central government, however, made the decision in 1999 to 
award the management to a single contractor, CCWL. This allowed the government to 
claim that they were concerned about the situation and were seen to have proposed an 
innovative solution. At the same time, the municipal authorities were relieved since they 
only had to deal with one contractor. Besides, the choice fitted with World Bank 
recommendations by increasing privatisation in the city.  
CCWL worked with both Canadian and local subcontractors. Since the company 
controlled the entire waste-management operation, it became more influential than the 
WMD itself. All the local private contractors were opposed to the decision to award the 
contact. Furthermore, the municipal authorities decided to pay 211 000 Ghana cedis per 
tonne, as opposed to the former sum of only 10 000 cedis. With so much revenue, 
CCWL’s results were effective: the firm doubled waste collection within eight months
(Hofny-Collins 2006: 118–119). However, problems developed. 
Firstly, this management of the city waste did not integrate a recycling system: the 
contractors were paid per tonne and had no interest in waste reduction. Secondly, the 
AMA struggled to pay CCWL. Thirdly, the system undermined the small local 
contractors, making it hard for them to survive. And with the AMA’s focus solely on 
CCWL, no attention was paid to the informal sector. 
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For these reasons, the partnership was terminated after the 2000 presidential elections 
and the change of government. The municipal authorities went back to the local small-
scale contractors and retained CCWL’s equipment. The current system divides the 
collection between the AMA and local contractors. The public services focus on the 
inner city centre, especially the markets and drains, but they cannot achieve their waste-
management objectives without the informal sector. Informality therefore appears to be 
a political answer to a technical issue. No specific policy has been formulated to 
integrate or repress the informal actors. This lack of will could be understood as a wish 
to protect a sector that appears to be very useful in achieving the municipal authorities’ 
formal goals. 
The Schéma Directeur de Gestion des Déchets reform in Burkina
Burkina Faso also tried to rationalise waste collection, but in a very different way. At 
the end of 2000, Ouagadougou chose to implement the Schéma Directeur de Gestion des 
Déchets (SDGD), or waste management master plan, to reorganise waste collection, 
transportation and storage.
The municipality invited tenders for 12 contractors – private, associative and/or 
informal – for each area of the city (Meunier-Nikiema 2007: 12). Each area would fall 
under the exclusive charge of a single contractor responsible for primary waste 
collection and cleanliness, for four years.
The selected contractors had to become a Groupement d’Intérêt Economique (GIE), or 
economic interest grouping. This was relatively easy for the private contractors, but 
much more difficult for the associations that had previously not been taxed. The GIE has 
to collect fees from the residents to pay the workers, but also, in theory, to finance 
storage areas and transportation to the main landfill site. These responsibilities are very 
onerous but seem logical because this plan has been implemented alongside a World 
Bank project for the landfill site. The World Bank can fund infrastructure but not the 
operating costs of a project. This reform seems to have been very successful, but the 
contractors now face difficulties, especially because they have to deal with informal 
collectors, who were not integrated into the plan. 
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Unexpected uses of informality   
Ouagadougou: A new type of actor     
By choosing local associations, the municipal authorities wanted to maintain the strong 
bonds existing between associations, residents and local territories. The aim of the local 
associations is to socialise the poorest women and to improve their lives and health by 
providing jobs and support. On the periphery of Ouagadougou, where the settlements are 
very new, associational life structures society and creates new relationships among the 
residents, as well as new kinds of links. In some respects, associations tend to be an 
alternative to traditional bonds, creating a new local identity, based on urbanity.  
In any sub-metro one will find several well-organised associations, traditional chiefs – 
lacking in formal power but nevertheless respected – and the decentralised 
administration. Residents have a wide range of opportunities, and they can contact a 
specific ‘type’ of actor, depending on their problem. This institutional opportunism 
creates a flexibility of relationships at the local level and is a major factor creating a 
‘local political field’, based on specific rules.
To fight informality, the municipal authorities chose to reorganise both the private and 
the associational sectors. The system works better now, but these two parties are a 
potential threat for the municipality because they are powerful and can stop waste 
collection if they dispute one of its decisions.
This rationalisation tended to unify the private and the associational sectors. It created 
new city actors, whom one could describe as entrepreneurs. Informality is therefore no 
longer the result of opposition between the formal and informal sectors but within the 
private or the associational sectors.
Through rationalisation, the municipal authorities aimed to formalise part of the 
informal sector. But those who have not been integrated into the plan are marginalised 
and complain to the entrepreneurs: 
Right now, we have no way to make the informals leave the areas. We know where they 
live and, anyway, you can’t hide to collect the waste…Something very paradoxical 
happens: the ones who haven’t been integrated into the project, they summon us to the 
City Council to tell us that we bring the mess (sorry for that) into their area. You see that! 
The informals summon us to the City Council! (Nikiema interview, 7 April 2005) 
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At the same time, the municipal authorities consider that the private contractors are 
responsible for their area and want to ‘decentralise’ more responsibilities to them: 
When some people don’t pay, there are some things that we – the contractors – can’t do, 
because we live in the areas. [If we summon someone to the City Council,] we will be 
accused. People will say, ‘It’s you who said I did this thing, it’s you who summoned me.’ 
It brings problems. I’d asked the municipal authorities to give us…a paper, something to 
protect us in case of problem. We are a relay of municipal authorities in the area. But, 
once, they called me. They wanted me to summon the people who throw their waste in 
the streets! I said it’s not my job. I said I am a resident in the area. (Siliga interview 5 
April 2005) 
In some areas, the entrepreneurs have no choice but to use the informal-sector operators 
as subcontractors because they do not have enough employees or equipment, or because 
the municipal authorities themselves asked them to give the informal organisations some 
work, to keep peace in the city. Ouagadougou’s reform gave more credibility to the new 
private sector, and also more powers to negotiate with the municipal authorities. But, at 
the same time, the reorganisation marginalised the poorest informal organisations. The 
reform was designed to ensure that responsibilities were borne by the entrepreneurs, and 
not the municipal authorities. Informality has thus been thwarted from above. From 
below, it becomes a local problem for the entrepreneurs and remains an opportunity 
when there is too much work. This situation does not allow any specific policy to be 
found to fight informality or improve the living conditions of the informal actors. 
Accra: Informality as a social link    
The AMA makes use of the informal sector to clean the city’s ‘hot spots’, such as the 
markets. The La sub-metro, a middle-class area close to Accra’s city centre, uses many 
informal operators to keep the district clean. This choice is logical, since it is a newly 
created district with little finance and even less personnel.
A group of about 20 young ‘truck-pushers’ work for the city and for private clients 
(residents or market traders) on tasks such as collecting the garbage in the markets or 
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emptying the drains. Their organisation is strictly informal; they have no documents 
proving that they are an association. These men offered to do this work because they are 
poor and uneducated. When the municipal authorities appoint them, they provide the 
equipment but do not pay them. The workers say that they are paid if the work is done 
well. An interviewee stated: 
We are supposed to work in an association and possibly get a permit or an authorisation 
certificate which would enable us to work, and even pay tax. But this may involve a lot of 
difficulties and bureaucratic problems. So we decided to help the AMA so that if we have 
any administrative problems…then the AMA will protect and defend us. (Interview with 
truck-pushers, 9 December 2004) 
The municipal authorities and these waste-collection workers are therefore mutually 
dependent. This kind of relationship reinforces the informal sector, especially because, 
in this specific case, the workers have no need to formalise their status. On the other 
hand, although this type of relationship may be effective at achieving specific goals at 
specific times, it is only in the short term. The immediate problems may be solved, but 
waste management is not improved; the truck-pushers have to move the garbage, but 
nothing is said about where to deposit it: ‘Our biggest problem lies with the collection of the 
waste as we gather it by the gutter side. When such problems occur, we have to convey the 
waste to the beach side.’, in the words of one of the truck-pushers. 
In this case, the municipal authorities prefer to focus on cleanliness, which is easier to 
achieve than genuine sanitation. 
The examples of Ouagadougou and Accra allow us to reformulate informality as a kind 
of relationship between two parties at a specific moment, rather than a category of actors 
or actions. In both cities, informality is present, even though the municipal authorities 
try to focus on what is formal on their territory. However, informality should not be 
seen as a weakness or a failure, but rather as a way to resolve new urban issues. It is an 
efficient alternative when funds or personnel are missing. Furthermore, it creates new 
kinds of relationships at the local level and contributes to building a local political field, 
with its own rules and a specific identity.  
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Conclusion: Solid-waste governance and informality  
Cleaning the city by removing waste from the streets and the environment has become an 
important issue in the capitals analysed in this chapter. Far from being limited to technical 
solutions, such as the kind of technology employed, solid-waste management is first and 
foremost a question of politics and, increasingly, of the public image a city wishes to portray. 
One can also observe that, and question why, waste recycling is less visible and is given less 
priority than waste removal. The fundamental fact is that the analysis of solid-waste 
management in these capitals over the last 10 to 15 years has shown it to be closely related to 
political agendas at the local, national and international levels. It is notable that structural 
adjustment policies, and the decentralisation that follows them, have influenced waste 
management systems in all the case studies. After the decentralisation policies came the 
question of collaboration between the various actors involved in solid-waste management. 
The focus falls here on the type of partnerships to be developed between private and 
institutional actors, and particularly the place given to the informal sector. 
A key issue: The inclusion of new actors   
In Addis Ababa, Mayor Arkebe promoted the integration of some agents in waste 
management through the formation of small private enterprises, but his tentative measure to 
exert control and build up a political clientele cast a shadow over the whole initiative. In the 
case of waste management, only a few actors were considered as partners, and neither 
scavengers nor recyclers were included or even considered. A similar situation prevails 
currently with the implementation of business process re-engineering and the decision by the 
city administration to dismantle the existing partnerships with small-scale enterprises and 
replace them with so-called cooperatives directly administrated by the kebeles. This removes 
autonomy from the previous partners, the small-scale enterprises born from the informal 
sector. 
In Maputo, the municipality has engaged with the informal sector in a process of 
formalisation to extend and improve the primary collection system, and facilitate informal 
recycling in a creative manner. Despite being an effective and successful mayor who began to 
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turn the city around, Eneas Comiche was axed by FRELIMO from its list of mayoral 
candidates for the 2008 municipal elections for being too independent, and was denied a 
second term of office.  
In Accra, the Ghanaian state has been reluctant to decentralise politically. Instead it 
decentralised its administration: ministries are well grounded locally, but decisions still come 
from the state. In addition, government still nominates a third of the local assemblies. In this 
context, informality has been opposed – an example being the CCWL experience discussed in 
this chapter. Compared with other cities in the region, Accra is quite clean. Nevertheless, the 
political cost of its waste-management reforms has been very high. The appointed mayors had 
to pay for this failure. But even if implementation was difficult, formally it led to a 
reorganisation of the local political game. Informal actors in Accra emerge as a resource for 
local political actors, who use them to improve their effectiveness and at the same time 
strengthen their leadership at the very local level. The paradox is that informal actors become 
key figures in the waste-management rationalisation process. 
In Ouagadougou, reforms have created space for new relationships in which informality has a 
role. For instance, the formalisation of primary collection created new relationships (of 
competition, defiance and forced collaboration) between the ‘official’ primary collectors and 
the informal sector. We have seen that a part of the informal sector was integrated into the 
city’s waste-management reforms. By so doing, the municipal authorities created a more 
privatised and rationalised system. Part of the informal sector was marginalised, but still 
exists. Even if the formal actors have a monopoly over their areas, they still have to negotiate 
with the informal actors. The municipality requests them to do so, to avoid too much 
marginalisation, which might lead to violence. Besides, the formal parties in the relationship 
need the informal parties in order to achieve their goals. The municipality, for its part, 
achieved its objectives, showing to the government, and the world, that it is in control and that 
the city, if not sanitised, is at least clean. 
In Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian state, given its strength and historical position, has shown 
continuity in its reluctance to trust a sector it cannot control. This, in turn, has generated a 
steady defiance from the informal sector. The authorities even sacrifice efficiency in their 
obsession to maintain control and demonstrate ‘modernity’ as a capital and a centre of power 
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attractive to investment. In response, the informal sector is trying to escape from partnerships 
it considers detrimental to its activities. 
In Maputo, the city management has always been dominated by party political considerations, 
and it remains to be seen whether the new team put in place by the ruling party will maintain 
the previous momentum. Decentralisation has left the ruling party firmly in charge, and 
opposition parties have been unable to challenge its hegemony over the city, so there is no 
great pressure for accountability from below. FRELIMO has effectively learnt the ‘rules of 
the game’ dictated by the World Bank and the international community, and has moved 
skilfully to maximise its resources at the local level, as these help it to consolidate its power 
within the city too. 
The informal sector today and the attitudes of the administration
The informal sector is still considered as non-modern, traditional and backward, and 
accordingly is at best ignored. The evidence from local governance in our case studies is that 
democracy, transparency and accountability are not well developed in the handling of the 
informal waste sector. Maputo seems to be the only city genuinely engaging with the informal 
sector, at least in the recycling industry.
In Addis Ababa, neither the articulation of a good governance discourse nor the 
implementation of many administrative reforms has shifted the traditional way of exerting 
power. Mayor Arkebe’s period in office represented the first serious, partly genuine, attempt 
to improve the state of urban governance in the city. He reorganised the municipal structure, 
and dismissed allegedly corrupt and/or inefficient administrators. Nevertheless, these 
measures were aimed not only at efficiency, but also at increased political control through the 
dismissal of employees who were not supportive of the government.  
As in Addis Ababa, informality has been considered as a threat by Ouagadougou’s municipal 
authorities. They tried to rationalise the informal system to achieve greater efficiency, but also 
to demonstrate their power over the capital city. Accra’s authorities claimed to formalise the 
waste-collection system, but it appears that the informal actors and municipal authorities have 
a ‘shadow’ partnership. Informal actors help the municipality to clean the city and, in turn, 
enjoy protection, despite their status. 
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In Maputo the poor performance of the solid-waste management system was seriously 
addressed in 2004 for the first time, and a potentially sustainable system created to gradually 
extend services to the suburban and peri-urban areas. The Comiche administration displayed 
political will in dealing with the many failures of urban management, including solid waste, 
and created the opportunity for a creative engagement with GTZ, which has provided the 
technical support necessary to develop capacity. 
As well as the local differences observed in these cities in the attitudes of the administration 
towards the informal sector, one can also see certain similarities when using Medina’s (1997) 
categories of attitudes: direct repression and criminal collusion were not practised. Most 
attitudes fall between control and neglect. Control is quite common. Neglect is widely visible, 
especially in the field of recycling, the exception being Maputo, where the Comiche 
administration supported informal recyclers as opposed to businesses in the control of the 
recycling trade. This example may help explain why the neglect towards recycling observed 
in the other cities could stem from the difficulties weak administrations might face when 
confronted with the powerful private business world of recycling. Medina uses ‘stimulation’, 
a category ranging from tolerance to active integration, as a possible attitude shown by the 
administration side. Tolerance is widely practised in all cases. Therefore, in the case of Addis 
Ababa the attempts to incorporate the informal sector are more a form of control than 
integration.
The informal sector still needs to be taken seriously, and one needs to establish under what 
conditions its actors will engage in public–private partnerships or be available to formalise. 
Informality is often depicted as an issue that hampers local development – through the 
avoidance of paying taxes, for instance. But at the same time, it is an answer to a very 
complex local situation, comprising patronage, allegiance, corruption and loyalty to the top. 
Formalising the informal requires a consideration of the entire local political system, and its 
links to the powers that be and the outputs of decentralisation. 
Compliance with formal criteria for good governance, a requirement of most international 
donors, may hide realities on the ground. All the cities analysed here have a long-standing 
tradition of upward accountability to the government rather than to the people; loyalty and 
trust shown to the dominant political party are important. All the cities have a legacy of 
authoritarian regimes. The case studies have shown that changes in political organisation 
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make little difference to the way things actually work. Informal institutions or patron-
clientelism seem to be a culture impervious to change, even where there is a reorganisation of 
the system from a top–down to an officially proclaimed bottom–up approach. Despite the 
strong focus on good governance, and the various administrative reforms municipalities have 
implemented during the last 15 to 20 years, the ‘traditional’ way of doing things persists and 
seems to be resistant to change.  
Solid-waste governance gives us a good picture of the political relationship between society 
and government. There are clear social inequalities in the delivery of the waste service, and 
the exclusion, in most cities, of efficient existing or potential partners, such as primary 
collectors or informal recyclers, demonstrates the social prejudice of the authorities and their 
tendency to sacrifice efficiency when their power is not secured. The real test of commitment 
by urban administrations to the social dimensions of poverty-reduction strategies, as 
championed by UN-Habitat, lies in the freedom they provide to informal actors, who are, by 
and large, the poor.
Even so, in some cases reforms have created the opportunity for new relationships where 
informality has a role to play. One element of hope for change is represented by an urban 
population showing increased awareness and expecting better services from their 
municipalities. In the cities we have studied, the dominant political cultures and the attitudes 
to informality have not changed fundamentally. Despite significant administrative reforms, 
and substantial donor funding, informality, in all its dimensions, has not been properly 
recognised. All the cities studied depend upon the informal sector to a great extent to provide 
services and sustain their populations. More recognition from the state, and better support and 
local arrangements with the informal sector, would stimulate it. The desired technical reforms 
for better service delivery cannot be implemented without considering the underlying political 
issues. This key link is missing, but needs to be created in order to allow all the informal 
actors better opportunities for employment and security within their cities. 
Notes
1 Locally made glue that becomes sticky when mixed with gypsum, and is usually used for painting walls.  
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2 The provisional government replaced the regime led by the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which 
defeated the Derg regime headed by Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. The TPLF later became the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which has been in power in Ethiopia since 1991. The 
government has reshaped the Ethiopian state into a federal republic, and carried out many administrative and 
decentralisation reforms, which in Addis Ababa created the sub-cities and kebeles. The tight grip maintained by 
the EPRDF and their allied ethnic-based parties has gradually become stronger. It was only interrupted by the 
short-lived victory of the opposition, regrouped under the banner of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy in 
Addis Ababa, in the 2005 elections. 
3 The kebele is the lowest-level administrative unit in Ethiopia. 
4 Yelibenwork A, New draft policy evokes protest from waste collectors, The Reporter, 28 March 2009. 
5 Qorale: the short form of the Amharic expression, Korkoro yaleh? (do you have any scrap metal?), shouted by 
boys collecting waste.  
6 See note 5 above.
7 For a discussion of the latter point, see De Brito (2010).  
8 Chichava S, Análise: Eneas Comiche e Daviz Simango: Por que ‘caíram’?, O País, 26 September 2008. 
9 This section is based on interviews conducted between 25 February 2005 and 14 July 2006. 
10 These handcarts are designed to pass through narrow alleyways, and are fitted with mesh beds to filter out 
sand from domestic waste. 
11 The bairro is the local suburban administrative unit. Maputo is divided into seven urban districts, with 64 
bairros. 
12 This section is based on interviews conducted on 12 July 2006, 15 July 2008, 29 July 2009. 
13 Secretàrios are the local point of articulation for many offices of state, including education and justice, and are 
the local link with the national service providers of water and electricity in their roll-out activities. 
14 In the days of single-party rule, when party and state were indistinguishable, the secretàrio was a key 
appointed FRELIMO party official. Most are long-established residents of their bairros, with a substantial 
history of party involvement and/or state employment, and many also have private businesses of their own. 
15 If the total urban population is estimated at 1.3 million, then the proportion of all residents receiving primary 
collection is just over 30%. 
16 Noticias, 25 January 2009, reported that the municipality considered necessary some form of association of 
catadores, both to defend their interests, and to manage the pernicious effects of spillage around containers 
created by their activities.  
17 GTZ/AGRESU contributed €50 000, and CARITAS & LVIA €89 000 (see Schwalbach 2005). 
18 The Recicla manager argued that the informal operators do not carry the same social overheads as the 
cooperative, and do not pay tax, which gives them an unfair advantage (Chauque interview, 18 September 2009). 
19 This service became the Onasene (Office National des Services d’Entretien, de Nettoyage et d’Embellissement) in 1988, after 
Sankara’s death. 
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APPENDIX 1: Overview of the reduction of procedures to obtain a business license before 
and after introduction of BPR (source: Getachew & Common, 2006).
                         
Procedures to obtain a business license before BPR. 
                        
Procedures to obtain a business license
after BPR

APPENDIX 2: The criteria for the evaluation of employees in line with BPR (source: Human 
Rights Watch, 2010).
1. Educational background (25%):
x Qualifications (15%)
x Relevant work experience (5%)
x Qualities in personal file (5%)
2. Motivation for change and democratization (35%):
x Efforts to know and accept government policies and strategies (10%)
x Cooperativeness and willingness to participate in team work (8%)
x Acceptance of the civil service reform and implementation in practice (10%)
x Avoidance of traditional and non-progressive thoughts (7%)
3. Conduct/Good manner (15%):
x Effective utilization and care of institution’s property (3%)
x Performance in work and role model to others (5%)
x Free from drugs and alcohol (3%)
x Free from gossip and ‘clique-ism’ (4%)
4. Service performance (25%):
x Efficiency and interest in providing appropriate service according to new 
standardized procedures (10%)
x Problem solving and accomplishing tasks within a given time frame (5%)
x Hostility and politeness (5%)
Accomplish work speedily and respect work time (5%) 

APPENDIX 3: Article in Ethiopian Herald on job creation within solid waste 
management (Source: Ethiopian Herald, 9 August 2006, pp 6). 

APPENDIX 4: Article in Addis Fortune on new containers bought by AACA. (Source: 
Addis Fortune, 12 December 2011, Vol. 11(554), pp 10).

APPENDIX 5: Strategies for solid waste management in Addis Ababa in 2010 (source: 
SBPDA, 2003).
1. Promote practical applications of environmentally sound techniques such as 
waste sorting, reduction, recycling, reuse, and waste-to-energy and composting 
activities.
2. Set up voluntary arrangements to promote recycling, particularly of packaging 
and scrapped vehicles and their parts.
3. Promote recycling programme for recyclable materials such as glass, paper, 
plastics, tyres, metals, cans, wood, and other materials.
4. Segregate different types of solid waste for compostable, recyclable, non-
recyclable/non-compostable, and special/hazardous waste.
5. Introduce appropriate and low-cost technologies for SWM and liquid waste, with 
the best possible combination of types and sizes of trucks, including hand- and 
motor-driven carts for poorly accessible areas. 
6. Encourage and enhance the design of waste pipes (chutes) in new high-rise 
buildings and apartments.
7. Enhance increased public awareness and change of attitudes/behaviours.
8. Develop mechanisms for programme support of kebeles, CBOs, and NGOs for 
environmental control, waste sorting, recycling, composting, and environmental 
cleaning.
9. Encourage involvement of big companies in secondary collection and micro- and 
small enterprises in primary collection. 
10. Strengthen solid waste fleet management, routing, two-shift system, as well as 
introduction of an appointed collection time, including working at night. 
11. Utilize computerized accounts of management of waste collection trucks. 
12. Enhance and promote the participation of the private sector.
13. Provide a conducive environment for the private sector and NGOs. 
14. Provide technical assistance for private investors and service providers to build 
their capacity.
15. Strengthen awareness-raising, specially targeting communities, by utilizing 
community leaders, religious and cultural leaders, professional associations, 
schools, and other social organizations.
16. Hold workshops, seminars, etc., to address issues related to target groups 
regarding the design and implementation of sanitation and beautification.
17. Media and other appropriate forums to be used appropriately for advocacy and 
awareness raising.
18. Promote community participation through establishing sanitation and 
beautification councils at all levels, as well as kebele and village sanitation and 
beautification committees.
19. Establish school clubs and involve students in keeping their schools, home, 
neighbourhood, and the general environment clean. 
20. Promote intersectional collaboration and create strong partnerships with various 
governmental bodies, associations, NGOs, and CBOs, and strengthen them 
through networking.
21. Actively promote international and regional cooperation in waste management.
Targets for solid waste management in Addis Ababa in 2010;
1. 100% of the city’s major streets will be cleaned daily.
2. 80% of the city’s open spaces to be clean of solid waste at any given time. 
3. 70% of the city’s drainage systems and rivers to be clean of solid waste at any 
given time. 
4. 30% of the households to segregate waste into various receptacles at source.
5. Solid waste collection to increase from 65% to 90%.
6. Of the total recyclable and compostable portion of waste, 50% to be recycled 
and composted.
7. 80% of hazardous and special waste to be separately stored, collected, and 
managed from municipal solid waste.
8. 40% of the waste generated to be collected by the private sector, of which 10% 
is to be collected by pre-collectors (micro- and small enterprises). 
9. 70% of the population to have proper awareness of urban sanitation and 
beautification.
10. The public is to participate in environmental cleaning, beautification, 
environmental and illegal dumping control, environmental awareness 
campaigns, waste sorting, recycling, and composting at community level.
11. People to actively contribute to:
 Illegal dumping decrease to less than 5%. 
 30% of households to segregate waste at source. 
 30% of households to compost their waste. 

APPENDIX 6: Interview guides
INTERVIEW GUIDE: SCAVENGERS
x Gender
x Age
x Where do you come from?
x How long have you been working as a scavenger?
x Why and how did you enter this job?
x What is required to be allowed to work at Repi?
x Do you have another job?
x Can you describe a normal working day?
 What do you like and dislike?
x Number of relatives who are scavengers?
x How are your relationships with? 
 The other scavengers
 Competition
 Support
 Present or past problems
 The manager at the landfill
 The truck drivers
 Middlemen
 Methane project
 Municipality 
 Has the municipality contacted you or given you some kind of support?
 What do you expect from the municipality?
x What are the main problems you face today?
 What can be done to improve your working situation?
x Do you have plans for the future?
 How will you achieve them?
x What kinds of materials do you collect?
 How much?
 Income?
x How does the situation today compare to e.g. five years ago?
 Amount of materials
 Price of materials
 Income
x Have someone informed you about future plans for Repi?
INTERVIEW GUIDE QORQORO ALLEH
x Gender
x Age
x Where do you come from?
x How long have you been involved in this activity?
x How and why did you enter this activity?
x How can you describe your work? What do you like and what do you not like?
x How is the situation within your business today compared to some years ago or when 
you started your work?
 Due to income, amount of and access to materials?
x Do you have another job or income?
x Are you operating or performing this job in cooperation with other qorqoro alleh?
x How is the relationship between the qorqoro alleh?
 Is there competition over places to operate?
 Do you support each other?
 Past and present problems with other qorqoro alleh?
 Number of relatives that are qorqoro alleh?
x How is your relationship towards the MSSEs operating in the city?
 Are you concerned about competition from the MSSEs?
x Have you considered improving your activity? If so, in what way?
 What kind of support do you need in order to improve your activity?
x Have you thought about organizing yourselves collectively?
 What is the main reason for you to organize yourselves?
 Have you thought about how to organize yourselves?
 What kind of support could you expect if you were to organize yourselves?
x How is your relationship with the wholesalers? 
 Based on contract? If so, what kind of contract and how many wholesalers do 
you have contract with?
 Ethnic background/family?
 Do the middlemen support you in any way? 
x How is your relationship with the municipality? 
 Do you have any relationship with the municipality? If so, what kind of 
relationship?
 How do you regard the municipality?
 What do you expect from the municipality in order to be able to improve your 
activity?
x What do you expect from the wholesalers in order to be able to improve your activity?
 If you where a wholesaler, what would you do in order to support the qorqoro 
alleh?
x What is your plan for the future?
 How are you going to achieve this?
x Do you have a saving system such as idir/ekub?
 What is the reason for saving money in idir/ekub?
INTERVIEW GUIDE: WHOLESALERS
x Gender
x Age
x Where do you come from?
x How long have you worked as a wholesaler?
 What was your occupation before you started as a wholesaler?
 Why did you become a wholesaler?
 Are you working alone or together with others?
x Can you describe your business? 
 What are the positive and negative aspects of your work?
x Have you thought about improving your business? 
 If yes, in what way?
 Do you need any support to improve your business? If yes, what kind of 
support?
x How is your relationship with the qorqoro alleh?
 Do you support them in any way?
x Do you buy materials from other people?
x Do you have any contact with the municipality? 
 How would you describe your relationship towards the municipality? 
 Are you willing to cooperate with the municipality? 
 What do you expect from the municipality and what are you willing to offer to 
enter cooperation with the municipality?
x To whom do you sell your materials? 
x How is your work today compared to some years ago? 
 Due to amount of materials, quality, demand, price, and people engaged in the 
activity?
x What kind of factors influences the recycling market?
x Did you organize yourselves collectively?
 Why did you organize yourselves?
 How has the organization process been? Positive aspects and difficulties during 
the process? What have you achieved?
x How will the renewal of täraMänn alleh/allesh tära affect your work? 
x If the qorqoro alleh were to stop working, in what way would it affect your work? 
x If you had to relocate your work, how would this affect your work and supply of 
materials?
 Have you thought about a possible place to relocate?
INTERVIEW GUIDE: MSSEs
x Gender
x Age
x Why did you enter this kind of activity?
x How long have you been involved in this activity?
x How would you describe your working situation? 
 What are the positive and negative aspects of your work? 
x Would you like to improve your work? If so, in what way?
 What kind of support do you need in order to improve your work?
 What do you expect from the municipality in order to be able to improve your 
work?
x How would you describe your relationship towards the municipality?
 How would you characterize your relationship towards the municipality during the 
period 2001–2005
 How would you characterize your relationship towards the municipality during the 
period 2005–2009?
x Compared to five years ago, how is the working situation today? Has it improved or 
not? If yes, how? If no, why not?
x What do you think should be done in order for you to have better working conditions?
x What have you done in order to improve your working situation? 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: COOPERATIVES
x Gender
x Age
x How long have you been working as a pre-collector?
x Can you describe your work?
 What do you like and dislike?
x How the situation today is compared to e.g. five years ago?
 Income?
 Working situation?
 Number of clients?
x How is your relationships with the
 Cooperatives
 Other members of the cooperatives
 The kebele, Sub-City, or City Administration?
 The households or your clients?
x What are the main problems you face today?
 How can the problems be solved?
INTERVIEW GUIDE: CITY AUTHORITIES
x How is the agency organized?
x What are the main tasks and responsibilities of the agency?
x What kind of solid waste services are provided within Addis Ababa today?
x What are the main obstacles to the services currently provided?
x What should be done in order to improve solid waste management in the city?
x What was the main reason for implementing the new regulation with the pre-collectors 
in 2009?
 Can you explain the new solid waste regulation?
 How does the payment of waste fees work?
 How many cooperatives have been established?
x How does waste collection from the transfer points work? 
 How do you control how much the cooperatives have collected? 
x What is your experience of the new regulation and the implementation up to now? 
x Do you have any strategy for how to improve solid waste services in Addis Ababa?
 Collection
 Transport
 Landfill
 Recycling
x Is it possible to obtain copies of the annual report, plans, and strategies, research 
conducted, annual budget, etc. of solid waste in Addis Ababa? 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: HOUSEHOLDS
x Gender
x Age
x What is the respondent’s status within the household?
x Head of household’s education level?
x Household head’s profession?
x Average income of the household per month? 
x How do you manage the waste generated by the household?
 Dispose of it in the containers
 Burn it
 Dispose of in open spaces
 Dispose of it in the river
 Use the private sector?
 Use the newly established cooperatives
 Qorqoro alleh
 Other
x Does your household have a solid waste collection service?
 If no, why not?
 If yes, who collects the waste from your household? (Private, cooperative, or 
others?)
x How long has your household used the solid waste collection service?
x How often do you receive the service? (Has it increased, decreased, or stayed the same 
for the last 6 months?)
x How much do you pay for the service each month? (Has the amount increased or 
decreased recently? If so, when and by how much?)
x Are you satisfied with the solid waste collection service you are getting today? (What 
are you satisfied with and what are you not satisfied with?
x How has the new solid waste system affected your household?
x How is the solid waste service today compared to 6 months ago? (Better or worse?)
x What do you think should be done to improve the solid waste collection service? 
x What do you think is the reason for the municipality to change the solid waste 
collection system?
INTERVIEW GUIDE: PRIVATE COMPANIES AND FACTORIES
x How long have you been involved in recycling solid waste?
x Where do you buy your materials?
x How is your relationship with the 
 Municipality
 Wholesalers
x What are the main problems facing you today?
x What can be done in order to improve your capacity?
INTERVIEW GUIDE: LOCAL NGOs AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
x What kind of activities are you involved in?
 Why are you involved in these activities?
x How long have you been involved?
x Who are your partners?
 How are your relationships with your partners?
x What has the work with the projects been like?
 What could have been improved?
 What are the main problems with the projects?
x In what way will your project benefit solid waste in Addis Ababa?
 What has been achieved within the project so far?
 What is needed in order to improve the outcomes of the projects?
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nt
ac
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
Em
ba
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y,
 
N
or
w
e g
ia
n 
N
G
O
s e
tc
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- c
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ag
er
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W
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Th
ei
r v
ie
w
 o
f S
W
M
 in
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
, c
ur
re
nt
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
an
d 
fu
tu
re
 p
la
ns
. T
he
ir 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s w
ith
in
 S
W
M
. T
he
ir 
in
te
re
st
 a
nd
 g
oa
ls
. H
ow
 d
o 
th
ey
 se
e 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t s
itu
at
io
n 
an
d 
w
ha
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 d
on
e?
 W
ha
t i
s t
he
ir 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
? 
H
ow
 is
 th
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t (
po
w
er
 to
 ta
ke
 d
ec
is
io
ns
, 
eq
ut
m
en
t, 
et
c.
). 
W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 c
on
ce
rin
g 
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
th
ei
r 
jo
bs
?
W
en
t t
o 
th
e 
Su
b-
C
ity
 a
nd
 c
on
ta
ct
ed
 h
im
 d
ire
ct
ly
.
H
is
 E
ng
lis
h 
w
er
e 
no
t f
lu
en
t s
o 
I w
as
 in
 n
ee
d 
of
 a
 
in
te
rp
re
to
r. 
La
ck
 o
f k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
la
ck
 o
f p
ow
er
 to
 
ta
ke
 d
ec
is
io
ns
. I
n 
m
an
y 
ca
se
s t
he
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
t r
ep
lie
d 
th
at
 I 
ha
d 
to
 ta
lk
 to
 th
e 
ci
ty
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
to
 k
no
w
 
m
or
e 
ab
ou
t t
he
 to
pi
cs
. 
K
eb
el
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s S
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Th
ei
r v
ie
w
 o
f S
W
M
 in
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
, c
ur
re
nt
 p
ra
ct
ic
e,
 fu
tu
re
 p
la
ns
 a
nd
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s w
ith
in
 S
W
M
. T
he
ir 
in
te
re
st
 a
nd
 g
oa
ls
. H
ow
 d
o 
th
ey
 se
e 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t s
itu
at
io
n 
an
d 
w
ha
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 d
on
e 
to
 im
pr
ov
e 
th
is
? 
W
ha
t 
is
 th
ei
r b
ac
kg
ro
un
d?
 H
ow
 is
 th
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t (
po
w
er
 to
 ta
ke
 
de
ci
si
on
s, 
eq
ut
m
en
t, 
et
c.
). 
W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
ch
al
le
ng
es
 in
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
th
ei
r 
jo
bs
?
W
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ke
be
le
 a
nd
 c
on
ta
ct
ed
 th
em
 d
ire
ct
ly
.
Tw
o 
of
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s w
er
e 
w
ill
in
g 
to
 ta
lk
 to
 m
e 
w
hi
le
 o
ne
 se
em
ed
 to
 a
vo
id
 m
e.
 In
 tw
o 
ca
se
s, 
th
e 
SW
M
 m
an
ag
er
 se
em
ed
 to
 b
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 th
e 
ke
be
le
 m
an
ag
er
 w
ho
 c
am
e 
in
 to
 o
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er
ve
 th
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
 a
nd
 st
ar
te
d 
to
 a
ns
ew
er
 th
e 
qu
es
tio
ns
 
hi
m
se
lf.
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ev
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 m
an
ag
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s S
W
M
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Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s v
ie
w
 o
f S
W
M
 in
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
. B
ac
kg
ro
un
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t p
riv
ou
s p
ra
ct
ic
e 
an
d 
hi
s v
ie
w
 o
f t
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
an
d 
fu
tu
re
 p
la
ns
. 
W
or
ki
ng
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 A
A
C
A
. W
ha
t w
as
 th
e 
re
as
on
s f
or
 th
e 
pr
iv
oi
us
 
pl
an
s, 
ho
w
 w
as
 th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
th
e 
re
su
lts
? 
H
e 
w
as
 th
e 
m
an
ag
er
 w
ith
in
 so
lid
 w
as
te
 w
hi
le
 I 
to
ok
 m
y 
m
as
te
r d
eg
re
e 
an
d 
I h
av
e 
ha
d 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 h
im
 fr
ee
qu
en
tly
 si
nc
e 
20
04
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Fr
ie
nd
ly
 a
nd
 ta
lk
ed
 o
pe
nl
y.
 S
en
si
tiv
e 
to
 p
ol
iti
ca
l 
is
su
es
.
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en
ta
l P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
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ut
ho
rit
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Th
ei
r v
ie
w
 o
f S
W
M
 in
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
, c
ur
re
nt
 p
ra
ct
ic
e,
 fu
tu
re
 p
la
ns
 a
nd
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s w
ith
in
 S
W
M
C
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 m
y 
m
as
te
r t
he
si
s.
W
he
n 
I t
rie
d 
to
 h
av
e 
an
 in
te
rv
ie
w
 w
ith
 th
e 
G
en
er
al
 
M
an
ag
er
 th
ey
 a
lw
ay
s g
ui
de
d 
m
e 
to
 o
ff
ic
ia
ls
 a
t a
 
lo
w
er
 le
ve
l. 
Se
em
s l
ik
e 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
lim
ite
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ab
ou
t s
ol
id
 w
as
te
.
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ne
d 
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m
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fo
rm
an
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A
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ua
l n
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rs
Fo
llo
w
-u
p 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
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fo
rm
at
io
n 
ai
m
ed
 a
t c
ol
le
ct
in
g 
D
iff
er
en
t s
tr
at
eg
ie
s t
o 
re
ac
h 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
an
ts
C
om
m
en
ts
A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
 U
rb
an
 P
la
nn
in
g 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t
1
2
Th
ei
r p
la
ns
 fo
r M
en
al
is
h 
Te
rr
a.
 A
sk
 fo
r L
D
P 
fo
r t
he
 a
re
a.
 W
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
fu
tu
re
 p
la
ns
, h
ow
 h
as
 th
e 
pr
os
es
s b
ee
n 
an
d 
w
ha
t i
s t
he
 st
at
us
 fo
r t
he
 a
re
a.
 
W
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ci
ty
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
an
d 
co
nt
ac
te
d 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 d
ire
ct
ly
. 
D
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
ar
ra
ng
e 
a 
m
ee
tin
g.
 S
ee
m
ed
 n
ot
 to
 b
e 
w
ill
in
g 
to
 ta
lk
 to
 m
e.
 In
 th
re
e 
of
 th
e 
m
ee
tin
gs
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 d
id
 n
ot
 sh
ow
 u
p 
an
d 
di
d 
no
t t
ak
e 
th
e 
ph
on
e.
Pr
oj
ec
t o
ff
ic
e 
Et
hi
op
ia
 a
nd
 F
ra
nc
h 
co
op
er
at
io
n
1
0
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 it
, w
he
n 
di
d 
it 
st
ar
t, 
w
ha
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
do
ne
, f
ut
ur
e 
pl
an
s
an
d 
ho
w
 h
as
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
be
en
 so
 fa
r?
W
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ci
ty
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
an
d 
co
nt
ac
te
d 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 d
ire
ct
ly
. 
Pl
an
ne
d 
to
 h
av
e 
se
ve
ra
l m
ee
tin
gs
, b
ut
 th
e 
of
fic
e 
w
as
 
cl
os
ed
 fo
r a
 lo
ng
 p
er
io
d 
du
e 
to
 th
at
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 in
 
ch
ar
ge
d 
qu
it 
an
d 
no
bo
dy
 to
ok
 o
ve
r. 
N
ot
 w
ill
in
g 
to
 
gi
ve
 a
ny
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 sa
id
 it
 w
as
 c
on
fid
en
tia
l. 
EN
D
A
 E
th
io
pi
a
1
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4
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
re
 th
ey
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
? 
W
hy
 d
id
 th
ey
 e
nt
er
 th
is
 k
in
d 
of
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
? 
W
ha
t i
s t
he
ir 
vi
ew
 a
nd
 in
te
re
st
 in
 S
ol
id
 W
as
te
? 
H
ow
 is
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
se
ct
or
? 
W
ha
t r
ol
e 
do
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
in
 
th
e 
va
rio
us
 p
ro
je
ct
s t
he
y 
ar
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
, a
im
, a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
nd
 o
ut
co
m
es
.
C
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 m
y 
m
as
te
r t
he
si
s.
Th
ey
 a
re
 n
ot
 d
oi
ng
 m
uc
h 
w
ih
in
 IG
N
IS
, t
he
y 
ar
e 
th
e 
lo
ca
l c
oo
rd
in
at
er
s b
ut
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
 in
 c
ha
rg
e 
ar
e 
on
 a
 
st
ud
y 
to
ur
 in
 G
er
m
an
y.
 H
as
 b
ee
n 
3 
pe
rs
on
s i
n 
ch
ar
ge
 th
e 
la
st
 3
 y
ea
rs
. S
ee
m
s l
ik
e 
th
ay
 a
re
 g
iv
in
g 
al
l t
he
 ta
sk
 to
 m
as
te
r s
tu
de
nt
s a
t A
A
U
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S 
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W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
re
 th
ey
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
? 
W
hy
 d
id
 th
ey
 e
nt
er
 th
is
 k
in
d 
of
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
? 
W
ha
t i
s t
he
ir 
vi
ew
 a
nd
 in
te
re
st
 in
 S
ol
id
 W
as
te
? 
H
ow
 is
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
se
ct
or
? 
Su
ch
 a
s m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 e
tc
G
ot
 th
ei
r c
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
so
lid
 w
as
te
 a
ge
nc
y 
at
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
 c
ity
 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tio
n.
M
ai
nl
y 
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al
l s
ca
le
 - 
ha
ve
 li
m
ite
d 
fu
nd
in
g 
an
d 
us
e 
m
os
t o
f t
he
ir 
tim
e 
w
rit
in
g 
pr
oj
ec
t p
ro
po
sa
ls
  -
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no
rs
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t t
he
 a
ge
nd
a?
IG
N
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W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
re
 th
ey
 in
vo
le
ve
d 
in
? 
W
hy
 d
id
 th
ey
 e
nt
er
 th
es
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
? 
W
ha
t i
s t
he
ir 
vi
ew
 a
nd
 in
te
re
st
 in
 S
ol
id
 W
as
te
? 
H
ow
 is
 th
ei
r 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
se
ct
or
? 
H
ow
 h
as
 th
e 
w
or
k 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t b
ee
n 
an
d 
w
ha
t a
re
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e?
G
ot
 th
ei
r c
on
ta
ct
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
EN
D
A
 - 
Et
hi
op
ia
G
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p
H
or
n 
of
 A
fr
ic
a
1
2
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
re
 th
ey
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
? 
Th
ei
r v
ie
w
 o
f t
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 
si
tu
at
io
n,
 fu
tu
re
 p
la
ns
 a
nd
 th
ei
r e
xp
er
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
in
 S
W
M
. 
M
ee
t i
n 
a 
w
or
ks
ho
p 
on
 so
lid
 w
as
te
 a
rr
an
ge
 b
y 
M
in
is
try
 o
f U
rb
an
 W
or
ks
 a
nd
 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t. 
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 h
ad
 u
se
d 
m
y 
m
as
te
r t
he
si
s a
s a
 b
as
is
 fo
r a
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
on
 so
lid
 w
as
te
 a
nd
 re
cy
cl
in
g 
in
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
. 
G
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
to
 st
ar
t w
ith
 - 
bu
t w
he
n 
th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
 re
al
iz
ed
 I 
ha
d 
no
th
in
g 
to
 g
iv
e 
I g
ot
 th
e 
im
pr
es
si
on
 th
at
 I 
w
as
 n
ot
 o
f a
ny
 in
te
re
st
 a
ny
m
or
e.
W
ub
 c
on
su
lt
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0
In
te
rv
ie
w
s w
ith
 w
ho
le
sa
le
rs
 le
ad
 m
e 
to
 W
ub
 c
on
su
lt.
 T
o 
co
nf
irm
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
gi
ve
n 
to
 m
e 
by
 th
e 
w
ho
le
sa
le
rs
 in
 M
en
al
is
h 
Te
rr
a.
 T
o 
ge
t t
he
ir 
vi
ew
 o
f w
ha
t 
ha
pp
en
d 
in
 th
e 
pl
an
ni
ng
 fo
r a
 L
D
P.
G
ot
 h
is
 n
um
be
r t
hr
ou
gh
 h
ea
d 
of
 p
la
nn
in
g 
de
pa
rtm
en
t a
t A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
 C
ity
 
A
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n.
G
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
 H
e 
to
ok
 h
is
 P
hD
 a
t N
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U
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id
ad
a
2
1
1
Th
e 
ai
m
 o
f t
he
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s h
as
 b
ee
n 
to
 g
ai
n 
m
or
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t h
is
 v
ei
w
 
of
 th
e 
po
lit
ic
al
 si
tu
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
cu
ltu
re
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
ci
ty
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n.
G
ot
 h
is
 n
ub
er
 th
ro
ug
h 
a 
Et
hi
op
ia
n 
fr
ie
nd
 in
 N
or
w
ay
G
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
an
d 
w
e 
ta
lk
ed
 fr
ee
ly
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Pl
as
tic
 U
ni
on
1
1
W
ha
t k
in
d 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
re
 th
ey
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 a
nd
 w
ha
t a
re
 th
ei
r i
nt
er
es
ts
? 
H
ow
 
m
an
y 
pl
as
tic
 fa
ct
or
ie
s a
re
 th
er
e 
in
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
 a
nd
 h
ow
 m
an
y 
m
em
be
rs
 d
o 
th
ey
 h
av
e?
 H
ow
 is
 th
ei
r r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 th
e 
ci
ty
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n?
 
G
ot
 th
e 
co
nt
ac
t n
um
be
r t
hr
ou
gh
 a
n 
et
hi
op
ia
n 
fr
ie
nd
.
G
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
an
d 
w
e 
ta
lk
ed
 fr
ee
ly
. H
ad
 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 a
bo
ut
 g
et
tin
g 
so
m
e 
su
pp
or
t f
ro
m
 m
e 
in
 
te
rm
s o
f c
on
ta
ct
s o
r f
un
di
ng
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Pr
iv
at
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co
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ul
ta
nt
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om
pa
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1
0
Th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s v
ie
w
 o
f S
W
M
 in
 A
dd
is
 A
ba
ba
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
fin
di
ng
s o
f t
he
 
re
se
ar
ch
 h
e 
co
nd
uc
uc
te
d 
on
 so
lid
 w
as
te
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
fo
rm
al
 re
cy
cl
in
g 
sy
st
em
 
an
d 
th
e 
re
as
on
s f
or
 th
is
.
R
ea
d 
a 
ne
w
sp
ap
er
 a
rti
cl
e 
ab
ou
t a
 st
ud
y 
do
ne
 a
nd
 se
ar
ch
 u
p 
th
e 
co
nt
ac
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
ph
on
e 
bo
ok
.
Ta
lk
ed
 fr
ee
ly
 a
nd
 w
e 
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d 
a 
go
od
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
C
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m
be
r o
f C
om
m
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 (M
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1
0
Th
ey
 h
av
e 
be
en
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 a
 re
se
ar
ch
 in
 M
en
al
is
h 
te
rr
a.
 B
ac
kg
ro
un
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 a
im
s, 
go
al
s, 
pr
oc
es
s a
nd
 th
e 
ou
tc
om
e.
 D
o 
th
ey
 
ha
ve
 a
 c
op
y 
of
 th
e 
st
ud
y?
C
on
ta
ct
ed
 th
em
 d
ire
ct
ly
 a
fte
r b
ei
ng
 in
fo
rm
ed
 a
bo
ut
 th
ei
r p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 th
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 b
y 
th
e 
W
ho
le
sa
le
rs
.
G
oo
d 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
 b
ut
 n
on
e 
of
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
em
pl
oy
er
s h
as
 b
ee
n 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
re
as
ea
rc
h 
co
nd
uc
te
d.
 S
ee
m
s l
ik
e 
al
l o
f t
he
m
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
em
pl
oy
ee
d 
re
ce
nt
ly
.
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TZ
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In
te
rv
ie
w
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ith
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ho
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sa
le
rs
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 m
e 
to
 G
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. T
o 
co
nf
irm
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
gi
ve
n 
to
 m
e 
by
 th
e 
w
ho
le
sa
le
rs
 in
 M
en
al
is
h 
Te
rr
a.
 T
o 
ge
t t
he
ir 
vi
ew
 o
f w
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t 
ha
pp
en
d.
W
en
t t
o 
G
TZ
 h
ae
d 
of
fic
e,
 w
as
 to
ld
 to
 o
g 
to
 a
 b
ra
nc
h 
at
 m
in
is
try
 o
f u
rb
an
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t. 
W
as
 th
en
 to
ld
 th
at
 th
e 
pe
op
le
 w
ho
 w
or
ke
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t w
er
e 
go
ne
 a
nd
 th
at
 th
ey
 d
id
 n
ot
 k
no
w
 a
ny
th
in
g 
ab
ou
t t
he
 re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 th
at
 th
ey
 d
id
 n
ot
 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 c
op
y 
of
 it
. W
as
 to
ld
 to
 g
o 
to
 u
rb
an
 p
la
nn
in
g 
ag
en
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 a
t m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
. 
W
he
n 
i a
rr
iv
ed
 th
er
e 
th
ey
 d
id
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
th
e 
re
se
ar
ch
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APPENDIX 9: List of materials prepared by various agencies in Addis Ababa (source: 
reproduced from ILO, 2007 with permission).
LIST OF MATERIALS PREPARED BY EPA AND AACA
No. Title of material Type of 
material
Date of 
publication
Language
1. Development and protection of riversides in 
our city
Brochure 1994 Amharic
2. Solid waste collection and disposal methods Brochure 1994 Amharic
3. Compost, its benefits and preparation Brochure 1994 Amharic
4. Why only in the month of Hidar Brochure Undated Amharic
5. Let us join forces to create pollution free, 
clean and green Addis Ababa the natural 
resources of which are protected
Brochure Undated Amharic
LIST OF MATERIALS PREPARED BY SBPDA AND AACA
1. Let us introduce you SBPDA Brochure 1996 Amharic
2. The role of the community in the creation of 
clean and beautiful Addis Ababa
Brochure 1996 Amharic
3. Waste is resource; let us reuse it Brochure 1996 Amharic
4. Sanitation is both individual and joint 
responsibility
Unknown Undated Unknown
5. If Everyone cleans its neighborhood, our city 
will be clean
Brochure 1996 Amharic
6. Preparation of Compost Brochure 1998 Amharic
7. General awareness about solid waste and 
environmental hygiene for school sanitation 
and beautification clubs
Guideline 1998 Amharic
8. Let sanitation be our culture in the new 
millennium
Brochure 1999 Unknown 
LIST OF MATERIALS PREPARED BY FEDERAL EPA
1. Festal Brochure Undated Amharic
2. Tefetro (Nature) Annual 
magazine
Since 1988 Amharic
LIST OF SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES DONE BY AACA, SBPDA AND EPA
No. Activity Date Language
1. Radio program `qorqoro alleh` 2009 Amharic

